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ABSTRACT 
While much is known about the polarities of the Protestant ‗Church Struggle‘ (Kirchenkampf) 
in Nazi Germany, comparatively little is understood about the complex and collective 
dynamic of the Landesbischöfe of the only three ‗intact‘ churches to escape incorporation into 
the Nazi-dominated Reichskirche. Traditionally, literature on the Kirchenkampf has taken a 
simplistic ‗good-versus-evil‘ approach to the conflict and, arguably inspired by a moral need 
to come to terms with the less-than-glorious past of the German Protestant Church, has been 
unable to locate the Landesbischöfe of the ‗intact‘ churches neatly within the conventional 
historiographical paradigm. 
By taking as its subject Landesbischöfe August Marahrens of Hanover, Hans Meiser of 
Bavaria and Theophil Wurm of Württemberg, this dissertation examines the contribution to 
the Kirchenkampf of three men, who, to ensure the continued existence of German 
Protestantism in the Third Reich, were ultimately forced to find ways to respond to National 
Socialism that lay somewhere between the parameters of defiance and compliance. In order to 
demonstrate the collective contribution of the Landesbischöfe to maintaining the status of the 
German Protestant Church amidst heightening Nazi tyranny, this dissertation traces how, with 
reference to external personal, political and socio-cultural conditions, the bishops moved from 
a seeming commonality of cause to display increasingly varied responses to the 
manifestations of both political and ecclesiastical National Socialism. By tracing the 
development of their moderate but nonetheless disparate positions, this dissertation not only 
questions the traditional historiographical assumptions that Landesbischöfe Marahrens, 
Meiser and Wurm failed to resist National Socialism effectively or were, at best, collectively 
neutral in the conflict, but also seeks to delineate, for the first time, the crucial parts played by 
each of the Landesbischöfe during three distinct stages of the Kirchenkampf. 
In devoting each of its three central chapters to a particular phase in the conflict, this 
dissertation demonstrates how each of the Landesbischöfe in turn steered the ‗intact‘ 
ensemble through the Third Reich as a modest yet effective force of opposition to Nazi 
despotism. Seen as a whole, this investigation ultimately demonstrates how, through their 
respective turns at national Church leadership, Landesbischöfe Marahrens, Meiser and Wurm 
did not undermine the wider Church resistance effort but, rather, saved the Church from 
subjugation to Nazism more effectively than would have been possible had they stood alone. 
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PREFACE 
 
The ‘Intact’ Predicament 
 
Nun machst du abermals einen Einwand: ››Ja, weltliche Gewalt zwingt nicht zum Glauben, sondern verhindert 
nur äußerlich, daß man die Leute nicht mit falscher Lehre verführe. Wie könnte man sonst den Ketzern 
wehren?‹‹ Antwort: Das sollen die Bischöfe tun; denen ist dieses Amt übertragen (Tit I, 9ff), und nicht den 
Fürsten.                
                   (Martin Luther)
2
 
 
In 1523 Martin Luther wrote a text which would henceforth define the role of secular 
authority in Christian eyes, as well as determine Christian responses towards temporal 
demands. Although relatively uncontroversial at the time of publication, the social ethics 
prescribed by Luther‘s Von weltlicher Obrigkeit were to have profound ramifications over 
four hundred years later during the course of the German Kirchenkampf (1933-1945). In the 
face of Adolf Hitler‘s Machtübernahme, those active in the German Protestant Church of the 
time were forced to reconsider Luther‘s sixteenth-century characterisation of the world as 
comprising two parallel and coexistent kingdoms: that of the secular and that of the spiritual. 
As the totalitarian ambitions of Hitler‘s National Socialist (Nazi) dictatorship became 
evermore apparent, Protestant clergymen throughout Germany began to reassess the inter-
relation of his new tyrannical regime with their time-honoured Christian duty to God. In light 
of Luther‘s Zwei-Reiche-Lehre, which rapidly became the locus theologicus for the thinking 
of academics and churchmen alike, questions arose as to whether it was more appropriate to 
view these two parallel modes of governance as existing in an antagonistic rather than a 
complementary relationship as previously thought. When political National Socialism 
(Nazism) began, in particular, to threaten the sanctity of Christian scripture with its own 
pseudo-religiosity, leading figures within the German Protestant Church had no choice but to 
prioritise either their national loyalty or their religious convictions or, indeed, to attempt to 
reconcile the two through a new brand of ecclesiastical Nazism. 
Although many pastors clearly proclaimed themselves either for or against the Nazi 
renewal of the German Protestant Church, it ought to be recognised that not all of the 
interpretations of Luther‘s Zwei-Reiche-Lehre, which arose as a result of this impromptu re-
examination of his theology, were so dualistic in nature. A lesser-acknowledged ‗third way‘3 
                                                          
2
 Luther, 1965, p.44. 
3
 This idea draws on Per Frostin‘s allusion to ―three different attitudes‖, which he describes as having prevailed 
in Nazi Germany in reference to Luther‘s Zwei-Reiche-Lehre (Frostin, 1994, p.8). 
vii 
 
was, in fact, also pursued by those in the so-called Kirchenkampf ‗middle‘, who rejected 
extreme allegiance to either the Church
4
 or the State,
5
 whether this was because they were 
unwilling to polarise themselves in the debate or, indeed, an inevitable result of circumstance. 
Three men who were to find themselves pushed into this middle ground once their regional 
churches (Landeskirchen) were spared seizure by the Nazis, were the Lutheran state bishops 
(Landesbischöfe) of the only ‗intact‘ Landeskirchen - those of Hanover, Bavaria and 
Württemberg.
6
 With the added pressure upon them of the Lutheran teaching that it was the 
specific responsibility of the bishops to thwart heretical doctrine and thereby maintain 
equilibrium between the secular and spiritual kingdoms, it ought to come as no surprise to 
discover that Landesbischöfe August Marahrens, Hans Meiser and Theophil Wurm 
respectively had no choice but to use the complex situation afforded to them by the fact that 
their churches remained ‗intact‘ to uphold the status of institutional Protestantism in Nazi 
Germany. 
                                                          
4
 For clarity, the word ‗Church‘ will be capitalised in this dissertation when it is used to refer to institutional 
Protestantism in Germany in its broadest sense. Un-capitalised uses of the term ‗church‘ will thus be used to 
refer to the constituent Landeskirchen of the wider German Protestant Church. 
5
 In the same way as this dissertation distinguishes between the dual meanings of the term ‗church‘, the word 
‗State‘ will be capitalised throughout this dissertation when referring to the political and territorial entity of 
Germany or, indeed, its instrument of secular governance. This is to avoid confusion with the un-capitalised use 
of the term ‗state‘, which refers to the individual constituent Länder of Germany.  
6
 In keeping with the language of this inquiry, this dissertation shall refer to the regions of Hanover and Bavaria 
using the English spellings. When citing works in German, it will, however, revert to the German terminology of 
Hannover and Bayern. Variations in the spelling of these terms within this investigation are thus intentional and 
ought not to be seen as inconsistencies. 
1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
a) Preliminary Remarks and Research Objectives 
As my preface indicates, this dissertation is concerned with the predicament of the three 
Lutheran Landesbischöfe of Hanover, Bavaria and Württemberg during the Third Reich and 
their distinctive contribution to the Protestant struggle against the demands of the Nazi 
regime. Although much has already been written about this struggle,
7
 this inquiry comes 
about as a result of a desire to uncover and understand the previously neglected and, arguably, 
often undervalued response to National Socialism epitomised by Landesbischöfe August 
Marahrens of Hanover, Hans Meiser of Bavaria and Theophil Wurm of Württemberg, who 
found themselves at the helm of the only three Protestant Landeskirchen in the Third Reich 
not to fall under the control of Nazi authorities. 
To understand thoroughly the origins of the bishops‘ predicament, it should be noted that 
at the start of the Third Reich institutional Protestantism in Germany comprised twenty-eight 
provincial churches, which were loosely united under the umbrella organisation of the 
Deutscher Evangelischer Kirchenbund (DEKB). Having lost their traditional summi episcopi 
with the abdication of the German princes in 1918, the Protestant Landeskirchen had felt 
vulnerable under the various coalition governments of the Weimar Republic and had not only 
provided themselves with individual constitutions but had also established the DEKB as a 
means to enhance their authority against the dominance of liberalism and Roman Catholicism 
under the Republic. When Adolf Hitler and his Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei 
(NSDAP) came to power in January 1933 with a pledge to uphold an undefined form of 
                                                          
7
 Although part b) of this ‗Introduction‘ details the specific titles which have inspired this particular 
investigation, reference ought to be made here to the seminal works on the Protestant Kirchenkampf, which 
range from early theoretical writings dealing solely with the clash of the Nazi and Christian ideologies (cf. 
Duhm, 1934; Gurian, 1936; Duncan-Jones, 1938; Frey, 1938; Bendiscioli; 1939) to retrospective ‗compendious‘ 
studies covering the full twelve years of the conflict (cf. Hermelink, 1950; Zipfel, 1965; Conway, 1968; 
Scholder, 1977, 1985; Helmreich, 1979; Meier, 1976-1984).  During the past sixty years, the Kirchenkampf has 
been, inevitably, covered from a range of different perspectives which include, amongst others, the specific 
contribution to the conflict of: the Bekennende Kirche (cf. G. Niemöller, 1959a&b; W. Niemöller, 1958a, 1960, 
1969; Helmreich, 1970; Besier and Ringshausen, 1986), the Glaubensbewegung Deutscher Christen (cf. Meier, 
1967; Sonne, 1982; Bergen, 1996; Siegele-Wenschkewitz, 1994; Heschel, 2008; Steigmann-Gall, 2003), 
confessional Lutherans (cf. Tiefel, 1972; Green, 2008), conservative elites (cf. Baranowski, 1986; Weiling, 
1998), parish churches (cf. Jantzen, 2008), women in the Church (cf. Thomas, 1995), and also intra-Protestant 
groups such as Methodists or Baptists (cf. Strahm, 1989; Strübind, 1995). More specifically for this 
investigation, regional studies have also been conducted into how the Kirchenkampf played out within the 
Landeskirchen of Hanover (cf. Besier, 1986; Grosse et al., 1996; Lindemann, 1998), Bavaria (cf. Baier, 1968, 
1979, 1999; Baier and Henn, 1969; Kremmel, 1987; Maser, 1990; Mensing, 1998) and Württemberg (cf. 
Hermelink, 1949; Lernser, 1958, Dipper, 1966; Schäfer, 1971-1986). The only official bibliography on the 
history of the Kirchenkampf covers all work published before 1958 (cf. Diehm, 1958) and the only formal 
attempt to categorise the historiographical styles of Kirchenkampf literature remains Conway, 1964. 
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―positives Christentum‖,8 it was thus understandable that the Protestant churches saw in 
Germany‘s new Nazi-dominated government a means to revive the union of ―nation and altar‖ 
of the pre-Weimar years.
9
 However, with the Nazis taking the earliest opportunity to 
subordinate every aspect of German life to their Führer-orientated State, two opposing camps 
emerged within the DEKB: The first of these, known loosely as the ‗German Christian 
Movement‘ or Glaubensbewegung Deutscher Christen (GDC), strove to incorporate Nazi 
principles into the Church,
10
 whilst the other, eventually known as the Confessing Church 
(Bekennende Kirche), sought to reject the heresy of the GDC and foster a national Church 
based solely on the concept of the sola Scriptura.
11
 
As a way of evading conflict as well as political interference in ecclesiastical affairs, a 
three-man committee of non-GDC churchmen took the initiative to devise a constitution for a 
unified Protestant Church in early 1933.
12
 Under Hitler‘s orders, however, prominent GDC 
member Ludwig Müller oversaw the work of the committee,
13
 thereby causing Nazi principles 
to infiltrate into the design for the new national Church, or Reichskirche. Following major 
disagreements between church officials and the Nazi State as to who should head the 
Reichskirche, and subsequent intervention from the State on behalf of the GDC in church 
elections, Ludwig Müller was eventually installed as Reichsbischof of the newly established 
Deutsche Evangelische Kirche (DEK) on 27
th
 September 1933, supported by a national 
Church governing committee of the Deutsche Evangelische Kirchenkanzlei (DEKK), 
comprising largely ‗German Christian‘ clergy.14 
                                                          
8
 Cf. Article 24 of the Party Programme, dated 24
th
 February 1920, in Zipfel, 1965, p.1. For a discussion of the 
many interpretations of ―positives Christentum‖, cf. ‗Positive Christianity or Nazi Cult: The Ideological 
Conflict‘ in Conway, 1968, pp.140-167. 
9
 Tiefel, 1972, p.330. 
10
 It is important to note that the GDC was never a unified movement within the DEKB but, rather, a collection 
of groups advocating differing degrees of radicalism towards the churches‘ assimilation to Nazism. For details 
on the discrepancies and practices within the GDC, cf. ‗Die Deutsche Christen (1931-1933)‘ in Scholder, 1977, 
pp.239-276; Helmreich, 1979, pp.78-81; as well as Sonne, 1982; Bergen, 1996; Heschel, 2008. 
11
 It should be noted that the Bekennende Kirche began life as the Jungreformatorische Bewegung (JB) and the 
Pfarrernotbund (PNB). The ‗Confessing Church‘ was established in the ‗Barmen Declaration‘ of May 1934. For 
details on the theology of the sola Scriptura, cf. Kistler, 1997. 
12
 This committee was known as the Kapler Ausschuss. It was headed by Dr. Hermann Kapler of the United 
Evangelische Kirche des Altpreußischen Unions (EKApU) and included Landesbischof August Marahrens of 
Hanover and Dr. Hermann Hesse as representatives of the Lutheran and Reformed churches respectively (cf. 
Helmreich, 1979, pp.133-135). It should also be noted here that alongside the efforts of the Kapler Ausschuss, 
Landesbischof Hans Meiser of Bavaria had also begun talks to foster a union of specifically Lutheran churches in 
Germany (cf. ibid.) 
13
 For details on the life, work and personality of Müller, cf. Schneider, 1993. 
14
 For in-depth accounts of the beginnings of the Reichskirche, cf. ‗The Seizure of Power‘ in Conway, 1968, 
pp.1-44; ‗Protestantische Kirchenreform‘ in Scholder, 1977, pp.355-387; ‗The Establishment of the German 
Evangelical Church‘ in Helmreich, 1979, pp.133-156. 
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Although institutional Protestantism in Germany may be seen to have taken on its first 
nationalised structure since the Reformation at this point, in truth the Reichskirche was not a 
completely nationalised Church at all. Not only did tensions grow between the intra-Church 
factions of the GDC and the Bekennende Kirche, as the latter quickly established its own rival 
system of Church governance in the form of the first Vorläufige Kirchenleitung (VKL) but, 
more significantly for this investigation, the GDC had also failed to capture the three Lutheran 
Landeskirchen of Hanover, Bavaria and Württemberg. As leaders of the only Protestant 
Landeskirchen to remain free from Nazi domination, the Landesbischöfe of these churches 
found themselves with a freedom that brought with it liabilities as well as advantages. 
As heads of Lutheran Landeskirchen, Landesbischöfe Marahrens, Meiser and Wurm 
already faced a complex predicament of owing loyalty to the secular leadership on the one 
hand, yet being obligated to stand up against it in defence of traditional Christian orthodoxy 
on the other. After finding themselves pushed into the middle ground of the Protestant 
Kirchenkampf as a result of their respective leadership of the so-called ‗intact‘ Landeskirchen, 
the capacity of the three Landesbischöfe to fulfil their dual Lutheran obligations to the State 
was further problematised by the challenging conditions emanating from the Intaktheit of 
their churches, which had collectively come to represent the only section of the German 
Protestant Church truly free from the harmful influence of ‗Nazified‘ Christianity. In line with 
their obligation as bishops to warn against any potential heretical practices of both the Church 
and the State, Marahrens, Meiser and Wurm were thus obligated to find ways to do so which 
would not jeopardise the only remaining undistorted example of institutional Protestantism in 
the Third Reich.   
This investigation is therefore based on the recognition that Landesbischöfe Marahrens, 
Meiser and Wurm were forced to grapple with two distinct forms of Nazism in the Third 
Reich: the political, which was employed by the NSDAP in its escalating policies of violence, 
tyranny and discrimination, and the ecclesiastical, which was practised by the GDC in its 
efforts to incorporate Nazi precepts into the Church. Due to their unspoken responsibility to 
maintain the status of institutional Protestantism in Nazi Germany, then, it must be 
appreciated that the bishops could neither fully embrace the influx of ecclesiastical Nazism 
into the Church nor completely object to developments brought about by political Nazism in 
the wider secular arena. As the histories of the so-called ‗destroyed‘ Landeskirchen already 
show, any attempt to do so would inevitably have put German Protestantism at risk of 
4 
 
complete annihilation by Nazism, as well as provoked revenge attacks from the State.
15
 In 
view of the bishops‘ unique ‗intact‘ predicament, which saw them having to devise ways to 
preserve the essence of German Protestantism within the precarious totalitarian context of the 
Third Reich, this investigation therefore recognises that Marahrens, Meiser and Wurm were 
ultimately forced to position themselves in the Protestant Kirchenkampf somewhere between 
the extremes of direct defiance and complete compliance. 
In its acknowledgement of the fact that Marahrens, Meiser and Wurm were forced to 
respond to the manifestations of both political and ecclesiastical Nazism in a manner quite 
distinct from the rest of the Protestant clergy in the ‗destroyed‘ Landeskirchen, who were 
compelled to choose between the polarities of the pseudo-religious Nazi Weltanschauung and 
the original Christian confessions, this dissertation seeks not only to show how the three 
Landesbischöfe responded to both political and ecclesiastical Nazism between 1933 and 1945, 
but also to explain why they chose the particular responses they did. Without an additional 
focus on the motivations of the three Landesbischöfe, which draws upon circumambient 
developments in their private lives, in their respective Landeskirchen and in the wider 
national political arena, their responses to both manifestations of Nazism risk appearing to 
highlight the personal will of each of the Landesbischöfe and not to reflect the complex web 
of structural obligations and limitations imposed on them by their unique ‗intact‘ predicament.  
Moreover, in recognition of their shared responsibility to preserve not only the Intaktheit 
of their own churches but, by extension, also the sanctity of Protestant Christianity in the 
Third Reich, this dissertation is further concerned with investigating the interdependency 
between the three Landesbischöfe and their mutual reliance upon each other‘s responses to 
Nazism. Despite being theoretically free to govern their own churches as they saw fit, 
Marahrens, Meiser and Wurm nonetheless shared an unwritten, collective aim to resist the 
influx of Nazi policies into their respective churches, since the loss of any one of their 
Landeskirchen threatened to weaken the ability of German Protestantism to withstand 
Nazism. At the same time, however, in order not to endanger the ecclesiastical Intaktheit of 
their churches unnecessarily, the Landesbischöfe needed to mask every effort they made to 
defy Nazism with a simultaneous attempt to pacify Nazi authorities, both within the Church 
and within the State. One of the key findings of this dissertation is that, whilst the bishops 
were obligated to appease proponents of both extreme Christocentrism within the Church and 
                                                          
15
 This claim is best supported by the case of Pastor Julius von Jan of Oberlenningen, who gave a sermon on 16
th
 
November 1938, preaching of the injustice of the Reichskristallnacht. In response to this sermon, he was brutally 
attacked, tortured and imprisoned by the Nazi authorities (cf. Dipper, 1966, p.263; Conway, 1968, pp.375-376). 
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political Nazism within the State, one of the bishops at any one time had to assume the central 
role of a force for moderation within their collective ‗intact‘ dynamic. 
It is by looking at the lives of bishops together in this way and reconciling their 
changeable displays of pro- and anti-Nazi sentiments in connection with their peculiar 
interrelationship that this investigation hopes to provide a new perspective on the bishops‘ 
conduct in the Third Reich. The chapters that follow therefore assess the bishops‘ individual 
contributions to the Protestant Kirchenkampf with reference to the structural requirements of 
their unique ‗intact‘ situation, and aim to demonstrate how the bishops‘ respective responses 
to the manifestations of both political and ecclesiastical Nazism ensured the continuous 
presence of an important, albeit intermediate, strand of resistance in Nazi Germany, which 
was to preserve the essence of German Protestantism through to the end of the Third Reich 
and beyond. 
 
b) Historiographical and Methodological Contexts for Research 
In order to formulate an account of the lives of Landesbischöfe Marahrens, Meiser and Wurm 
in the Third Reich, this dissertation has to grapple with two distinct sets of historiographical 
and methodological concerns: the first of these relates to the narration of Germany‘s Nazi past 
in its widest sense, whilst the other specifically affects the historiography of the Protestant 
Kirchenkampf within this broader context. In order to demonstrate the basis on which this 
dissertation contributes to the particular historiography of the Protestant Church Struggle, 
there follows a description of the two levels of historiography which have shaped the 
investigation. 
 
i) The Historiography of the Third Reich 
As Ian Kershaw remarks in his work on The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of 
Interpretation,
16
 any attempt to write about an aspect of Germany‘s Nazi past must not only 
take account of the polarisation of opinion affecting all areas of historical study as political 
agendas change, new generations emerge, and fresh routes of investigation are explored; it 
must also deal with what he calls ―the inevitable merging of three dimensions‖.17 The first 
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dimension, the ―political-ideological‖, concerns the politicisation of the historiography of the 
Third Reich and the tension between historiographical investigation and political or 
ideological agendas.
18
 The second dimension, the ―moral‖, deals with the trivialisation of the 
darker aspects of Third Reich history and the need to strike a balance between a sympathetic 
understanding of complex historical developments and an acknowledgement of the wider 
brutal historical context.
19
 Finally, the third dimension, the ―historical-philosophical‖, relates 
to differences in historical approach to Germany‘s Nazi past and the requirement to find an 
appropriate perspective between the normalisation and the overt moralisation of the history of 
the Third Reich.
20
 Using Kershaw‘s terminology to distinguish the three dimensions in 
question, I shall now explain how each dimension plays into my particular investigation into 
the lives of Landesbischöfe Marahrens, Meiser and Wurm in the Third Reich, and how this 
dissertation has sought to address the points of contention which these dimensions raise. 
 
The Political-Ideological Dimension 
As the first of the dimensions to be taken from Kershaw, the political-ideological dimension 
of Third Reich historiography relates to the various ways in which political and ideological 
differences shape patterns and practices of writing the history of Germany‘s Nazi past. As 
Kershaw explains, this dimension particularly originated in the conflict of agendas between 
the two Germanies between 1949 and 1989, when historians of the German Democratic 
Republic used the history of the Third Reich to warn against the barbarity of Western 
capitalism, whilst their counterparts in the Federal Republic of Germany employed the Nazi 
past to ward off any recurrence of totalitarianism in the future. Even though these competing 
ideological agendas no longer predominantly influence the historiography of the Third Reich, 
the political-ideological dimension has not ceased to affect historiographical practices in this 
area; only nowadays it tends to manifest itself in the form of philosophical disputes between 
historians of different kinds of liberal-democratic persuasion. Modern-day political-
ideological disputes as to how the history of Nazism should be best narrated thus evaluate 
whether present-day social and political values should influence historical writing or whether 
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historians ought to abandon these tendencies in pursuit of ‗value-free‘ and ‗objective‘ 
historical accounts.
21
 
In its investigation into the lives of Landesbischöfe Marahrens, Meiser and Wurm in the 
Third Reich, then, this dissertation encounters the political-ideological dimension primarily 
because it deals with the highly-politicised legacies of at least one of its subjects, as can be 
illustrated by the recent Meiserstraße disputes throughout Bavaria.
22
 As recently as 2006, 
predominantly left-wing democratic parties in Bavaria began to call for the renaming of 
buildings and streets which had originally been dedicated to Landesbischof Meiser after his 
death to honour his leadership of an ‗intact‘ church.23 To justify these calls, the campaigners 
referred to an essay which Meiser had written in 1926 in response to the request of church 
authorities that he take a position on the so-called ‗Jewish Question‘. In this essay, entitled 
‗Die evangelische Gemeinde und die Judenfrage‘,24 Meiser frequently spoke of Jewish 
members of German society as the ‗others‘ and primarily criticised them for putting 
themselves and the purity of their people first, together with their zeal for making money.
25
 
Even though Meiser penned his words long before the term ―Judenfrage‖ became associated 
with the Nazi death camps, and forgetting the fact that the Nazis in fact persecuted Meiser in 
1934 for the generosity they considered him to have shown toward German Jews in the very 
same essay,
26
 the campaigners ignored the integrationist nature of Meiser‘s message, which 
encouraged the assimilation of Jewish people into German society, and instead interpreted it 
as being in line with the ‗exclusionist-expulsionist‘ anti-Semitism of the Nazis,27 branding 
Meiser a ―Nazi-Bischof‖, ―ein glühender, unverbesserlicher, bekennender Antisemit‖ and ―ein 
geistiger Wegbereiter des Holocausts‖.28 
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As the recent politicisation of Meiser‘s personal history demonstrates, then, any attempt 
to foreground the efforts of him and his counterparts in the ‗intact‘ churches to protect 
German Protestantism has come to be associated with the agenda of the democratic right, 
whilst any attempt to foreground their alleged affinity to Nazi policies of discrimination 
relates to the agenda of the democratic left. Since these different social and political agendas 
have been shown to have a profound influence on the way in which the lives of the bishops 
are perceived, this investigation must necessarily take into account the political-ideological 
perspectives of both sides in its quest for objectivity. It is therefore to be expected that this 
dissertation will elicit political-ideological judgements from its readers as it seeks to bring out 
those efforts of the bishops which helped to defy Nazi hegemony as well as identify those 
which could be seen to be complicit in wider Nazi crimes against humanity. For this reason, I 
find it necessary to clarify in the next section the moral dimension of Third Reich 
historiography, which concentrates specifically on the need to contextualise individual 
narratives of achievement with reference to the darkest aspects of Germany‘s Nazi past, and 
explain how this dimension plays into this particular inquiry. 
 
The Moral Dimension 
Nazi Germany will forever be remembered as a regime of terror that brought about the 
Second World War and carried out the systematic murder of millions throughout Europe. Any 
historiographical attempt to reach a sympathetic understanding of the lives of subjects 
operating within the Third Reich is therefore inherently problematic. As Ian Kershaw details, 
in the immediate post-war era it was customary for historians to make explicit their revulsion 
towards the barbarism of Nazism. As time progressed, however, historians began to depart 
from the indignation and blanket condemnation of these early historiographies and turned, 
instead, to formulating historical accounts which empathised with those members and sections 
of German society who lived and functioned ‗normally‘ in the Third Reich. As a result of its 
turn away from the moral content of Nazism, this historical writing has in turn come under 
criticism from historians such as Karl Dietrich Bracher and Klaus Hildebrand for 
downplaying and even trivialising the brutal reality of Germany‘s Nazi past.29 The charge of 
trivialisation stresses the importance of ensuring that accounts which seek to reach a 
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sympathetic understanding of certain historical phenomena within the Third Reich do not, by 
consequence, underestimate the totalitarian dimension of Nazism and ignore its inherent 
savagery.   
There is indeed a risk that this dissertation, in its effort to understand the actions of the 
Landesbischöfe of the ‗intact‘ churches between 1933 and 1945 and to demonstrate the 
interdependency between the three men, might appear to trivialise Nazi brutality: after all, 
Landesbischöfe Marahrens, Meiser and Wurm neither did anything tangible to stop Nazi 
crimes against humanity nor, with the exception of Landesbischof Wurm in the latter years of 
the Third Reich, did they even formulate clear positions towards the Nazis‘ rapidly escalating 
persecution of the Jews. It must be borne in mind, however, that it is difficult to comment on 
the bishops‘ true attitudes toward Nazi anti-Semitic policies due to a lack of documentary 
sources – a result of both the bishops‘ fear of State reprisals and the peculiar nature of their 
situation, which caused them to view Nazi violence as peripheral to their immediate aim of 
protecting the autonomy of German Protestantism.
30
 It is for this reason that the only section 
of this dissertation to deal explicitly with the bishops‘ responses to Nazi terror covers the 
years 1939 to 1945: this is the period when documentary evidence shows that one or more of 
the Landesbischöfe were compelled to take position openly on Nazi atrocities. 
Since Nazi policies of persecution and discrimination are known to have escalated rapidly 
from 1933 onwards, however, it is important that the structure and design of this dissertation 
does not overlook the relative silence of Landesbischöfe Marahrens, Meiser and Wurm on the 
subject of Nazi anti-Semitism and injustice in the period prior to 1939. For this reason, the 
first two chapters of this dissertation acknowledge the wider context of Nazi brutality in 
which the Protestant struggle played out and make reference to those acts of Nazi violence 
which the bishops failed to condemn or prevent. In doing so, it is hoped that this dissertation 
will be seen as having heeded the warnings of historians such as Bracher and Hildebrand 
against trivialising Nazi brutality and will not be viewed as presenting an account of the 
bishops‘ lives which risks over-glorifying their particular contribution to the historical 
development of Nazi Germany or even acting as an apology for the bishops‘ own ‗blinkered‘ 
vision of their rightful function in the Third Reich. The historical-philosophical dimension of 
Third Reich historiography, which deals with the ways in which different historical methods 
either normalise or moralise Germany‘s Nazi past, also addresses the concern for the 
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trivialisation of Nazi barbarity. I have therefore chosen to discuss the impact of the historical-
philosophical dimension on this investigation in the next section. 
 
The Historical-Philosophical Dimension 
In addition to the political-ideological and moral concerns which surround the historiography 
of the Third Reich, Ian Kershaw also acknowledges that any attempt to recount an aspect of 
Germany‘s Nazi past must also reconcile differences of opinion between competing schools 
of historical-philosophical approaches. On a basic level, this involves squaring the tradition 
that puts a heavy emphasis on both the uniqueness of Nazi Germany as a historical 
phenomenon and the importance of individual – and primarily Hitler‘s – will in determining 
its outcome, with a more recent social history approach. This seeks both to integrate the 
history of the Third Reich into the wider pattern of Germany‘s past and to attribute its 
historical development to continuities or changes emanating from existing social structures.
31
 
Most notably, these differences of opinion were played out in the so-called ‗historicisation‘ 
debate of the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
In short, the ‗historicisation‘ debate began when German social historian Martin Broszat 
revolutionised the way in which the history of the Third Reich had previously been narrated. 
Through his work on the so-called ‗Bavaria Project‘, Broszat focused on retelling the history 
of ‗everyday life‘ (Alltagsgeschichte) in Nazi Germany in the hope of creating a more 
nuanced understanding of the relationship between the Nazi regime and the society it 
attempted to control. In examining the various ‗conflict spheres‘ which emerged between the 
Nazi rulers and pre-existing sections of German society, Broszat most notably introduced the 
concept of Resistenz into the historiography of the Third Reich to describe partial opposition 
to Nazi hegemony, as opposed to Widerstand which categorised resistance efforts that were 
intended to thwart Nazism in its entirety. Although Broszat fully acknowledged that, on the 
whole, ‗functional‘ Resistenz was incapable of preventing the realisation of the wider Nazi 
aims of war and genocide, he nonetheless recognised its ability to prevent Nazism‘s claim to 
total power, regardless of the motives or intentions behind it.
32
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In a chain of correspondence addressed directly to Broszat,
33
 however, Israeli historian 
Saul Friedländer voiced concern that Broszat‘s efforts to ‗historicise‘ Germany‘s Nazi past 
ran the risk of overlooking the most brutal aspects of Nazi history and were thrusting toward 
―some kind of overall relativisation of the moral problems specifically raised by Nazism‖.34 
The historical-philosophical differences between Broszat and Friedländer, then, are clearly 
located in their respective treatment of those social institutions and agents which operated 
within the conventional parameters of defiance and compliance in the Third Reich. While 
Broszat used these case histories to demonstrate how they served to maintain old German 
traditions, to the extent that he interpreted their supposed non-participation as a form of 
rebellion, Friedländer drew on the very same subjects to exemplify how, conversely, their 
passivity to Nazi policies served to stabilise the Nazi system. Whilst Broszat‘s approach to the 
historiography of Germany‘s Nazi past obviously allows for attention to be paid to the much-
neglected actions of ―those personalities who cannot readily be categorised as belonging 
either to the regime or the opposition‖,35 Friedländer‘s critique of Broszat‘s methods 
nonetheless reinforces the importance of maintaining a continual awareness of the moral 
dimension of Third Reich history, particularly to avoid overlooking and offending the victims 
of Nazi Germany‘s horrific crimes and to prevent them from becoming, in Friedländer‘s own 
words, ―a static and abstract element of the historical background‖ to the Third Reich.36 
To the extent that it focuses on the social continuity of German Protestantism in the Third 
Reich and the particular Resistenz displayed by the Landesbischöfe of the ‗intact‘ churches to 
maintain this, this dissertation clearly draws upon Martin Broszat‘s methodological approach 
to the history of Nazi Germany. However, in doing so, it does not lose sight of the criticisms 
which this approach has provoked. In adopting social history methods in this dissertation, I, 
like Broszat, do not intend for this methodology to imply ―any softening of the political-moral 
judgment on the unjust character of the Nazi regime‖.37 In fact, by explicitly recognising at 
the outset that the Resistenz displayed by the Landesbischöfe of the ‗intact‘ churches did not 
prevent the NSDAP from carrying out its definitive aims of expansion and mass murder 
across Europe, I hope to have provided this dissertation with a different trajectory from that 
which is traditionally associated with the conventional concept of Widerstand and the 
question of whether the bishops‘ resistance efforts might have hindered Nazi Germany from 
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engaging in war and genocide. Instead, by focusing my investigation on the specific struggle 
for the control of the Protestant Church in the Third Reich, and examining the extent to which 
the Landesbischöfe of the ‗intact‘ churches were able to fend off the Nazi domination of 
German Protestantism with Resistenz, I intend for this dissertation to demonstrate how the 
actions of the Landesbischöfe during the Third Reich had a limiting effect on the reach of 
Nazism into the Church only, and thus successfully contributed to preventing the totality 
claim of the Nazi regime over the original Protestant confessions. In order to address as best 
possible potential concerns regarding the normalisation and trivialisation of the darker aspects 
of Third Reich history, however, and to go some way to achieving the ―synthesis of polarised 
interpretations‖ surrounding Germany‘s Nazi past called for by Kershaw,38 the historical 
significance of both the bishops‘ Resistenz and the preservation of ‗intact‘ Protestantism in the 
Third Reich is kept in check throughout this investigation by a consistent acknowledgement 
of the moral dimension of wider Nazi history. 
 
ii) The Historiography of the Protestant Kirchenkampf 
The existing historiographical literature on the Protestant Kirchenkampf can be seen to uphold 
one of two contrasting positions regarding the significance of the actions of Landesbischöfe 
Marahrens, Meiser and Wurm in the Third Reich. On the one hand, until now, generalised 
historical accounts of the Kirchenkampf have tended to downplay the collective contribution 
of the three Landesbischöfe, either in favour of the more spectacular modes of resistance to 
Nazism offered by radical members of the Bekennende Kirche,
39
 or to exemplify them as 
typical Church agents who did ―too little, too late and for the wrong reasons‖.40 On the other 
hand, (auto-)biographical accounts, which deal with the life and work of any one of the three 
bishops, have thus far failed to offer anything other than hagiographical narratives which, in 
their endeavour to establish a positive legacy for their chosen individual protagonist, 
continually focus on his respective successes whilst excluding or, at best, excusing his 
obvious errors. 
Similarly, it may be said of the newest contribution to Kirchenkampf literature which 
specifically focuses on the response to Nazism of confessional Lutherans - namely Lowell C. 
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Green‘s Lutherans Against Hitler: The Untold Story41 - that, while it constitutes the first 
attempt to evaluate the collective contribution to the Protestant Kirchenkampf of the ‗intact‘ 
churches, it nevertheless remains biased in its focus only on their displays of resistance which 
were clearly inspired by Lutheran logic and its underlying intention to undermine the 
confessional scruples of the ‗Dahlemites‘. As the opening to this dissertation suggests, 
however, my investigation seeks to offer a more ―balanced‖ account of the contribution to the 
Protestant struggle of the three Landesbischöfe, chiefly by placing itself between the 
polemical narratives of existing historiographies, which either condemn the bishops for their 
moments of seeming compliance or eulogise them for their most prominent displays of 
defiance. Thus, in order to establish the need for the balanced narrative that this dissertation 
seeks to provide, there now follows an analysis of the texts on the Protestant Kirchenkampf 
which best represent each polemical position that this dissertation intends to re-visit and 
correct. 
 
The Historical-Philosophical Bias 
The first way in which the lives of Landesbischöfe Marahrens, Meiser and Wurm in the Third 
Reich have been previously interpreted relates directly to the wider ‗historicisation‘ debate 
and is best demonstrated by reference to overarching historiographical accounts of the 
Protestant Kirchenkampf, which have attempted to fit the contribution of the three bishops to 
the development of the Church Struggle within narratives that were ultimately designed to 
prove that the German Protestant Church actively resisted Nazism in its widest sense, both 
inside and outside its traditional ecclesiastical confines. Due to the initiatives of Martin 
Niemöller to establish the first Church resistance movement,
42
 the ability of Karl Barth to re-
interpret Christian scripture to formulate the anti-Nazi Barmer Theologische Erklärung
43
 and, 
of course, the involvement of Dietrich Bonhoeffer in the well-known 1944 assassination 
                                                          
41
 St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 2007. 
42
 Namely the PNB. For details cf. W. Niemöller, 1958b; and ‗The Establishment of the Pastors‘ Emergency 
League‘ in Helmreich, 1979, pp.146-148. 
43
 Considered to be the most explicit declaration of Church resistance to the Nazi State, the ‗Barmen Declaration‘ 
rejects the intrusion of earthly principles into the sacred space of the Christian Church. For details of its 
construction, cf. G. Niemöller, 1959a, 1959b; Locke, 1984; Scholder, 1985. For the theses of the ‗Barmen 
Declaration‘, cf. the official website of the Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland (EKD) at:  
http://www.ekd.de/bekenntnisse/142.html (last accessed: 04/06/2010). 
14 
 
attempt on Hitler,
44
 it is the actions of Niemöller, Barth and Bonhoeffer which came to 
dominate early interpretations of the Protestant Kirchenkampf. 
The most notable examples of such historiographies are contained within the Arbeiten zur 
Geschichte des Kirchenkampfes (AzGK) series,
45
 which was originally a product of the 
Kommission für die Geschichte des Kirchenkampfes in der nationalsozialistichen Zeit (KGK), 
founded in 1955 specifically to give voice to the contribution to the Church Struggle of 
―viel[e] unmittelbar Beteiligter‖.46 Although it remains the largest compendium of works on 
the Kirchenkampf to date, which covers studies of national Confessing Church synods
47
 as 
well as more regional-specific inquiries,
48
 not a single title from the AzGK series specifically 
documents the unique predicament of the bishops of the ‗intact‘ Landeskirchen, either 
individually or collectively. Moreover, with eight of the titles from the series having been 
written by Gerhard and Wilhelm Niemöller, the brothers of the Confessing Church leader 
Martin Niemöller, the partiality of the series towards the more obvious resistance efforts of 
the Church against the immorality of Nazism is only to be expected. 
It is nonetheless important to recognise that such partisanship to the ‗Dahlemitic‘ cause is 
not just typical of German-language titles of the early post-war era, whose inherent bias could 
at least be explained by the efforts of KGK historians to rebuild the morality of their shattered 
nation and its Church.
49
 Victoria Barnett‘s more recent English-language study, entitled For 
the Soul of the People: Protestant Protest Against Hitler,
50
 also seeks to expose the 
contribution of the German Protestant Church to the wider anti-Nazi resistance movement in 
Germany and, in doing so, is ultimately forced to concede the supremacy of the status 
confessionis of Bonhoeffer, which led to ―a basic commitment to political activism‖.51 
Although Barnett acknowledges the individual contributions of Landesbischöfe Marahrens, 
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Meiser and Wurm to the Church Struggle within their ―cautious course‖ in the Church 
middle,
52
 the underlying intention of her narrative to portray the Church as a legitimate 
instrument of resistance to the barbarity of the Third Reich meant that the bishops‘ own 
Resistenz efforts were always going to be overshadowed by the Widerstand of the more 
radical ‗Dahlemites‘. Furthermore, by posing the rhetorical question as to ―what early, public 
resistance by men of Meiser‘s and Wurm‘s stature might have achieved‖,53 Barnett‘s study 
leaves the final contribution of the Landesbischöfe to the wider resistance efforts of the 
Protestant Church shrouded in an air of unmistakable inadequacy. 
It is such acknowledgements of the bishops‘ comparative failure to act more convincingly 
in the face of Nazi atrocities that have led to a second wave of historiographies which 
completely overlook the Resistenz efforts of clergymen to protect the Christian confessions 
and seek, instead, to demonstrate the decisive failure of German Protestantism to act as an 
effective force of Widerstand against Nazi brutality. The most striking example of such a 
work is Wolfgang Gerlach‘s And the Witnesses Were Silent: The Confessing Church and the 
Persecution of the Jews.
54
 In his aim to demonstrate that the Church remained inactive in the 
face of Nazi crimes, Gerlach makes use of the structural limitations of Landesbischöfe 
Marahrens, Meiser and Wurm to portray them as having been concerned purely with 
preserving calm within Church circles,
55
 and to have done nothing more than to object to the 
ideological encroachment of the State into the realm of ecclesiastical affairs.
56
 By 
emphasising, for example, that Marahrens ―continued to praise the Führer for his constructive 
work‖ whilst many were being sent to their deaths in Nazi extermination camps,57 Gerlach 
makes no attempt to understand the full array of structural constraints upon Marahrens during 
the latter stages of the Protestant Kirchenkampf, or even acknowledge the subtle benefits of 
Marahrens‘ continual appeasement of the Nazi State for the work of those better positioned to 
act, like his counterpart Theophil Wurm as this dissertation will show. Although Gerlach does 
raise the possibility that Wurm‘s own praise for the Nazi State and inclusion of anti-Semitic 
remarks may have been ―a strategic benevolent gesture, to preserve the Christians and their 
church from the flames of terror‖,58 by infusing his narrative with continual references to the 
number of lives that were lost during the deliberations of the Landesbischöfe, Gerlach 
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ultimately renders it impossible for his readers to see anything positive in the bishops‘ 
moderate Resistenz. 
As the works of Wolfgang Gerlach and Victoria Barnett jointly show, then, a 
historiographical approach which emphasises that German Protestantism either actively 
resisted or failed to oppose the scourge of Nazism provides an inadequate framework in 
which to portray the restricted contribution to the Kirchenkampf of Landesbischöfe 
Marahrens, Meiser and Wurm. On the one hand, studies such as that of Gerlach draw on the 
bishops‘ moments of ambivalence to Nazi anti-Semitism and violence to create a negative 
perception of the conduct of German Protestants in the Third Reich. On the other hand, 
although works such as that of Barnett recognise the bishops‘ Resistenz, they nevertheless 
cannot avoid comparing their moderate Kirchenkampf activities with the more direct displays 
of Widerstand emanating from the ‗Dahlemitic‘ strand of the Bekennende Kirche. Since both 
approaches take too little account of the bishops‘ specific Kirchenkampf predicament, this 
dissertation seeks rather to assess the bishops‘ apparently vacillating responses to Nazism 
with a view to understanding what motivated their alternating displays of modest defiance and 
reasonable compliance.  
 
The (Auto-)Biographical Bias 
Arguably arising out of an attempt to correct the less-than-glorious portrayals of the three 
Landesbischöfe in Kirchenkampf historiographies with clearly weighted historical-
philosophical persuasions, biographical and autobiographical accounts of the bishops‘ lives in 
the Third Reich have also been published. These accounts document the personal contribution 
of the individual bishops to the Protestant struggle, both on the level of their respective 
Landeskirchen and also with regard to the wider national arena of the Protestant 
Kirchenkampf. Conceived with the express intention both to amend ―falsche Perspektive‖59 
and to respond to the derogatory ―Vorwürfe‖ of the bishops‘ critics,60 these particular 
accounts of the bishops‘ lives in Nazi Germany are intrinsically predisposed to selecting and 
highlighting those aspects of their careers which best display their ‗Confessing‘ credentials. 
Although the majority of these narratives are biographical in nature, having been written by 
dedicated scholars,
61
 contemporaries
62
 or even relatives
63
 of the individual bishops, Theophil 
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Wurm‘s own post-war memoirs can also be seen to display the same bias, since he gave as his 
motive for writing his own life story a desire that his particular interpretation of history be not 
forgotten.
64
 
Despite being the most impartial example of (auto-)biographical literature on the three 
bishops, Eberhard Klügel‘s Die Lutherische Landeskirche Hannovers und Ihr Bischof 1933-
1945,
65
 which is supported by a supplementary volume of Dokumente,
66
 nonetheless reveals 
its inherent selectivity when failing to address Marahrens‘ controversial utterances regarding 
racial discrimination against the Jews.
67
 By disregarding important and widely-accessible 
documentary material which shows Marahrens to have considered the matter a purely secular 
affair and not an immediate concern of the Church, Klügel manifestly undermines his own 
declared intention to produce an objective ―mit Dokumentation verbundene Darstellung der 
hannoverschen Landeskirche im Kirchenkampf‖.68 
At the other end of the spectrum to Klügel‘s intensive academic study, however, sits 
Hans Christian Meiser‘s Der Gekreuzigte Bischof: Kirche, Drittes Reich und Gegenwart. Eine 
Spurensuche.
69
 Having been written by the grandson of Landesbischof Meiser in response to 
recent claims that his grandfather was a pronounced anti-Semite who therefore does not 
deserve to have streets named after him throughout Bavaria,
70
 Der Gekreuzigte Bischof does 
not hide its intrinsic partiality. From his initial insinuation that any disparaging attacks on the 
legacy of Meiser are, by extension, also assaults on his own integrity,
71
 H. C. Meiser leaves 
no doubt that his publication is intended to combat the claims of all those who seek to 
undermine the reputation of his family‘s name. Presented in a judicial fashion, H. C. Meiser‘s 
work forcefully defends Landesbischof Meiser‘s actions in Nazi Germany against the claims 
of his critics.
72
 Moreover, through his inclusion of original documentation which pits the 
NSDAP‘s denunciation of Meiser against evidence of the protest writings of Meiser and his 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
62
 Cf. Schmidt-Clausen, 1989. He claims he spent ―fast ein halbes Jahr lang in enger Tischgemeinschaft‖ with 
Marahrens whilst at university (p.7). 
63
 Cf. H. C. Meiser, 2008, written by Hans Meiser‘s grandson. 
64
 Wurm, 1953, p.8. 
65
 Berlin and Hamburg: Lutherisches Verlagshaus, 1964. 
66
 Berlin and Hamburg: Lutherisches Verlagshaus, 1965. 
67
 This sentiment is corroborated in Gerlach, 2000, p.127, who confirms that Wilhelm Niemöller has also 
criticised Klügel‘s work for its omissions in ‗Corrigenda zur neusten Kirchengeschichte‘, in Evangelische 
Theologie, 28 (1968), pp.594-95. 
68
 Klügel, 1964, p.ix. 
69
 München: München Verlag, 2008. 
70
 See the description of the Meiserstraße controversy on p.7 of this dissertation. 
71
 H. C. Meiser, 2008, pp.5-6. 
72
 Cf. ‗Die Vorwürfe und ihre Entgegnung‘, in ibid., pp.48-66. 
18 
 
Württembergian colleague Wurm, thereby portraying Meiser as a clear opponent to Nazism,
73
 
H. C. Meiser uses the moral dimension of Third Reich history to his own advantage and 
reaffirms the function of his book as being purely to portray the positive about his 
grandfather. 
Despite the various degrees of bias inherent in biographical accounts, as exemplified by 
those of Klügel and H. C. Meiser, it should be noted that other works on the Landesbischöfe, 
which may not necessarily be biographical in character, display a similar penchant for 
projecting an overly positive image of the bishops. Examples to note in this context are Hans 
Meiser‘s Kirche, Kampf und Christusglaube: Anfechtungen und Antworten eines 
Lutheraners
74
 which, while presenting Meiser‘s actual sermons, first had its contents selected 
by Meiser‘s relatives and then displayed in such a way as to present a particularly positive 
vision of their ancestor. Similarly, Gerhard Schäfer‘s Landesbischof D. Wurm und der 
nationalsozialistische Staat 1940-1945: eine Dokumentation
75
 portrays Wurm as standing ―an 
der Spitze‖ of the German Church.76 Despite containing a wealth of invaluable documentary 
sources on Wurm‘s contribution to the Protestant Kirchenkampf, the publication concentrates 
solely on Wurm‘s most pronounced stage of resistance to Nazi crimes between 1940 and 
1945, and avoids mentioning his earlier ambivalent attitude to Nazi anti-Semitism, which 
Schäfer alludes to only in passing.
77
 
Although the above books are only a handful of examples of the (auto-)biographical 
literature that has been produced to date on the individual bishops,
78
 their intrinsic favouritism 
towards their protagonists nonetheless highlights the need for an account of the bishops‘ lives 
in the Third Reich which is influenced neither by a personal need to reformulate opinions on a 
close relative nor by a professional desire to revise the legacy of a representative of a 
particular German region and its associated sense of provincial identity. In this context, it 
should also be noted that not a single biographical work specifically dedicated to the lives of 
the individual bishops has yet been produced by a non-German, thus further highlighting the 
necessity for the impartiality which this dissertation seeks to provide, as well as exposing an 
obvious gap in English-language literature on the Protestant Kirchenkampf. 
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The Confessional Bias 
In addition to broad Kirchenkampf historiographies and narrower (auto-)biographical accounts 
of the lives of the three Landesbischöfe in the Third Reich, a further strand of 
historiographical writing has emerged, which has seen scholars begin to investigate in more 
detail the complex predicament of the so-called Church ‗middle‘.79 Particularly relevant for 
this investigation is the historiographical focus on the response to Nazism of confessional 
Lutherans, which was first conducted by Hans Tiefel in his 1972 journal article, ‗The German 
Lutheran Church and the Rise of National Socialism‘.80 In recognising the specific 
predicament of confessional Lutherans in the Third Reich as being caught somewhere 
between ―a temptation and a crisis‖,81 Tiefel observed that the response of confessional 
Lutherans to the manifestations of both political and ecclesiastical Nazism was restricted by 
varied sentiments of ―nationalism and conservatism, coupled with a predisposition to 
obedience to the state‖, all of which were ―further accentuated by traditional pietism‖.82 Tiefel 
twice mentions the actions of Hanoverian Landesbischof Marahrens in Nazi Germany, calling 
them ―a [...] sample of the Lutheran chorus supporting Hitler‖,83 as well as a demonstration of 
how Lutheran theology prohibited its adherents from making ―any politically critical 
judgements in the name of Christ‖.84 
Despite Tiefel‘s valuable insights into the theological quandary of prominent 
confessional Lutherans, however, his findings remain limited in their applicability, since the 
subjects of his inquiry were either obligated to strictly employ Lutheran logic in the Church 
like Marahrens, or were academics of the ‗Erlangen School‘ of theology which was 
considered to be representative of the staunchest Lutheran position in Nazi Germany.
85
 
Tiefel‘s failure to account for the more relaxed demonstrations of confessional Lutheranism 
of Landesbischof Wurm, for example, ultimately renders his study a purely theoretical 
reflection on the attitudes of confessional Lutherans rather than a convincing qualitative 
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analysis of the drastically disparate Lutheran predicaments represented by the ‗intact‘ and the 
‗destroyed‘ Landeskirchen alike.    
Virtually taking over from where Tiefel left off thirty years previously, Lowell C. 
Green‘s Lutherans Against Hitler: The Untold Story86 represents the first attempt to apply 
Tiefel‘s findings to a wider spectrum of confessional Lutherans, which includes all three 
bishops of the ‗intact‘ Landeskirchen87 as well as representatives of the ‗Erlangen School‘ of 
Lutheran theology.
88
 Contrary to Tiefel, however, who did not hesitate to highlight the 
readiness of confessional Lutherans to support Nazism alongside their displays of moderate 
theological resistance, Green‘s study focuses solely on the contribution of confessional 
Lutherans to the resistance and conciliation efforts of the wider Protestant Church. Likely as a 
result of his express intention to respond to ―the denunciations by those living in an easy post-
Hitler era who were scolding those who did their best in dark and cloudy times‖,89 Green 
continually intersperses his narrative with declarations of the supremacy of confessional 
Lutheranism
90
 and jibes at the other Reformed and United Protestant confessions.
91
 
Moreover, Green‘s distinct preference for confessional Lutheranism92 compels him to 
give account only of the bishops‘ clearest displays of defiance which were firmly grounded in 
Lutheran principles. As such, his entire narrative on the three bishops focuses exclusively on 
their respective struggles to keep the manifestation of ecclesiastical Nazism out of their three 
Landeskirchen.
93
 Most strikingly, Green devotes the largest section of his narrative to the 
staunchest confessional Lutheran of the three men, Meiser, whilst only attributing three pages 
of his book to the Kirchenkampf activities of Wurm. Whereas Wurm is usually the only one of 
the three bishops to be acknowledged for his eventual displays of unequivocal resistance as a 
result of his later protestations to the Nazi State against its persecution of the Jews,
94
 Green 
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downplays Wurm‘s more heroic moments and remarks that ―Confessional Lutherans found 
Wurm‘s unionistic tendencies regrettable‖.95 Thus, even though Lowell C. Green may have 
taken the important step of recognising the Landesbischöfe of the ‗intact‘ churches as having 
collectively represented a ―bulwark and an emblem of hope for people in the destroyed 
churches‖,96 he does so at the cost of overlooking their individual responses to Nazism which 
were either too closely associated with displays of compliance or could be seen to have 
emanated from a theological awareness outside the constraints of confessional Lutheranism. 
As a result of the studies of Tiefel and Green, then, any overt incorporation of the 
confessional bias into accounts of the lives of the three Landesbischöfe in Nazi Germany can 
be seen to be just as constraining to the bishops‘ legacies as the historical-philosophical bias 
of broader Kirchenkampf works and the (auto-)biographical bias of individual inquiries. What 
this overview of existing literature on the bishops of the ‗intact‘ churches has hopefully done, 
therefore, is demonstrate that their particular response to Nazism requires investigation not 
only by a non-partisan author, but also by one who is willing and able to investigate equally 
the influence of personal, socio-cultural, geo-political and religious factors on the bishops‘ 
eventual contribution to the Kirchenkampf, and successfully weigh up their eventual intra-
Church Resistenz against their lack of wider Widerstand against Nazi atrocities.  
 
c) Relevance and Intended Contribution 
In order to make clear the relevance of this particular investigation for the field of 
Kirchenkampf historiography in particular, it is ultimately important to demonstrate how this 
dissertation intends to redress the legacies which the above narratorial tendencies have created 
for Landesbischöfe Marahrens, Meiser and Wurm. Taken collectively, there can be no doubt 
that existing historiographical works, which have used the Landesbischöfe either to prove or 
to disprove the mobilisation of the wider German Protestant Church against the violence of 
the Third Reich, have resulted in a shared legacy for the three men which renders their 
Kirchenkampf efforts insignificant. Having been shown to lack both the theological rationale 
and moral understanding of the ‗Dahlemites‘ and to have remained relatively silent about the 
plight of the Jews in Nazi Germany, the bishops‘ lives during the Third Reich have been left 
with an air of unmistakable inconsistency. 
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Despite challenging the view established by broad historiographies, principally by 
exposing the individual sentiments behind the bishops‘ collective activities, the (auto-) 
biographical bias in Kirchenkampf literature on the three bishops has nonetheless led to 
considerable discrepancies between the bishops‘ collective and personal legacies. In the case 
of Marahrens, readers are left to correlate the positive image of the Landesbischof conjured up 
by the biographies of Walter Ködderitz, Eberhard Klügel and Kurt Schmidt-Clausen with the 
findings of investigations like that of Wolfgang Gerlach, which portray Marahrens as a pro-
Nazi who was ultimately reluctant to help the Jews.
97
 Similarly, readers of H. C. Meiser‘s 
claims that his grandfather helped to save the lives of ―mindestens 126 Menschen 
nichtarischer Abstammung‖98 will be at a loss to reconcile this with Wolfgang Gerlach‘s 
declaration that Meiser ―never made a statement about the Jewish question during the Third 
Reich‖.99 Finally, readers of Wurm‘s letters of protest against the Nazi euthanasia programme 
and the Holocaust during the latter years of the Protestant Kirchenkampf, detailed in Gerhard 
Schäfer‘s Dokumentation,100 will have difficulty connecting these heroic acts to Wurm‘s 
earlier anti-Semitic statements outlined by Wolfgang Gerlach.
101
 The positive biographies of 
Wurm also create a further problem for unsuspecting readers, who have to reconcile his 
eventual acts of resistance with the knowledge that Wurm nonetheless remained a man of the 
Church ―middle‖102 and not a ‗Dahlemite‘ of the ilk of Bonhoeffer, Niemöller and Barth. 
In short, as a result of these contradictory interpretations of the bishops‘ lives, two clearly 
established views have come to exist about the three men: the collective and the individual. 
Collectively, the Landesbischöfe have been left with an unfavourable legacy, which is critical 
of their unwillingness and inability to do more against Nazi violence and anti-Semitism. 
Individually, however, (auto-)biographical historiographies have done much to correct the 
legacy of Wurm in particular, who has inevitably come to be known as the most heroic of the 
three Landesbischöfe, owing to the wealth of documentary sources available on him that 
testify to his eventual protestations against Nazi atrocities. The legacy of Marahrens, 
conversely, has fared less well, with Marahrens‘ tendency to mollify the Nazi State and 
express anti-Semitic sentiments having been further highlighted by studies devoted 
specifically to exposing his pro-Nazi credentials.
103
 Somewhere in the middle of the 
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commendable individual legacy of Wurm and the lamentable personal legacy of Marahrens, 
however, lies that of Meiser, who has been scorned for his anti-Semitic remarks in the 
Weimar years, yet praised for his co-founding of the Confessing Church, his steadfast 
Lutheran scruples, and his ‗underground‘ efforts to save the lives of Jewish members of his 
Landeskirche. The disunity behind the bishops‘ initially presumed unanimity within the 
Church ‗middle‘ has thus been thoroughly exposed. 
Although the confessional bias in existing literature on the Landesbischöfe seems to have 
done much to re-establish a connection between the individual legacies of the three bishops, 
which goes further than merely recognising them as part of the Church ‗middle‘, it has thus 
far worked on the assumption that all of the bishops translated their Lutheran confession into 
Kirchenkampf action in the same way. Through their consistent focus on the staunch 
Lutheranism of the ‗Erlangen School‘, the narratives of both Hans Tiefel and Lowell C. Green 
have, in fact, left no room to explain Wurm‘s more flexible Lutheranism and, as a result, have 
ended up either downplaying his more courageous protests against Nazi brutality or 
dismissing him entirely from their accounts. Thus, despite their efforts to narrate the lives of 
the Landesbischöfe in Nazi Germany as a collective, such confessional narratives have only 
ended up shattering the unity which they originally sought to convey and, more significantly, 
dispelling the idea that the bishops ever worked as a coherent group. 
This dissertation, by contrast, seeks to overcome the singular focus of existing 
historiographies and provide a much-needed integrative narrative on the bishops‘ lives in the 
Third Reich. It aims, therefore, to bridge the bishops‘ incongruous personal and collective 
legacies by demonstrating how their individual actions impacted upon their shared ‗intact‘ 
dynamic. In order not to produce an explicit hagiography for the bishops, however, this 
dissertation attempts to balance their ecclesiastical successes with their general failure to 
effect substantial change on wider Nazi policies of violence. 
 
d) Structure and Approach 
In line with the above explanation of the aims and intended contribution of this dissertation to 
Kirchenkampf historiography, my investigation has been conducted in such a way so as to 
make best use of available source material, and executed and structured in a way that not only 
befits the three subjects of this inquiry but also the three distinct stages of the Protestant 
Kirchenkampf in which each of the bishops in turn can be seen to have assumed leadership 
24 
 
over their peculiar ‗intact‘ dynamic. In order to justify the operational approach of this 
investigation, there now follows an explanation of both the sources and the format used in the 
dissertation to make a case for the bishops‘ significant contribution to the historical 
development of the Protestant Kirchenkampf. 
   
i) Sources 
In writing this dissertation, I not only had to regard the strikingly divergent concerns of the 
different historical ‗schools‘ as to how the history of Germany‘s Nazi past should be best 
narrated, but I also had to address problems arising from the inadequacy of available source 
material. Although the central chapters of this dissertation draw predominantly upon primary 
documentation consulted in archival collections, it must be borne in mind that, due to the 
climate of fear induced by intense Gestapo surveillance, critiques and criticisms of the Nazi 
regime are scarcely found amongst the documentation of the churches from the Third Reich. 
Further to this, many sources relating to Landesbischöfe Marahrens and Meiser in particular 
have also been lost or remain inaccessible. 
In the case of Marahrens, the majority of his personal documents were destroyed during 
the Allied bombing raids on Hanover, meaning that the only surviving source material to give 
insight into the bishop‘s position is his official correspondence in the form of Wochenbriefe to 
his Landeskirche, held in the Landeskirchliches Archiv Hannover (LKAH), as well as official 
records relating to his various executive roles in the first VKL, the Lutherrat and the eventual 
Geistlicher Vertrauensrat, housed in the Evangelisches Zentralarchiv (EZA) in Berlin. Even 
though the personal Nachlass of Meiser fared better and survived the destruction of the 
Second World War, access to its contents remains strictly controlled today by Meiser‘s 
family. Since I was ultimately unable to gain permission to inspect Meiser‘s private 
documentation, as I could not promise to use the materials in such a way as to project a purely 
positive image of the Landesbischof, I was once again forced to base my interpretation of 
Meiser‘s place in the Protestant Kirchenkampf on the public holdings of both the EZA and the 
Landeskirchliches Archiv der Evangelisch-Lutherischen Kirche in Bayern (LKAB), based in 
Nuremberg. 
Compensating only slightly for the deficiency of sources relating to Marahrens and 
Meiser is the comparative wealth of surviving material on the life and work of 
Württembergian Landesbischof Wurm in the Third Reich. Since the holdings of the 
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Landeskirchliches Archiv Stuttgart (LKAS) include copies of Wurm‘s personal writings as 
well as private correspondence with his counterparts in Hanover and Bavaria, such sources at 
least offered further indications of the positions held by Marahrens and Meiser during 
Germany‘s Nazi dictatorship. Further to this, I was also able to draw on existing publications 
of primary sources on all three of the Landesbischöfe, such as those collections of documents 
edited by Eberhard Klügel, Fritz and Gertrude Meiser, and Gerhard Schäfer respectively.
104
 
 
ii) Chapter Outline 
In order to construct a narrative for Landesbischöfe Marahrens, Meiser and Wurm, which 
deals with both their individual and their collective responses to Nazism, as well as their 
respective successes and failures in preventing Nazi hegemony, this dissertation advances its 
argument over the course of three distinct chronological stages. I have chosen this tripartite 
chapter structure specifically to reflect the configurations in the bishops‘ shared ‗intact‘ 
dynamic that were characteristic of each stage of the Protestant Kirchenkampf. For this 
reason, the chapters of this dissertation take their titles from the shifting patterns in the 
bishops‘ unique alliance and do not conform to milestone events in the history of the 
Confessing Church.
105
  
Despite dealing with different stages of the Protestant Kirchenkampf, however, each 
chapter in this dissertation is structured around the same fundamental questions. The first of 
these asks how the Kirchenkampf affected the lives of the three bishops during the specific 
timeframe being discussed, and the answers to this are hopefully made clear by the sub-
headings of each chapter. These sub-headings have been designed to display the chief 
concerns of the bishops during each period and to allow for a discussion of their individual 
positions toward each topic or event. This approach has been primarily inspired by Hans 
Otte‘s call for historiographies of the Kirchenkampf to incorporate and develop ―konkrete 
Forschungsthemen‖, from which it is possible to paint ―ein zutreffenderes Bild vom 
Verhältnis der Landeskirche[n] zum Nationalsozialismus‖.106 To enhance this picture of the 
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bishops‘ lives in Nazi Germany even further, then, the second question asks to what extent the 
positions of the Landesbischöfe with regard to the individual ―Forschungsthemen‖ of this 
inquiry were influenced by the various levels of church administration on which they 
operated. Each chapter therefore takes account of regional administration (including local 
Nazis as well as regional GDC and ‗Confessing‘ clergy), national governance (including the 
Reichskirche leadership, the Confessing Front, the national Lutheran community and the Nazi 
government) and, finally, international administration (including the wider ecumenical and 
political arenas), in order to expose how the bishops personally juggled the demands of 
various Church factions with a range of regional, national and international expectations. It is 
only once the precise mediating roles of each of the Landesbischöfe have been exposed in this 
way that the summaries at the end of each chapter can finally ask, and subsequently 
demonstrate, how the attempts made by the Landesbischöfe to reconcile their individual 
multilateral concerns specifically served to protect the ‗intact‘ Protestantism that they were 
collectively obliged to defend. 
It is also worth noting at this point that, in order to display consistency between the 
findings of each chapter and the overarching structure of the argument, this dissertation tends 
to analyse, where possible, the Hanoverian predicament first, the Bavarian situation second, 
and the Württembergian condition third.
107
 This sequence should not, therefore, be seen as 
either reflecting the respective importance of each Landeskirche or, indeed, the personal 
preferences of the author. 
Since the beginning of this ‗Introduction‘ has already provided necessary historical 
contextualisation for this investigation, which is sufficient to explain both the origins of the 
Protestant Kirchenkampf and the particular ‗starting positions‘ of the three bishops at the 
beginning of the Third Reich, the first of these central chapters focuses immediately on ‗The 
Marahrens Years‘ of 1933 to 1935. It demonstrates that Marahrens‘ prominent status in the 
alternative national Church administration initially served to confer an air of defiance on the 
‗intact‘ dynamic, albeit of a moderate variety. While the first two sections of this chapter 
establish the contradictory nature of the bishops‘ responses to the manifestations of both 
political and ecclesiastical Nazism, the final section of the chapter, which focuses on the 
bishops‘ responses to the intra-Church opposition movement of the Bekennende Kirche, is 
nonetheless designed to demonstrate how the bishops‘ collective membership of the outlawed 
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Church government under Marahrens‘ headship served to establish them as opponents to the 
encroachment of Nazism into the Church.  
The second chapter concentrates on ‗The Meiser Years‘ of 1935 to 1939 and it details 
how Meiser assumed necessary leadership over the ‗intact‘ dynamic from Marahrens once the 
years of staatliche Kirchenpolitik set in. In recognition of the structural interplay between the 
development of Meiser‘s lutherischer Flügel and the advances in staatliche Kirchenpolitik in 
this period, the first two sections of this chapter detail how the ‗intact‘ dynamic and the Nazi 
State actively engaged with each other, before an intensification of State measures caused the 
bishops to seek refuge in Meiser‘s lutherischer Flügel and revert to passivity instead, as the 
final section of the chapter explains. 
Finally, the third chapter is designed not only to show how Wurm took over the reins of 
the ‗intact‘ dynamic from Meiser during the Second World War, rendering ‗The Wurm Years‘ 
of 1939 to 1945 firmly his own, but also to trace to their peak the underlying tendencies in the 
trajectory of the three bishops, originally established in the earlier chapters. The intention 
behind Chapter Three, then, is not only to show Wurm‘s eventual headship of the ‗intact‘ 
dynamic as the logical corollary of his underlying tendencies during the first two stages of the 
Protestant Kirchenkampf but also to show the decline from prominence of Marahrens and 
Meiser to be an inevitable consequence of their parallel leadership roles in the national 
Protestant and specifically Lutheran Churches. 
Although each of the three chapters of this dissertation could theoretically be developed 
into self-sufficient monographs to demonstrate the significance of each individual 
Landesbischof in each period, the content of each chapter is nonetheless linked together 
throughout by continual references to the development of wider Third Reich history, as well 
as by an overarching desire to weave the findings of the three chapters together to form one 
expansive narrative that details how the bishops‘ respective turns at leadership worked in 
harmony to preserve the status of institutional Protestantism in Nazi Germany. The 
‗Conclusion‘ to this dissertation hopefully brings the strands of the three chapters together and 
makes these interconnections clear. A concluding reflection on the historical significance of 
the bishops‘ efforts to preserve the Protestant Church in Nazi Germany in relation to the wider 
context of war and genocide in the Third Reich should, however, serve to relativise the 
bishops‘ contribution to the development of Germany‘s Nazi past as well as explain their 
eventual ambiguous ‗end positions‘, placed firmly between the polarities of defiance and 
compliance. 
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Finally, this dissertation closes with a brief ‗Epilogue‘ devoted to the post-war careers of 
the Landesbischöfe. Although its content admittedly falls outside the chronological remit of 
this investigation, the ‗Epilogue‘ is intended to indicate the role the bishops played in the 
post-war history of institutional Protestantism in Germany and to provoke thought on how 
they were viewed and treated during the closing years of their lives.  
 
e) A Note on Confessional Lutheranism 
Since this dissertation is predominantly concerned with the Landesbischöfe of the specifically 
Lutheran churches of Hanover, Bavaria and Württemberg, its central chapters frequently 
allude to the notion of confessional Lutheranism and associated Lutheran logic. However, 
primarily because this investigation has arisen as a result of a desire to revisit and correct 
historiographical accounts of the bishops‘ legacies, and is not concerned with the theological 
justification for their actions, it should be emphasised from the outset that any reference to the 
term ‗confessional Lutheranism‘ in this inquiry is used purely to denote the bishops‘ 
collective adherence to the basic principles of Lutheran theology as outlined below. Even 
though the following explanation of the central principles of Lutheran theology provides only 
a basic introduction to confessional Lutheranism, it is nonetheless sufficient for the 
parameters of this inquiry. 
To begin, therefore, it is important to recognise that Lutheran theology rests upon a series 
of seemingly inconsistent dualities, three of which are relevant for the purposes of this 
dissertation.
108
 The first and most fundamental of these dualities is referred to as the ‗Dual 
Revelation of the Law and the Gospel‘, which dictates that God reveals his presence to us on 
earth via two parallel systems, namely that of the Law (which functions to reveal the 
corruption of human nature and discloses divine punishment) and that of the Gospel (which 
serves to provide forgiveness for violations of the Law for those who believe in God‘s 
mercy).
109
 The applicability of this teaching to the Nazi context of this investigation can be 
seen on two levels: Firstly, an acknowledgement of the Law as a means of God‘s Revelation 
meant that confessional Lutherans were more likely than exponents of Reformed and United 
Protestantism to support unquestioningly the policies and punishments emanating from the 
Nazi State. Secondly, even once the injustices of the State had become clear, a supreme belief 
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in receiving redemption from God for having lived knowingly under the immoral principles of 
Nazi Law nonetheless prevented many confessional Lutherans from attempting to resist Nazi 
policies and put at risk their jobs, communities and even lives. 
It is upon the ‗Dual Revelation of the Law and the Gospel‘ that the most crucial Lutheran 
teaching for this investigation builds, namely that of the Zwei-Reiche-Lehre. Just as Luther 
believed God to have revealed Himself through the Law and the Gospel, so too did he believe 
that God ruled the world via two separate realms, or kingdoms. As well as perceiving God to 
rule directly over the spiritual kingdom through Christ and through the Gospel, Luther also 
wrote that God ruled the secular kingdom indirectly through the State and through the Law. 
Adhering, in effect, to ―a fused paradox‖,110 confessional Lutherans have traditionally come to 
view the secular and the spiritual kingdoms as mutually reinforcing, whereby the secular 
realm serves the spiritual realm through the promotion of peace and justice and, in turn, the 
spiritual realm serves the secular realm by providing it with a Christian basis for its Law and 
Order. However, due to Luther‘s original instruction that neither realm should be seen to 
encroach on the other, even though both realms remain mutually reinforcing, confessional 
Lutherans have developed a tendency both to object to the State‘s encroachment into the 
spiritual affairs of the Church and to refrain from comment on the political affairs of the State. 
Translating this into the specific context of Nazi Germany used in this investigation, then, the 
Lutheran doctrine of the Zwei-Reiche-Lehre can be used to explain the paradoxical propensity 
of confessional Lutherans for supporting political Nazism yet simultaneously rejecting 
ecclesiastical Nazism. This has often proved a point of contention in interpreting the 
responses to Nazism that are characteristic of the Lutheran bishops. 
Finally, the last Lutheran teaching which needs to be understood for the context of this 
investigation is his doctrine of the Orders of Creation, which distinguishes between the 
absolute power of God and the ordained power of God; the former is transmitted via the Spirit 
of God and the latter is implemented via His people, whom He created and thereby 
empowered.
111
 Translating this into the modern world, then, Lutheran teaching tells us that 
God‘s ordained power can be seen to be displayed through both the clergy and the 
government, the first of which have been appointed to spread His spiritual Word and the latter 
to enforce His secular Order. Putting this belief into play in the specific context of the Third 
Reich, it should be easier to understand why confessional Lutherans in Nazi Germany were 
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reluctant to criticise the national leadership which they saw as carrying out God‘s secular rule. 
Moreover, this particular doctrine of the Orders of Creation also explains why Hitler and the 
NSDAP were ultimately able to play on the Christian conscience and almost claim to be 
legitimately fulfilling the work of God.
112
 
In summary, then, whenever reference is made to the Lutheran credentials of the three 
bishops or, indeed, to the Lutheran logic behind their respective responses to Nazism in the 
central chapters of this dissertation, this inquiry is bringing into play one or all of the three 
central Lutheran teachings outlined above. 
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CHAPTER ONE – 1933-1935: THE MARAHRENS YEARS 
 
Since the origins of the Protestant struggle in the Third Reich have already been outlined in 
the ‗Introduction‘ to this dissertation,113 this chapter focuses on how the struggle specifically 
developed for the Landesbischöfe of the ‗intact‘ churches from 1933 until July 1935. After 
that point the temperament of the conflict altered dramatically when the Protestant churches 
began to cooperate with the Nazi State via church committees, as Chapter Two will discuss. 
As the structure of this chapter is designed to demonstrate, however, the initial years of the 
Protestant struggle were dominated by the ambiguity of the NSDAP‘s position toward 
German Protestantism and the subsequent attempts of the GDC to translate the supposed will 
of the Nazi State into the ecclesiastical policies of the Reichskirche. 
Although the NSDAP had not formulated a clear policy toward German Protestantism at 
the beginning of the Third Reich, it was already resolute in its decision to persecute and 
discriminate against Jewish citizens and other selected minorities under its jurisdiction. Not 
only did the NSDAP open its first concentration camp in Dachau as early as 22
nd
 March 1933 
in an effort to sanitise German communities from beggars, criminals, and the homeless but, 
from April 1933, it incrementally began to incorporate into its laws a so-called ‗Aryan 
Paragraph‘ which forced the exclusion of Jews from various areas of German society. By the 
beginning of 1935, the Nazis had stripped the Jews of their rights to own land, to participate 
in the Arts and to serve in the military or as editors of public newspapers.
114
 With the Nazis 
widely implementing the ‗Aryan Paragraph‘ to prevent German Jews from holding prominent 
positions in the workplace or from becoming members of cultural or social establishments, it 
was unsurprising that the GDC sought to enact the same racial laws within the Church in an 
effort to appease Germany‘s secular leaders. At the synod of the EKApU, held on 5th and 6th 
September 1933 in Berlin, the GDC therefore enacted the so-called Arierparagraph into the 
legislation of the DEK in an attempt to exclude all ‗non-Aryans‘ or those married to ‗non-
Aryans‘ from the service of the Protestant Church.115 
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In spite of the fact that the NSDAP never explicitly ordered the GDC-led Reichskirche to 
implement racial laws into the DEK during the early years of the Third Reich, it nonetheless 
assisted the GDC in its nationalistic and anti-Semitic design for the Reichskirche. Most 
notably, the Nazi government appointed August Jäger as Rechtswalter of the DEK in July 
1933, and in addition to immobilising ‗Confessing‘ candidates during the Reichskirche 
elections of the same month, a year later he set about putting pressure on the ‗intact‘ churches 
of Hanover, Bavaria and Württemberg to assimilate into the DEK. For Landesbischöfe 
Marahrens, Meiser and Wurm in particular, then, the boundaries between the political Nazism 
of the NSDAP and the ecclesiastical Nazism of the GDC became increasingly more blurred as 
the State revealed its support for ‗German Christian‘ ambitions to oust them from office. 
Although the intra-church resistance movements had been steadily attracting new 
members during first year of the Third Reich as a growing number of clergymen took 
aversion either to the heresy of the GDC or to the intrusion of the Nazi regime into Church 
affairs, it was not until Landesbischöfe Meiser and Wurm jointly proclaimed the formation of 
the Bekennende Kirche from Ulm Münster on 22
nd
 April 1934 that a credible alternative to the 
leadership of Reichsbischof Müller and the DEKK emerged. Equipped with its first VKL led 
by Landesbischof Marahrens, the Bekennende Kirche strove to find ways to combat the 
encroachment of Nazism into the Church. With Landesbischöfe Marahrens, Meiser and Wurm 
all proving instrumental to the establishment and administration of the Bekennende Kirche in 
the early years of the Third Reich, this chapter seeks to explain the bishops‘ eventual turn 
toward an early policy of defiance by first clarifying their positions toward the NSDAP and 
the GDC. In this way it should become clear that, due to his steadfast aversion to Nazism 
within the Church and his executive positions on both the Kapler Ausschuss and the first 
VKL, August Marahrens of Hanover steered the ‗intact‘ dynamic which he shared with 
Meiser and Wurm onto an initial course of Resistenz to Nazi hegemony. 
In order to lay the foundations for this discussion, it should also be noted that in this 
period, whilst the Landesbischöfe of the ‗intact‘ churches were busy establishing their 
opposition to Nazism in the Church, Landesbischof Hans Meiser of Bavaria was also 
preoccupied with attempts to foster closer union between the German Lutheran 
Landeskirchen. In addition to summoning together Lutheran leaders throughout the DEKB on 
14
th
 May 1933 in the hope of devising a constitution for a national Protestant Church based 
specifically on confessional Lutheranism, Meiser also established the Lutherischer Rat on 25
th
 
August 1934 as a means to ensure Lutheran opinions were not overpowered by the 
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‗Dahlemitic‘ strand of the Bekennende Kirche. Having become increasingly more convinced 
of the power of confessional Lutheranism to defy the ecclesiastical Nazism of the GDC and 
thus foster an alternative church union, Meiser subsequently encouraged the formation of the 
Lutherischer Pakt on 12
th
 February 1935 as a means to establish consistency between the 
legislation and the administration of the three ‗intact‘ Landeskirchen. Further to this, he also 
actively promoted the Lutherischer Tag that took place in Hanover between 2
nd
 and 5
th
 July 
1935 and was intended to strengthen Lutheran identity through its resemblance to a mass 
rally. It is therefore against this backdrop of ongoing Lutheran unification efforts amidst 
intensifying policies of racial discrimination from the NSDAP that this chapter commences its 
investigation into the lives of Landesbischöfe Marahrens, Meiser and Wurm during what it 
presents as the ‗Marahrens Years‘. 
 
The Landesbischöfe and the National Socialist State 
No attempt to analyse the conduct of Landesbischöfe Marahrens, Meiser and Wurm in the 
Third Reich could effectively begin without an investigation into how each of the bishops 
regarded Germany‘s new Nazi government and its hyper-nationalist Weltanschauung. For the 
context of this chapter in particular, it is important to continue to regard the political Nazism 
of the NSDAP and the heretical, ecclesiastical Nazism of the GDC as two distinct entities, not 
only because ‗German Christianity‘ was never endorsed as the official Party religion,116 but 
primarily since Landesbischöfe Marahrens, Meiser and Wurm generally welcomed 
Germany‘s new secular regime during the early months of the Third Reich and recognised the 
benefits that it brought to the social standing of their churches. For this reason, the bishops 
were only openly concerned about the escalation of Nazism within the Church in this period. 
The bishops‘ partial opposition to Nazism already leaves their integrity open to question, but 
their position is further problematised by the fact that the NSDAP had begun translating its 
anti-Semitic manifesto into concrete policies of racial discrimination as early as July 1933,
117
 
sweeping away the influence of Christian morality in Germany at large and replacing it with 
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pseudo-scientific principles of eugenics. Since they tended to support political Nazism in as 
far as it was beneficial to the status of German Protestantism, yet failed to speak out against 
the NSDAP when it threatened to destroy fundamental Christian ethics outside the Church, 
the attitudes of the Landesbischöfe to the NSDAP stand in urgent need of clarification. By 
investigating the hazy positions of Landesbischöfe Marahrens, Meiser and Wurm with regard 
to the wider political backdrop of Nazism in Germany, then, this sub-chapter seeks to 
demystify the ambiguity behind the bishops‘ responses to the NSDAP with reference to both 
their own personal predicaments and the distinctive socio-cultural contexts of their respective 
Landeskirchen. 
To begin, it should be noted that the Evangelisch-Lutherische Landeskirche Hannovers 
(ELLKH) served a predominantly industrial workforce, which had been so deeply affected by 
the Great Depression of the Weimar years that its voters turned to the NSDAP in their masses 
in 1933 in hope of economic reform. Prior to this, Hanover had been a stronghold of the left-
wing Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) but, as electoral results show, the 
NSDAP first began to attract votes from the conservative-national parties in the area in the 
late 1920s, before also winning industrial workers round to its tenuous form of specifically 
‗German Socialism‘ in the early 1930s.118 It was thus against this backdrop of dramatic 
political change that August Friedrich Karl Marahrens was appointed first Landesbischof of 
the ELLKH in 1925. Reflecting upon the specific demographics of his Landeskirche in 1934, 
Marahrens explained, ―Wer mein Haus kennt, weiß, daß nicht nur die Jugend meines Hauses, 
sondern auch die Eltern dieser Jugend längst vor dem Januar 1933 das nationalsozialistische 
Gedankengut vertreten haben‖.119 As well as drawing attention to the general enthusiasm of 
Hanoverians for Nazism, Marahrens‘ words, which conjure up an image of a cohesive 
religious community, also characterise his own position in relation to that community. As part 
of the ecclesiastical ‗house‘ of which he speaks, it can reasonably be inferred that Marahrens 
too counted himself amongst the adherents to Nazi ideology in his Landeskirche. Adding to 
this the assertion of Hanoverian historian Hans Otte that Marahrens was an explicit product of 
his time, who belonged firmly to a ―Generation, die den Aufstieg des Deutschen Reichs 
miterlebt hatte‖,120 it becomes apparent that Marahrens was deeply influenced by the 
particular Nazi Zeitgeist which had overcome the economic crisis and the supposed ills of the 
Weimar period. If we recognise Marahrens as part of the cohort of Germans who had 
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ultimately welcomed and enthusiastically contributed to the coming to power of the NSDAP, 
then, it becomes understandable that Marahrens, particularly as a self-proclaimed 
―schwerblütiger Niedersachse‖,121 shared in the ardour for political Nazism in a region in 
which the NSDAP received far more votes than the national average.
122
 
In addition to his regional and generational reasons for welcoming the onset of Nazism in 
Germany, Marahrens was also indebted to the Nazis for contributing to the revival of 
community in his Landeskirche. The NSDAP had, after all, particularly reinvigorated church 
life for Lutheran Landeskirchen, since it repeatedly manipulated the image of ―Luther the 
German‖ in its early propaganda. This had the effect that Lutheranism suddenly appeared to 
many to be the ‗true‘ German confession.123 For this reason, the early years of the Third Reich 
saw a dramatic increase in church attendance and activity. This, together with the Nazis‘ 
emphasis on a ―Gemeinschaftsideologie‖,124 had the effect that the churches suddenly found 
themselves back in their traditional position as the focal point of German communities.
125
 The 
religious renaissance of the early years of the Third Reich had particular benefits for the 
predominantly working-class ELLKH, since the religious facade of the NSDAP managed to 
inspire previously agnostic Hanoverians to become regular churchgoers.
126
 Moreover, the 
ELLKH had long sought ways to differentiate itself from its Reformed counterpart in the 
region, namely the Evangelisch-reformierte Kirche der Provinz Hannover,
127
 so the Nazis‘ 
distinct preference for the Lutheran tradition only enhanced the ELLKH‘s deep-rooted sense 
of separatism and boosted its claim to confessional superiority over its Reformed and United 
neighbours.
128
 In view of these dramatic changes to the societal standing of the ELLKH, 
therefore, it is apparent that Marahrens carried with him a great sense of gratitude to the 
NSDAP for the elevated status of his Landeskirche and its associated confessional identity in 
the early years of the Third Reich. 
Beyond this, the onset of political Nazism in Germany had additional benefits for 
Marahrens‘ Landeskirche, particularly when it began to obliterate the political-ideological 
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forces of liberalism and communism that threatened to undermine the hold of the church 
within the region. Marahrens himself confirmed that the pastorate of his ELLKH had long 
been engaged in the fight against ―Freidenkertum und Bolschewismus‖,129 which were 
particular concerns in areas of northern Germany like Hanover. Despite having come under 
the control of the NSDAP in 1933, these areas still had strong undercurrents of support for the 
political Left and were particularly susceptible to radical revolutionism.
130
 Marahrens 
therefore had reason to be grateful to the NSDAP for enticing his parishioners away from 
these traditionally unchristian forces and eventually freeing his Landeskirche from its 
ideological enemies.  
Moreover, with the NSDAP repeatedly declaring itself the secular protector of God‘s 
Germanic Volkstum and Vaterland, and continually appealing to Christian customs and 
traditions, particularly during the first eight weeks of its leadership,
131
 Marahrens found that 
the political agenda of the Nazis seemed to complement his own ecclesiastical mission to 
preserve the traditional character of the society he served. Although the concepts of Blut und 
Boden quickly came to be associated with the racial and eugenic diatribe of the Nazis, it must 
be remembered that before they were appropriated by the NSDAP for its own pseudo-
scientific mythology they were in fact ―positive natural values‖ in Lutheran theology.132 On 
10
th
 February 1934, amidst confusion concerning how best to deal with the intrusion of 
Nazism into the Church, Marahrens released a statement to the ELLKH in which he 
proclaimed that, ―Meine Arbeit soll wie bisher unter dem Leitwort stehen: für Kirche und 
Volkstum im Dritten Reich‖.133 In light of the original Lutheran origins of Marahrens‘ motto, 
therefore, it can be appreciated that his initial reluctance to alter his ecclesiastical methods 
was because he viewed the missions of his Landeskirche and the NSDAP as forming two 
sides of the same coin. It is also in this context that we should consider Marahrens‘ decision 
to display loyalty and appreciation to the NSDAP during the initial years of the Third Reich, 
including his adoption of the Nazi salutation ―Heil Hitler!‖134  
Finally, it should be borne in mind that, as the leader of a highly Lutheran Landeskirche, 
Marahrens was obligated under the central Lutheran doctrine of the Zwei-Reiche-Lehre to 
                                                          
129
 Letter from Marahrens to his Amtsbrüder, 17/09/1934 [Tagebuch Nr .4502], LKAH, HI 611, Nr.14. 
130
  For example, as the electoral results in Hanover of 1933 show, although the NSDAP received 48.8 per cent 
of the vote, the SPD still obtained 23.1 per cent, and the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD) 4.8 per 
cent of the vote (cf. Schröder, 2008b).. 
131
 Scholder, 1977, p.280. 
132
 Tiefel, 1972, p.327. 
133
 ‗Rundschreiben‘, 10/02/1934 [Nr. 830], LKAH, HII, 122A, Nr.9-11. 
134
 Cf. Letter from Marahrens, 13/07/1934, LKAH, HII 121, Nr.93-96. 
37 
 
respect and honour the secular government. Providing insight into the specific nature of his 
commitment to the NSDAP is Marahrens‘ belief that, ―Die uns gesetzte Obrigkeit ist 
Ordnung, unter der wir stehen mit unserem Leben. In diese Ordnung müssen wir hinein, da 
müssen wir uns einfügen‖.135 Marahrens‘ words show that he did not revere the NSDAP 
purely because it practised a form of political order with which he could associate, but rather 
because his Lutheran scruples called on him to accept and to serve the secular government of 
his nation irrespective of its political orientation. Marahrens himself employed this very 
Lutheran logic when justifying his right to continue to govern the ‗intact‘ ELLKH in 1934. 
His Lutheran obligation to serve the secular leadership provided him with a rhetorical means 
to indicate that he supported the rule of the NSDAP, but without declaring open allegiance to 
the politics it practised. In an address at Whitsun, Marahrens therefore stated that, 
Immer war es mein ehrliches Bemühen, in dem mir anvertrauten Amt unserem Volk und seinem Führer 
zu dienen und mit dem der Kirche gegebenen Worte für Glück und Wohlfahrt meines Vaterlandes zu 
arbeiten.
136 
Acknowledging Marahrens‘ strong sense of Lutheran obligation to serve the secular 
authorities, however, also calls into question his expressions of loyalty and dedication to the 
Nazi State since, under the Zwei-Reiche-Lehre, Marahrens was called to accept and to serve 
Germany‘s governmental leaders yet not to comment openly on political matters. Adding to 
this the particular tradition of his ELLKH, which was ―betont unpolitisch‖137 and had long 
prohibited its Pfarrerschaft from displaying allegiance to any political party for fear of 
diminishing trust amongst the electorate and undermining its intention to serve the entire 
Hanoverian community,
138
 it becomes clear that external pressures were at play in prompting 
Marahrens to abandon the practice of political neutrality that he had upheld without fail since 
assuming office as Landesbischof in 1925. 
In view of Marahrens‘ previous reticence on political affairs in Germany, it can be 
asserted that it was the circumstances of 1933 that prompted him to refer to political 
developments more openly at the start of the Third Reich. In this respect, it must be 
appreciated that Marahrens‘ expressions of loyalty to the Nazi State were not simple 
reflections of his own political preferences but, rather, a result of a strategic endeavour to 
appease his pastorate and parishioners. Since the NSDAP had come by now to appeal to all 
levels of society in Hanover, it must be accepted that Marahrens only stood to gain from any 
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demonstrations of political allegiance which showed him to be in line with those of the people 
he served. This, together with the desire of Protestant clergymen to curry favour with the 
NSDAP at the very start of the Third Reich in the hope of achieving closer cooperation 
between the Church and the State,
139
 can be seen to have led Marahrens to relax his policy of 
silence towards political developments. 
Moreover, once the brutal nature of Germany‘s new Nazi government became apparent 
and a failure to be seen to be willing to participate in its specific Volksgemeinschaft risked 
reprisals and even a loss of authority, the nature of Marahrens‘ expressions of loyalty to the 
NSDAP changed significantly. From this point onwards, it must be appreciated that he needed 
to maintain a certain degree of cordiality with the Nazi State in order to protect his bishopric 
from undue pressure. The need to defend his Landeskirche with an outward appearance of 
being willing to embrace Nazism became all the more immediate once the GDC assumed 
leadership over the Reichskirche and the ELLKH was at risk of forcible assimilation into the 
DEK at any time. This risk was especially high due to the position of the ELLKH amidst the 
Nazi heartlands. In order to divert suspicion away from his desire to continue to keep the 
‗intact‘ ELLKH independent of the Reichskirche, then, Marahrens was ultimately obligated to 
demonstrate to Nazi agents that he was not an adversary of Nazism per se. As Matthew 
Hockenos explains, Marahrens‘ support for the NSDAP may well have been more restrained 
than that of the GDC in this period but his ―political quietism was no less political‖.140 
Marahrens therefore acted in full awareness of his responsibility as a Landesbischof of an 
‗intact‘ church to employ any measure necessary to ensure the survival of the original 
Protestant confessions, even if this appears in retrospect to align him with Nazi policies of 
discrimination in the wider secular arena. 
In the same way as Marahrens initially had many personal reasons to welcome the onset 
of Nazism in Germany, Landesbischof Hans Meiser of Bavaria also had much to be thankful 
to the NSDAP for. Since his own instatement as Landesbischof of the Evangelisch-
Lutherische Kirche in Bayern rechts des Rheins (ELKB) came about on 4
th
 May 1933 as a 
result of his predecessor Friedrich Veit‘s dual disenchantment with the policies of both the 
NSDAP and the GDC, Meiser owed his recent personal advancements within the ranks of the 
ELKB completely to the onset of Nazism and its early interference in church affairs. Not only 
did Meiser‘s readiness to assume leadership of the ELKB after the NSDAP had already come 
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to power demonstrate that he was not averse to the idea of working under the Nazi regime, but 
the fact that he was also known to be ―[p]olitisch national und konservativ eingestellt‖ at 
heart
141
 suggests that his preferences for a nationalistic and patriotic political backdrop were, 
at the very least, accommodating of the Nazis‘ agenda. 
Hitler‘s Machtübernahme brought more than just personal benefits for Meiser however. 
As early as 1927, Meiser had informed fellow members of the Bavarian pastorate of his belief 
that, ―Wir müssen in der Kirche ein rechtes Gemeinschaftsleben haben, um von da aus dann 
auch das Volksleben neu aufbauen zu können‖.142 It can therefore be appreciated that, when 
the Nazis reinvigorated German Protestantism at the start of the Third Reich, Meiser could be 
particularly grateful to the NSDAP for doing so in the way he had long desired. For this 
reason, it has been claimed that Meiser welcomed the onset of Nazism in Germany 
specifically ―weil er in ihm eine religiöse Kraft sah, vor der sich die Kirche nicht verschließen 
durfte‖.143 This claim also becomes all the more applicable in the specific context of Meiser‘s 
own Landeskirche which, being positioned in a highly Catholic Land and serving just under 
one third of the Bavarian populace, had long found itself subjugated by both the confessional 
and political dominance of Roman Catholicism in the region.
144
 With the NSDAP achieving 
landslide victories in 1933 in Bavaria‘s northern territories of Ober- and Mittelfranken, which 
were also the strongholds of the ELKB,
145
 Nazism had therefore already proved itself to 
Meiser to be a convenient means to diminish at least the political clout of the Catholics. 
Meiser‘s deep-felt sense of antagonism toward Roman Catholicism, which arose from the 
particular geo-political positioning of his Landeskirche, nonetheless restricted the extent to 
which Meiser was able to embrace Germany‘s new political leader, Adolf Hitler. As a result 
of Hitler‘s own, albeit dubious, claim to be a practising Catholic, Meiser explicitly regarded 
Hitler ―als Katholik‖, and as someone who ―[das] Wesen der evangelischen Kirche nicht 
kennen kann‖.146 In view of the implicit risk that Hitler might someday put Catholic interests 
first, Meiser was hesitant to give his full support to a political movement that ultimately 
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boasted a self-confessed Catholic as its figurehead. Even though the NSDAP‘s tendency to 
invoke Lutheran principles in its early manifestos and campaign platforms was enough to 
prove to Marahrens in Hanover that the Party upheld specifically Protestant precepts, it is only 
natural that Meiser, who had been brought up in a Landeskirche with a strong history of both 
confessional and political subjugation by its Catholic counterpart, viewed the NSDAP under 
Hitler‘s headship with some suspicion. 
Another factor which caused Meiser to remain apprehensive toward the NSDAP was his 
early recognition that the Extreme Right was at risk of turning the national political 
movement into a ―religiöse[-] Ersatzform‖, tarnishing the purity of a ‗Christianised‘ society 
through its idolisation of the Nazi ―Volkstum‖ or ―Staatgedanken‖, and evoking the 
―Bestifikation des Menschen‖ through its deification of the State.147 Although the GDC was 
eventually to come to embody the specific threat to the sanctity of the Church that Meiser 
initially feared, there can be no doubt that his early detection of the dangers of overt support 
for Nazism served to keep Meiser‘s response to the NSDAP as cautious and professional as 
possible. Bearing in mind the highly Lutheran character of the ELKB, which prompted Meiser 
to instruct his pastorate to pay to the State only ―den Dienst, den wir ihr tun sollen‖,148 it can 
be asserted that Meiser did not allow his initial enthusiasm for the potential of Nazism to 
subdue political Catholicism to interfere with his personal policy of ―parteipolitisch[e] 
Neutralität‖,149 which he had practised within the church throughout his ecclesiastical career. 
Finally, Meiser also had personal reasons to distrust the NSDAP once it began to employ 
a hate campaign against him in April 1934 with the intention of ousting him from office. The 
NSDAP‘s campaign against Meiser began when Nazi Gauleiter Karl Holz published an 
article in the Fränkische Tageszeitung which described Meiser as ―volksverräterisch‖ and a 
―Haupthetzer‖, owing to the supposed compassion he showed toward the Jews in his essay on 
the so-called ‗Judenfrage‘ of 1926.150 Likely enraged at a letter Meiser had written to Nazi 
authorities in Ansbach only a month previously, in which he advised the NSDAP against ―die 
gesellschaftliche und wirtschaftliche Schädigung der Juden‖,151 the Nazis resurrected excerpts 
from Meiser‘s 1926 essay to prove that his attitude towards the Jews was too lenient for their 
current political agenda. Since the Nazis had already imposed tight controls on the German 
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press by this point, it was easy for them to select and propagate only those parts of Meiser‘s 
essay in which he explicitly encouraged the Germans to show respect and affability towards 
the Jews. Although Meiser‘s failure to respond to the NSDAP‘s public condemnation of his 
attitudes and defend his position may appear a missed opportunity to restate more clearly his 
desire to see the Jews assimilated into German society, and therefore to stand up for German 
Jews who had by now lost many basic rights at the hands of the Nazis, it must be borne in 
mind that Meiser was ultimately forced to adopt a policy of silence to ensure that he avoided 
making any further comments which could be misconstrued by the Nazis and, thereby, give 
them cause for his dismissal. Since the GDC had already taken control over the Reichskirche 
and was looking for any means possible to add to this the remaining ‗intact‘ Landeskirchen, 
Meiser was prompted to put his ‗love‘ for his Landeskirche first in this period152 to ensure that 
Nazi insurgents did not oust him from office and destroy the essence of ‗intact‘ Protestantism 
both in Bavaria and in Nazi Germany at large. 
Contrary to Marahrens and Meiser, who had both traditionally refrained from political 
comment, Landesbischof Theophil Wurm of Württemberg had a long history of involvement 
in the political affairs of his region. During the early years of the Weimar Republic, Wurm 
had actively campaigned for the regional branch of the moderately conservative 
Deutschnationale Volkspartei (DNVP) – namely the Württembergische Bürgerpartei – which 
had resulted in his own election to the Stuttgarter Landtag on 12
th
 January 1919.
153
 In his 
post-war memoirs, Wurm retrospectively justified his overt involvement in politics by 
explaining that, ―...so hielt ich die Freihandelspolitik der bürgerlichen und 
sozialdemokratischen Linken für völlig verkehrt und war einer agrarfreundlichen 
Wirtschaftspolitik eher zugeneigt‖.154 Wurm‘s disdain for left-wing politics did not, however, 
only stem from a personal affinity to bourgeois interests but also from ecclesiastical concerns. 
Even during Wurm‘s early career as a parish pastor, he had been openly critical of the 
democratic Left for its lack of sympathy for German Protestantism. To this end, he had once 
expressed concern that, 
Christentum und Arbeiterbewegung stehen in Deutschland nicht in normalem Verhältnis zu einander. 
Auf der einen Seite hat das Christentum zu wenig Einfluß auf die Arbeiterbewegung, auf der anderen ist 
die Arbeiterbewegung zu eng mit den religiösen Kämpfen verflochten.
155 
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Taking a holistic view of German society, then, Wurm interpreted the relationship 
between the Christian clergy and the political Left as one which risked subjugating the role of 
religion and, by extension, also the status of institutional Protestantism in Germany. Although 
Wurm did not become Kirchenpräsident of the ELLKW until 1929,
156
 he had long made his 
aversion to left-wing politics clear. It can thus be appreciated that the NSDAP with its anti-
leftist and seemingly Christian agenda appealed to Wurm‘s own conservative preferences and 
hope for future cooperation between the Church and the State. It is also important to note in 
this context that the Evangelisch-Lutherische Landeskirche in Württemberg (ELLKW) was 
the first Protestant church to break free from the Weimar Republic in 1924 by providing itself 
with its own self-governing constitution. The tendency to view the political Left with caution, 
therefore, was not simply a character trait unique to Wurm, but rather one that was shared by 
the entire ecclesiastical community he served.   
In addition to opposing the political Left, the pastorate of the ELLKW also boasted a long 
tradition of resentment towards the power of political Catholicism in its region. In spite of the 
fact that the ELLKW served a Protestant community which comprised roughly two-thirds of 
the regional population,
157
 the Catholic Church had long subjugated its Protestant neighbour 
in Württemberg politically, with Eugen Bolz of the Catholic Zentrumspartei successively 
heading coalitions in the region from 1928 until the onset of Nazism in 1933.
158
 As can be 
demonstrated by Wurm‘s own involvement in the Württembergische Bürgerpartei, clergymen 
of the ELLKW conformed to the conclusion of Jeremy Noakes and Geoffrey Pridham in so 
far as they had ―long resented the dominance of the Catholic Centre in their area‖ but had 
traditionally split their vote amongst several conservative-national parties which rendered 
them less able to influence political events.
159
 Faced with the situation in which a vote for the 
political Left threatened to endanger German Protestantism with ‗godless‘ Bolshevism and a 
vote for the moderate Right risked prolonging the subjugation of the Protestant voice under 
the authority of political Catholicism, it can be appreciated that Wurm saw in the NSDAP an 
effective, albeit not ideal, means to bring to an end more than a decade of Protestant 
oppression by political Catholicism. 
It is in this context that it is important not to interpret Wurm‘s early warning to the 
ELLKW not to bring political preferences into the realm of the Church as an indication that 
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Wurm had given up on trying to influence political developments in Germany. This, after all, 
would be surprising given his strong personal history of political engagement. Instead, it 
should be accepted that there were strategic benefits to be had for Wurm by appeasing the 
NSDAP as it grew in popularity in the early 1930s. In a letter to the pastorate of the ELLKW 
as the Nazis were gaining ground in Germany in 1932, Wurm perhaps surprisingly stressed 
that, 
Es besteht die ernste Gefahr, daß unter den jetzigen Verhältnissen, durch die parteipolitische Tätigkeit 
von Geistlichen das Ansehen und seelsorgerliche Wirken des Pfarramts aufs schwerste geschädigt 
wird.
160 
With the popularity of the NSDAP on the rise at this time, it must be appreciated that Wurm 
could not afford to run the risk of allowing his traditionally conservative-national pastorate to 
dissuade the citizens of Württemberg from voting for the only party that looked set to work to 
the advantage of the ELLKW, namely by quelling the influence of both political Catholicism 
and the anti-Christian Left. Adding to this the fact that Wurm publicly maintained hope for 
―eine ganz neue Harmonie zwischen Kirche und Staat‖ in the early years of the Third 
Reich,
161
 it becomes clear that his decision to warn his pastorate to refrain from expressions of 
political allegiance from the pulpit was also a way of preventing his colleagues in the 
ELLKW from openly endorsing other moderately conservative parties and, thereby, 
jeopardising relations with the NSDAP. For these reasons, Wurm‘s initial positive response to 
the NSDAP can be seen to be in line with Theodore S. Hamerow‘s conclusion that Protestant 
clergymen did not endorse the NSDAP because it met exactly with their political preferences 
but, rather, because it signified ―the victory of traditional authority over destructive 
revolutionism‖ as well as ―the triumph of national religious faith over alien spiritual 
influence‖.162 
Further supporting the above is Wurm‘s instruction to the ELLKW in 1934 in which he 
exclaimed, ―...laßt uns nie vergessen, was wir als Kirche bis heute dem Staat an Förderung 
und Schutz verdanken. In alter Treue stellt sich unser württembergisches Kirchenvolk 
fürbittend und mitarbeitend hinter die Regierung unseres Staates‖.163 The gratitude which 
Wurm displays to the NSDAP here can be seen, in part, to be for the furtherance and 
protection which the Nazis had afforded to his Landeskirche by obliterating its traditional 
political enemies. It is nonetheless also important not to read Wurm‘s declaration of loyalty to 
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the Nazi State without appreciating the dictates of his Lutheran confession. As early as March 
1933, Wurm saw it as the ―Pflicht‖ of his Landeskirche to stand ―in erster Reihe‖ with 
Germany‘s new Nazi government.164 Without appreciating that, under Lutheran logic, 
clergymen were obligated to support the rule of the secular authorities, it may appear that 
Wurm was breaching his own instruction to the pastorate of the ELLKW not to display 
political preferences in the Church. 
The extent to which Wurm‘s confessional scruples can be considered honourable is 
however undermined by the fact that he continued to adhere to the Lutheran instruction to 
honour the State even whilst the NSDAP was enacting its policies of racial and societal 
discrimination. Even whilst the Nazis were using their first concentration camp in Dachau to 
‗clean up‘ German society, for example, Wurm gave a sermon in September 1933 in which he 
encouraged his audience to think of Hitler as the God-given Führer of Germany, ―der sein 
Bestes daran setzt, [...] alle Unsauberkeit aus Verwaltung und öffentlichem Leben zu 
entfernen‖.165 In recognition of Wurm‘s passion for political change, it was highly likely that, 
when employing the controversial term ―Unsauberkeit‖, Wurm was referring to the political 
adversaries of the church that the NSDAP had ousted from power. Nevertheless, the 
resemblance of Wurm‘s words to the rhetoric of ‗uncleanliness‘ used by the Nazis to describe 
the Jews is strikingly apparent.
166
 Even at the start of 1935, when the NSDAP had already 
enacted numerous laws against German Jewry, Wurm still continued to stress the opinion that, 
―In staatlichen Dingen hat nur der zu entscheiden, der zum Führer berufen ist. Ihm gehört 
Vertrauen und Gerhorsam‖.167 Although Wurm‘s reluctance to interfere in ‗earthly‘ matters 
can be seen as being in line with the biblical lesson of Romans 13, which teaches churchmen 
not to meddle in the affairs of the State regardless of the brutality of its measures,
168
 there can 
be no doubt that his early silence on the Nazis‘ persecution of the Jews gave the NSDAP a 
free licence to intensify its violent policies in the ensuing years of the Third Reich. In his 
strategic endeavour to curry favour with the NSDAP in the initial stages of Nazi Germany, 
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then, Wurm problematically proved himself prepared to compromise wider Christian 
standards in German society in order to elevate the status of his Landeskirche. 
Wurm‘s early reluctance to protest about the State‘s discriminatory policies against the 
Jews must also be set against the fact that he did not hesitate to protest to the NSDAP once 
Nazi precepts began to infiltrate into the Church. In a Denkschrift that was also signed by 
Landesbischof Meiser, the two men expressed their ―schärfste[n] Protest‖ directly to Hitler 
about the conduct of Reichsbischof Müller, whom Hitler had not only personally endorsed but 
whose ―Eingliederungsaktion‖ within the DEK he clearly facilitated and supported.169 To 
criticise the encroachment of Nazism into Church affairs and the subsequent attempts of the 
NSDAP to silence Church complaints, Meiser and Wurm paid homage to Nazi values and 
stated that, 
Aus der Verantwortung für die Evangelische Kirche wie aus innerster Verbundenheit mit dem Schicksal 
unseres Volkes und Staates und im Einvernehmen mit angesehenen Gliedern unserer Landeskirchen 
bitten wir den Herrn Reichskanzler, Alles zu tun, um einem Zustand ein Ende zu machen, der nicht bloß 
die Volksgemeinschaft stört und schädigt, sondern auch dem Ansehen Deutschlands und der Deutschen 
Evangelischen Kirche in den Kreisen der Auslandsdeutschen Eintrag tut.
170 
As has already been demonstrated by the earlier discussion in this sub-chapter of Marahrens‘ 
desire to work for the benefit of German Volkstum, Meiser and Wurm‘s plea to Hitler to 
preserve the German Volksgemeinschaft is in line with the Lutheran ambition to protect the 
traditions of the German nation and should not be interpreted as them adhering to the same 
racial and eugenic goals as the Nazis. In spite of the bishops‘ best intentions to adhere to the 
constraints of their Lutheran confession, however, their failure to campaign for justice in the 
wider German society nonetheless leaves the bishops with a dubious interpretation of 
Christian morality.   
 To summarise the responses of Landesbischöfe Marahrens, Meiser and Wurm to Nazism, 
it ought to be noted that, although all three bishops generally responded positively to 
Germany‘s new Far Right government, their reasons for doing so were not exclusively 
attributable to personal enthusiasm for Nazi ideology. Politically, Marahrens welcomed the 
move since the NSDAP had overpowered the anti-Christian liberalism that was particularly 
prevalent in northern Germany and re-inspired his working-class parishioners with its 
seemingly Christian agenda. Meiser and Wurm were similarly pleased with the NSDAP‘s 
ability to suppress political Catholicism in Germany and thereby to raise the profiles of their 
Landeskirchen in their predominantly Catholic regions. In particular, Meiser was indebted to 
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the NSDAP for his promotion to the position of Landesbischof of the ELKB when his 
predecessor objected to Nazi policies, whilst Wurm was appreciative of the NSDAP for 
destroying German Protestantism‘s political adversaries which he had himself once tried to 
defeat through his own political activism. Confessionally, however, all three bishops shared 
the Lutheran obligation to honour the secular government and refrain from political action 
against it. Although this goes some way toward explaining their generally positive reception 
of the NSDAP, it nonetheless poses questions about the bishops‘ wider Christian scruples, 
since none of the men commented on the Nazis‘ escalating discrimination against the Jews 
during this period. 
Although all three bishops shared a professional obligation to advise the secular 
government against breaches of Christian morality, it must be appreciated that, after the 
establishment of the GDC-led Reichskirche, the bishops‘ immediate priority to preserve the 
Intaktheit of their respective Landeskirchen meant that they had to ensure that they did not 
overly infuriate Germany‘s new political leaders and give them cause for their dismissal. 
Landesbischof Meiser, in particular, already had personal experience of Nazi aggression after 
being subjected to a Nazi hate campaign in 1934. He and his ‗intact‘ colleagues had already 
experienced, therefore, the power of the Nazi machinery to determine their fate in the Church. 
Moreover, in light of the bishops‘ personal indebtedness to the NSDAP for the elevated status 
of their Landeskirchen, together with their shared Lutheran duty to honour the secular 
government, it must be accepted that the Landesbischöfe had more reason to respond 
positively to the NSDAP in the early years of the Third Reich than to reject it. 
 
The Landesbischöfe and the Deutsche Christen 
Even though it is problematic enough that Landesbischöfe Marahrens, Meiser and Wurm 
initially showed general appreciation for the NSDAP in the early years of the Third Reich, the 
bishops‘ lack of unanimous condemnation for the specifically ecclesiastical Nazism of the 
GDC is even more dubious in view of their shared Lutheran duty to guard the Church from 
heresy. Although the three bishops were theoretically united in their disdain for the 
unorthodox practices of the GDC, they were not immune to outside pressures either to 
compromise or to reinforce their theological positions. These pressures emanated in particular 
from the respective socio-cultural and geo-political surroundings of the bishops‘ 
Landeskirchen. Since the bishops were therefore caught between a doctrinal duty to resist the 
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influx of the GDC into the Church and a strategic, nationalist desire to improve the reputation 
of their respective Landeskirchen, this sub-chapter examines the individual reactions of the 
bishops to the GDC with a view to clarifying their sometimes contradictory responses to 
‗German Christian‘ heresy at the very beginning of the Third Reich. 
To take the case of Landesbischof August Marahrens of Hanover first, then, it is 
important to recognise that, unlike his counterparts in the southern ‗intact‘ churches, 
Marahrens initially responded unenthusiastically to the ecclesiastical Nazism of the GDC. 
Despite often being depicted as an ardent pro-Nazi in broad sweeping historiographies of the 
Protestant Kirchenkampf, Marahrens was clear from the outset that he did not wish to see the 
politico-ecclesiastical practices of the GDC infiltrate German Protestantism. Long before the 
GDC had the chance to realign German Christianity with Nazi policies, Marahrens involved 
himself in the Kapler Ausschuss in the initial months of the Third Reich in an attempt to 
formulate a Christocentric constitution for a national German Church. Even after Ludwig 
Müller had imbued this constitution with Nazi precepts, however, Marahrens continued to 
work against the heresy of the GDC and cast his vote in the intra-church Reichsbischof 
elections of May 1933 for ‗Confessing‘ candidate Friedrich von Bodelschwingh. Although the 
NSDAP was not happy with von Bodelschwingh‘s landslide electoral victory and quickly 
proclaimed the result invalid, announcing instead public re-runs of the election on 23rd July 
1933, Marahrens nonetheless remained steadfast in his adherence to undistorted Protestantism 
and voted for von Bodelschwingh yet again in the public polls.
171
 This was an extremely 
courageous decision for Marahrens, particularly in light of the growing ‗brownshirt‘ 
congregations that were typical of his ELLKH at the time. After all, even by this early stage in 
the Third Reich, Marahrens‘ ELLKH comprised the largest proportion of pro-Nazi 
parishioners, if not pro-Nazi pastors, out of all three ‗intact‘ Landeskirchen.172  
Marahrens‘ honourable decision to reject the ecclesiastical Nazism of the GDC from the 
outset was in accordance with his spiritual vocation to protect the Church from heretical 
practices. Testifying to the strength of his commitment to Christocentrism in this period is a 
letter Marahrens wrote to Hitler on 17
th
 July 1933, advising him to remove all forces that ―die 
Kirche [...] zur unfreien oder staatlich beeinflußten macht‖.173 As Gertraud Grünzinger 
suggests, however, Marahrens‘ steadfast aversion to the GDC also arose from personal 
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reasons,
174
 and should be traced back to his own experience as part of the Kapler Ausschuss in 
the initial months of the Third Reich. After Hitler forced the original three-man commission 
to allow Ludwig Müller to contribute to its negotiations as his personal Vertrauensmann, it is 
apparent that Marahrens had more experience than most of both Müller‘s personal character 
and his intentions for German Protestantism at large. In the first instance, then, Marahrens‘ 
daily dealings with Müller caused him to characterise the Reichsbischof candidate as an 
overly militaristic man who had no appreciation of the essence of the original Christian 
confessions.
175
 In addition to his personal distaste for the figurehead of the GDC, Marahrens‘ 
participation in the Kapler Ausschuss also allowed him to come to the early conclusion that a 
Reichskirche under the leadership of the GDC was ―bekenntniswidrig‖. Although Marahrens 
was involved in the Kapler Ausschuss primarily because he wanted to bring about ―die 
Einheit der DEK‖, his dealings with Müller made him realise that he was striving for ―eine 
wirkliche Einheit‖ for the Church which would ensure the sanctity of the original Protestant 
confessions.
176
 By contrast, Marahrens saw that Müller desired for German Protestantism a 
national Church, led by ―eine bekenntnismäßig nicht gebundene Kirchenbehörde‖ that failed 
to acknowledge the status confessionis of each of its constituent Landeskirchen, and instead 
adopted ecclesiastical Nazism as the cornerstone of its unification process.
177
 Since 
Marahrens truly desired to create a unified German Church based on the principles of the sola 
Scriptura, it was only logical that Marahrens twice vetoed Müller‘s claim to power by voting 
instead for his rival von Bodelschwingh. This was Marahrens‘ means of displaying his deep-
seated aversion to both Müller and the heretical practices of his GDC. 
It is also important to note that, even once the vast majority of Protestant Landeskirchen 
had been assimilated into the GDC-led Reichskirche in the wake of the second round of 
Church elections, Marahrens still did not yield to the influence of Müller and his GDC. 
Although Marahrens‘ ELLKH became one of the only three ‗intact‘ Landeskirchen not to 
come under the control of the GDC, this was purely due to the actions of Marahrens himself. 
In spite of a convincing victory for the GDC in the second round of elections in the 
Hanoverian church senate, Marahrens decided, on his own accord, to retract his signature 
from the contract that had been drawn up to hand over supreme authority of the ELLKH to 
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Reichsbischof Müller.
178
 This Marahrens was able to do since, on 23
rd
 May 1933, he had been 
bestowed with the power of Bevollmächtigung in his role as Landesbischof of the ELLKH. 
This power enabled him to suspend the constitution of the ELLKH in the case of an 
emergency and, in its place, impose his own leadership over the Landeskirche with unlimited 
and unquestionable authority.
179
 For this reason, when it came to signing the ELLKH over to 
the GDC, Marahrens was able, by law, to follow his gut instinct and impress his own anti-
GDC convictions over his entire Landeskirche by enacting his power of Bevollmächtigung. 
Even once Marahrens had managed to secure control over his Landeskirche, however, the 
GDC did not cease to be an issue for the ELLKH. Since the majority of the ELLKH‘s senate 
had voted in favour of assimilation to the GDC-led Reichskirche and many Hanoverian 
parishioners were staunch supporters of Nazism, the dynamics of Marahrens‘ opposition to 
the GDC had to change once he had overruled its authority to govern in his church. In order to 
stay on side with his predominantly ‗German Christian‘ senate and Nazi officials in his region 
to ensure that future insurgencies or attacks on his leadership did not arise, Marahrens was 
ultimately compelled to accept and to work with the presence of Nazi agents in his 
Landeskirche. This did not mean that Marahrens‘ original aversion to the GDC-led 
Reichskirche and to Ludwig Müller had softened in any way after 1933, however. Rather, 
Marahrens‘ reaction to ecclesiastical Nazism simply altered in line with the elevated status of 
the GDC, which had suddenly moved from being a force that Marahrens had no choice but to 
oppose in order to retain his leadership of the ELLKH to become a force that he then had to 
appease for the very same ends. 
In this respect, Marahrens‘ subsequent declarations of commitment to Nazism in general 
can be seen as a strategic means to appease his highly Nazi bishopric and prove his 
ideological credentials in the face of his rejection of the GDC. To illustrate this, Marahrens 
justified his denial of the GDC‘s right to rule over his Landeskirche by claiming that he was 
nonetheless willing to conform to the wider societal demands of the NSDAP. In an undated 
statement to the ELLKH, Marahrens explained, 
Der Entschluß von Landesbischof D. Marahrens ist um so bemerkenswerter, als er von Anfang an für 
eine starke und feste Geschlossenheit der Deutschen Evangelischen Kirche eingetreten ist. Er bekennt 
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sich damit zum Willen des Führers und hat dies bereits wiederholt unter Beweis gestellt. Er hält es für 
eine unabweisbare Pflicht, für eine in sich fest gegliederte evangelische Kirche einzutreten...
180 
Marahrens attempted, therefore, to shroud his rejection of the GDC-led Reichskirche by 
emphasising his Lutheran duty to recognise the secular authority of the NSDAP. Adding to 
this his commitment to devise an alternative means by which to unify German Protestantism, 
it can be seen that Marahrens protected his position as Landesbischof from potential reprisals 
from the Nazi State, which may have otherwise interpreted his specific opposition to 
ecclesiastical Nazism as an aversion to its wider political aims. 
In the same vein, it must be appreciated that, by keeping members of the GDC in 
prominent positions of governance within his ‗intact‘ ELLKH, Marahrens was not only able 
to avoid giving the GDC cause for revenge attacks on his leadership but was also able to 
manipulate the presence of ‗German Christian‘ clergymen to his own benefit. Even though it 
was inevitably difficult for Marahrens to cooperate with ‗German Christian‘ members of his 
senate after he had defied their demands for assimilation into the Reichskirche, his intra-
church collaboration with the GDC was essential to raising the profile of the ELLKH in the 
eyes of the Nazi State, which would not have looked kindly upon any attempt by Marahrens 
to exclude from church administration the ecclesiastical agents which it had once publicly 
endorsed. By accepting the presence of moderate Deutsche Christen in the administration of 
the ELLKH, then, Marahrens was able to demonstrate to the NSDAP that he was not 
completely opposed to Nazi precepts and was willing to work with the GDC to bring about 
the creation of a unified German Protestant Church that was more amenable to the ambitions 
of both the Church and the State. Marahrens demonstrates this very logic in a Rundschreiben 
of 18
th
 July 1933, in which he states,  
Zahlreiche Aussprachen zum Beispiel mit maßgebenden Vertretern der Glaubensbewegung ―Deutscher 
Christen‖ haben mir Einblick in diese gegeben, und ich erkenne deren wertvolle Kräfte und 
volksmissionarische Ziele, soweit unsere hannoversche Landeskirche in Betracht kommt, durchaus an. 
Ihre Mit-/arbeit wünsche und erwarte ich auch in unserer Landeskirche in weitestem Maße.
181
 
Before condemning Marahrens for not abiding by the complete rejection of the GDC 
which he displayed during the Reichsbischof elections of 1933, however, it is important to 
recognise the multiple pressures upon him which drove him not to lose favour with either the 
moderate Deutsche Christen or the Nazi State at this point. Although Marahrens continued to 
emphasise that his objection to the ―Kirchengesetz‖ of the GDC-led Reichskirche should in no 
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way be viewed as a denunciation of the wider policies of the NSDAP,
182
 it ought to be 
acknowledged that he at least had to maintain an appearance of accepting wider Nazi ideology 
in order to ward off potential reprisals from both the GDC and the Nazi State, and to maintain 
the trust of his predominantly Nazi bishopric. Without such strategic appeals to Nazism to 
justify his rejection of ‗German Christianity‘, Marahrens‘ rebuttal of the GDC risked losing 
him the support of his parishioners and pastorate, as well as the respect of the national 
NSDAP government itself. Marahrens‘ tendency to resort to any means necessary to preserve 
‗intact‘ Protestantism in Germany in this period nonetheless remains questionable since it 
included supporting, or at the very least accepting, Nazi policies at large, which already 
included unchristian policies of discrimination in the wider German society. 
Contrary to Marahrens‘ initial steadfast objection to the ecclesiastical Nazism of the 
GDC, however, Landesbischof Hans Meiser of Bavaria did not offer convincing resistance to 
‗German Christian‘ heresy during the Reichsbischof elections at the start of the Third Reich. 
Despite casting his first vote in the intra-church elections in favour of the Christocentric 
candidate Friedrich von Bodelschwingh, like Marahrens, Meiser nonetheless changed his 
voting preferences in the public re-run of the elections only two months later. After the initial 
intra-church ballot had taken place, it was revealed that the heads of three major Protestant 
Landeskirchen had voted against von Bodelschwingh, including Landesbischof Theophil 
Wurm of Württemberg
183
 whose voting tactics will be discussed in the final part of this sub-
chapter. Although Meiser had originally opted to see von Bodelschwingh at the helm of the 
newly established Reichskirche, he was quickly influenced by the rationale of the three 
defectors and soon joined their intra-church opposition movement to call for von 
Bodelschwingh‘s resignation. Since it was highly unlikely that Meiser had fallen for the 
politico-ecclesiastical policies of the GDC within such a short period of time, particularly in 
light of his early concerns over the establishment of a ―religiöse[-] Ersatzform‖ discussed in 
the previous sub-chapter, Meiser‘s subsequent decision to vote for Ludwig Müller in the 
second round of Church elections raises the question of what prompted his sudden change of 
heart.  
To begin to account for Meiser‘s drastic change of opinion towards the GDC, then, we 
should first look to the particular geo-political positioning of his Landeskirche, which had 
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long been considerably overshadowed by the prominence of political and religious 
Catholicism. Not only did more than two thirds of the Bavarian populace belong to the 
Catholic Church but political Catholicism dominated the region through the local branch of 
the Catholic Centre Party; the Bayerische Volkspartei (BVP). Since Meiser‘s ELKB was 
visibly eclipsed by this confessional and political ‗other‘ at the start of the Third Reich, it can 
be appreciated that Meiser came to see in the GDC a decisive opportunity to defy the Catholic 
forces that had long subjugated his Protestant Landeskirche. To understand this logic, it is 
necessary to remember that, even though the GDC had fewer members in southern Germany, 
it nevertheless had more clout in the predominantly Catholic south than it did in the 
particularly pro-Nazi north. This is because, whilst membership of the GDC in northern 
Germany generally signified commitment to the ‗Nazification‘ of Christianity alone, in the 
southern German Länder allegiance to the GDC implicitly indicated alignment with Nazi 
politics at large. Since a vote for the GDC ostensibly gave Meiser an added opportunity to 
align his Landeskirche with the largest threat to the continuation of political Catholicism, it is 
understandable that he altered his voting preferences in favour of a convenient means to 
threaten the traditional dominance of the BVP. Moreover, since his Württembergian 
counterpart, Landesbischof Wurm, was already calling for the GDC to assume leadership over 
the new Reichskirche, Meiser was not impervious to the logic of his southern German 
neighbour, who, after all, had long been engaged in political endeavours to undermine the 
clout of the Catholics in his own region. 
Further supporting this explanation of Meiser‘s sudden decision to support the GDC in 
the public Church elections of 1933 is the fact that, in essence, the nature of the GDC in the 
southern German Länder was not as radical as it was in its northern German strongholds. 
Although the southern German factions of the GDC still endorsed the same ‗Nazified‘ 
Christianity as, for example, the staunchest Thuringian Deutsche Christen, their 
predominantly Catholic societal backdrop nonetheless meant that their members were more 
willing to accept the existing governing structures of their local Landeskirchen. This was 
because they saw in the existing administration the most effective means to protect their 
minority movement from potential attacks by their far more numerous Catholic 
counterparts.
184
 Further to this, the geographical distance of the ELKB from the heartlands of 
‗German Christian‘ extremism inevitably rendered Meiser less aware of the destruction that 
the GDC could potentially cause to the northern German Landeskirchen, which ultimately had 
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no ‗free space‘ for political or theological opposition. This line of thinking is in line with 
Klaus Scholder‘s proclamation that, 
Dem bayerischen Landesbischof, der erst kurz zuvor mit der festlichen Zustimmung von Staat und 
Partei in sein Amt eingesetzt worden war, / lag der Frieden in seiner Landeskirche näher als der Kampf 
für einen fernen, der Union verdächtigen Reichsbischof, der zudem unabsehbare politische 
Schwierigkeiten heraufbeschwören konnte. Man wird an dem Urteil schwerlich vorbeikommen, daß die 
Provinzialität der Landeskirchen ein wesentlicher Grund für den Sturz Bodelschwinghs war.
185 
In respect of the drastically disparate demographics of the ELKB to the majority of the 
‗destroyed‘ Landeskirchen, then, it can be appreciated that Meiser did not realise the extent to 
which he was putting at risk his own Landeskirche, and German Protestantism at large, in his 
pursuit of political alignment with Berlin through the GDC. In light of the relative moderation 
of ‗German Christians‘ in his own region, it can even be understood why Meiser concluded 
that he only stood to gain from the tactical manoeuvre. 
In spite of his ignorance, Meiser was nonetheless careful to ensure that he kept the ‗upper 
hand‘ in his relationship with the Bavarian GDC. Even though the movement had failed to 
earn enough votes in the ELKB to warrant the incorporation of Meiser‘s Landeskirche into 
the GDC-led Reichskirche, Meiser continued to recognise the benefits that were to be had 
from continued co-operation with the GDC. In August 1933, Meiser publicly proclaimed 
himself tolerant of its ecclesiastical Nazism and specifically stated, 
Solange die neue Bewegung keine Bedrohung unseres Bekenntnisstandes herbeiführt und solange sie 
gewillt ist, sich als aufbauender Faktor in unser gesamtkirchliches Leben einzufügen, soll sie auch in 
unserer Landeskirche Raum haben.
186 
Before using this statement to identify Meiser as a laissez-faire supporter of the GDC, 
however, it is important to acknowledge the subsequent ―Bedingungen‖ which he attached to 
its involvement in the ELKB; namely that ―[d]ie unbedingte Wahrung des Bekenntnisstandes‖ 
of the ELKB must remain the main priority of the GDC, that the aim of the GDC must always 
be ―innerkirchlich religiös‖, and that those at the pinnacle of the movement must continue to 
respect Meiser‘s ―Führung‖ so that the unity of his Landeskirche would neither become 
threatened nor destroyed by ―Einzelaktionen‖.187 Although Meiser may well have appeared to 
be openly welcoming of the GDC, in practice he was not tolerant of anything other than 
Christocentrism in his Landeskirche. His strict ultimatum to the GDC confirms the hypothesis 
that Meiser merely used the politico-ecclesiastical profile of the GDC to forge an outward 
alliance with the NSDAP and, thereby, to protect his Landeskirche from undue Nazi 
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aggression.
188
 All the while, however, by emphasising his supreme authority over the church, 
Meiser ensured that the GDC could not, in turn, unleash its ecclesiastical Nazism in his 
Landeskirche. 
Meiser‘s high-handed response to the GDC nevertheless had to alter once he no longer 
had to deal with the relatively ‗mild‘ ecclesiastical Nazism of Bavarian ‗German Christians‘ 
alone but with the brutality of the national Reichskirche leadership at large. On 3
rd
 September 
1934, Reichsbischof Müller, with the assistance of Rechtswalter Jäger, issued a directive to 
Meiser to surrender the autonomy of the ELKB to the GDC-led Reichskirche. Since Jäger‘s 
involvement demonstrated that the GDC was now supported by the Nazi State, Meiser‘s 
ability to object to the aims of the GDC must be seen as having been severely restricted by the 
danger that any criticism of its ecclesiastical Nazism could be interpreted as a parallel 
condemnation of the political ambitions of the NSDAP. For this reason, Meiser strategically 
responded to Müller‘s demands using Lutheran logic that was unique to the spiritual realm of 
the Church. In a statement of 15
th
 September 1934, Meiser declared that, ―Lutherische 
Landeskirchen können ihre Kirchengewalt nur einer Reichskirche übertragen, die selbst 
eindeutig an das lutherische Bekenntnis (die Augsburger Konfession) gebunden ist‖.189 By 
characterising the structure of the Reichskirche as inadequate to allow for the confessional 
peculiarities of the ELKB, and insufficient to preserve the original Lutheran confession in 
Germany in general, Meiser found a purely spiritual method to respond to the unorthodoxy of 
the GDC without criticising Nazi ambitions at large.  
It should also be noted here that the GDC‘s attempted subversion of the ELKB in 
September 1934 marked the start of Meiser‘s specific endeavour in the Protestant 
Kirchenkampf to protect the essence of confessional Lutheranism in Nazi Germany. Whereas 
Marahrens criticised the GDC for its inability to recognise the three distinct confessional 
identities of Lutheran, Reformed and United Protestantism,
190
 Meiser began at this point 
explicitly to defend the status of confessional Lutheranism only. Evidently infuriated that the 
recent actions of the GDC had violated the original Lutheran basis of the DEK‘s constitution, 
Meiser proclaimed that, ―Die Verfassung wurde nicht gehütet, sondern gebrochen. Das Recht 
wurde in Unrecht verkehrt und das Unrecht zum Recht gemacht‖.191 Meiser‘s turn towards an 
explicit rejection of the GDC in 1934 not only came about in defence of his own bishopric, 
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therefore, but also in defence of the traditional Lutheran underpinnings that he saw as integral 
to specifically German Protestantism. 
Meiser‘s belated acceptance of the potential destructiveness of the GDC meant, however, 
that he was no longer able to respond to ‗German Christian‘ ambitions with direct displays of 
hostility. For the sake of preserving the Intaktheit of his ELKB and, more specifically for 
Meiser, the essence of confessional Lutheranism which it epitomised, Meiser had to ensure 
that he was seen to be committed to both the concept of Protestant unification in general
192
 
and the secular governance of the NSDAP. To this end, in a letter to his pastorate in 
November 1934, Meiser exclaimed, 
Die Amtsbrüder wissen, daß der mir aufgezwungene Kampf frei von allen politischen Motiven allein 
um die unversehrte Geltung des Bekenntnisses und um ein wahrhaft geistliches Handeln innerhalb der 
Deutschen Evangelischen Kirche geht und daß ich mich allezeit bemüht habe, ihn mit einem reinen und 
unverletzten Gewissen und so, wie es einem lutherischen Bischof geziehmt, zu führen.
193 
As well as dissociating his rejection of the GDC from a wider renunciation of Nazism in 
general, Meiser most notably justified his objection to ‗German Christianity‘ on the grounds 
of his personal status as a Lutheran Landesbischof. By emphasising his professional 
obligation both to protect the Church from heresy and to guide Germany‘s secular 
government towards a more righteous path, Meiser ultimately found in confessional 
Lutheranism not only a cause for complaint over the heresy of the GDC but also a means by 
which to convey it tacitly. Although Meiser‘s turn towards the protection offered by Lutheran 
logic served to defy the intentions of the GDC in this period, however, the extent to which this 
decision can be considered honourable is nonetheless put in doubt by the fact that Meiser took 
it in the knowledge that it prevented him from commenting on the NSDAP‘s escalating 
policies of discrimination in the wider secular arena. 
Even though Landesbischof Theophil Wurm of Württemberg headed a church with 
similar geo-political demographics to Meiser‘s ELKB, Wurm began his career in the 
Protestant Kirchenkampf in clear acceptance of the GDC. Whereas both Marahrens and 
Meiser initially wished to see Friedrich von Bodelschwingh assume leadership over the newly 
established Reichskirche, Wurm, as leader of arguably the most pietistic ‗intact‘ Landeskirche 
in Germany,
194
 did not hesitate to give his full support to Ludwig Müller in the initial intra-
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Church elections of 1933. Further to this, even once von Bodelschwingh had been appointed 
Reichsbischof of the DEK, Wurm continued to remain a part of an intra-Church opposition 
group that began to call for von Bodelschwingh‘s ‗voluntary‘ resignation. Although we may 
reasonably expect Wurm to have rejected the GDC outright as a result of his traditional 
Württembergian pietism, an account of a conversation between Wurm and a fellow member 
of the Church council, Johannes Kübel, demonstrates that Wurm was well aware of the 
irregularity of his actions. When Kübel reportedly confronted Wurm with the words, ―I, the 
Frankfurt liberal, am for the Pietist Bodelschwingh, and you, the Württemberg Pietist, are for 
Müller‖, Wurm is said to have shrugged his shoulders and dismissed Kübel with the reply, 
―Yes, right hand, left hand, all mixed up‖.195 Wurm‘s own admission that his endorsement of 
Müller was not compatible with the confessional tradition of his Landeskirche suggests, 
therefore, that, as Shelley Baranowski reasons, subsidiary ―regional factors‖196 must be at play 
in explaining why the bishop of one of the most devoutly Protestant Landeskirchen with one 
of the lowest proportions of NSDAP voters in Germany so enthusiastically endorsed the pro-
Nazi GDC at the start of the Third Reich. 
To investigate further Wurm‘s specific predicament at the beginning of 1933, then, it 
should be noted that Wurm‘s personal history of political involvement on behalf of the 
conservative-national Württembergische Bürgerpartei testified to Wurm‘s deeply ingrained 
sense of political scruples and responsiveness to political opportunities. Although Wurm was 
no longer actively involved in politics at the start of the Third Reich, it can be reasonably 
expected that he still possessed a strong political desire both to reinstate conservative-national 
values in Germany and to overturn Catholic political hegemony in his region. As a result of 
Wurm‘s overt political interests, then, it is only natural that he recognised earlier than most 
the unspoken profit that was to be had from endorsing the GDC. This in-depth knowledge of 
political tactics also explains why Wurm responded positively to the Deutsche Christen much 
earlier in the Reichsbischof elections than his southern German counterpart Meiser, who had 
always refrained from political comment in the name of staunch confessional Lutheranism. 
It is in the context of Wurm‘s heightened political awareness, therefore, that it becomes 
possible to understand why Wurm attempted to fuse the two distinct manifestations of Nazism 
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represented by the NSDAP and the GDC respectively from the very beginning of the Third 
Reich. In order to re-establish the successful co-operation between the Church and the State of 
the pre-Weimar years, Wurm knew that the Church had to receive the endorsement of the 
State, and to do this the State needed to recognise the benefits that were to be had through 
partnership with the Church. For this reason, even before the prospect of a Reichskirche 
materialised, Wurm was careful to promote the idea of the Protestant Church working in 
accordance with and even enhancing the secular aims of the State through its spiritual 
provisions. Writing about Germany‘s new NSDAP leaders to the pastorate of his ELLKW on 
30
th
 March 1933, Wurm thus stated that,  
Um so inniger und anhaltender muß die Fürbitte für diese Männer sein, daß der allmächtige und 
barmherzige Gott sie die rechten Wege und die rechten Mitarbeiter finden lasse und daß er dem bösen 
Geist der Zwietracht, des Eigennutzes und der Ungerechtigkeit wehre.
197 
From Wurm‘s early implication that the Church ought to become an appropriate ―Mitarbeiter‖ 
of the Nazi State it can be ascertained that Wurm wished to promote an image of institutional 
Protestantism in Germany that was willing to work in harmony with the secular 
administration of the NSDAP. Although Wurm did not specifically endorse or promote the 
‗Nazification‘ of Christianity to achieve this Church-State alliance, it can be appreciated why, 
once the GDC had gained ground in the DEKB and Hitler had publicly given Müller his 
personal backing, the GDC became the most convenient means for Wurm to achieve his 
original ends. 
In spite of the fact that Wurm‘s initial enthusiasm for the GDC can be explained by the 
distance of his ELLKW from the northern Nazi heartlands, which meant that like Meiser he 
was less aware of the malevolence of the movement, Wurm‘s double vote for Müller in the 
summer of 1933 nonetheless puts Wurm in a problematic position today. After all, his desire 
to elevate the social standing of his Landeskirche by actively welcoming the pro-Nazi GDC as 
a means to foster closer relations with the NSDAP inevitably risked both the sanctity of the 
Protestant confessions and Christian morality in Germany at large. It was only the voting 
preferences of the wider ELLKW, which failed to vote for the GDC in the second round of 
Church elections, that gave Wurm the ‗wake-up call‘ he needed to recognise the dangers 
inherent in close affiliation with the GDC. In spite of the fact that the GDC enacted the 
Arierparagraph in the DEK in September 1933, and had even held its infamous Berlin 
Sportpalast rally on 12
th
 November 1933 in which Dr. Reinhold Krause expressed his desire 
                                                          
197
 ‗Schreiben des Kirchenpräsidenten an die Geistlichen der württembergischen Landeskirche‘, 30/03/1933, 
LKAS, Bestell-Nr.3.3, Nr.7, p.50. 
58 
 
to rid German Protestantism of the ―jüdische Lohnmoral‖ of the Old Testament,198 only in 
April 1934 did Wurm‘s position towards ‗German Christians‘ begin to change. Months after 
the above violations of Christian precepts had occurred, Wurm penned a sermon to criticise 
the conduct of Reichsbischof Müller in allowing such infringements to occur under his 
supreme leadership over the DEK. In it, Wurm blatantly accused the GDC of having 
provoked Protestant clergymen in Germany to become involved ―in schweren kirchlichen 
Kämpfen‖ which he described as follows: 
Diese Kämpfe richten sich nicht gegen den Staat, der wiederholt erklärt hat, daß er die Verkündigung 
der Kirche unangetastet sein lasse; sie richten sich auch nicht / gegen die Deutsche Evangelische 
Kirche, deren Verfassung wir achten. Aber sie richten sich gegen eine kirchliche Gruppe, deren Führer 
oft genug zu erkennen gegeben haben, daß sie gar nicht merken, wie sehr sie das Evangelium 
abschwächen...
199 
Although Wurm was careful not to attack the NSDAP in his criticism of the GDC, 
irrespective of whether he truly believed the Nazi State would keep to its word to leave the 
DEK to its own devices, his open condemnation of the nature of the GDC and its leader 
clearly demonstrated that, regardless of his previous opinions towards them, he had now 
become a clear opponent of ‗German Christianity‘. 
Likely contributing to Wurm‘s change of attitude towards the GDC is the evident 
resurgence of his pietistic values, which the GDC‘s violations of Christian principles had 
brought about. After all, the escalating heretical practices of Reichsbischof Müller during the 
initial months of his leadership over the DEK had brought Wurm to the conclusion that, ―wer 
das Bischofskreuz trägt, darf auch das Kreuz nicht scheuen, das aus der unverkürzten 
Verkündigung der Wahrheit erwachsen kann‖.200 For this reason, Wurm can be seen, in turn, 
to have become aware of his own duty as Landesbischof to thwart the unorthodoxy of his 
counterparts in the wider DEK. From this point on, then, Wurm used his supreme authority 
over the ELLKW to oversee ecclesiastical appointments on all levels of his Landeskirche. Not 
only did Wurm begin to snub those members of his clergy who professed to be active in the 
GDC but he also appointed ‗Confessing‘ clergymen into prominent positions of church 
administration wherever possible.
201
 By ultimately endorsing ministers whom he considered 
to convey the original Christian message, Wurm can not only be seen to have come round 
eventually to rejecting the GDC on pietistic grounds but also to have ensured the propagation 
of his regained pietism from the very grassroots of his Landeskirche. To a certain extent, then, 
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Wurm can be seen to have played the role of God in his ELLKW, as he personally selected 
those whom he saw as fittest to ensure the survival of the original Protestant confessions. 
With his traditional pietistic values recovered by mid-1934, therefore, Wurm‘s responses 
to the ecclesiastical Nazism of the GDC only became more critical after this point. Like 
Marahrens and Meiser, however, Wurm had to ensure that he differentiated his rejection of 
the GDC from that of Nazism at large in order not to jeopardise the autonomy of his 
bishopric. For this reason, Wurm continued to appease Nazi agents with declarations such as 
his pledge that, ―er [steht] fest und entschlossen auf dem Boden des heutigen Staates, unter 
seinem Führer Adolf Hitler‖.202 In spite of such strategies of appeasement, Wurm nonetheless 
came to criticise the GDC in a way that was precariously close to condemning the racial 
policies of the NSDAP as well. On one occasion Wurm appealed to the original Christian 
parables to proclaim publicly that, ―Wir können uns Jesus nicht konstruieren als nordlichen 
Menschen, sondern müssen es uns schon gefallen lassen, daß er im jüdischen Lande geboren 
ist und aus dem Hause und Geschlechte Davids war‖.203 As well as attacking the heresy of 
‗German Christianity‘, Wurm‘s words undoubtedly undermined the mythology of the 
NSDAP, which rested on the principles of Aryan superiority and Jewish inferiority. On the 
same occasion Wurm‘s condemnation for the GDC‘s decision to implement the 
Arierparagraph in the DEK came even closer to critiquing the racial fundament of Nazi 
pseudo-scientific mythology when he stated, ―Es ist gut, wenn unser Blick auf das ganze Volk 
gerichtet ist; wir haben nicht das / Recht, irgend jemanden durch menschlichen Machtspruch 
auszuschließen‖.204 As well as allowing him to express objection to the unchristian practices 
of the GDC, Wurm‘s regained pietistic rationale also caused him to begin to question the 
morality of the NSDAP‘s rule, and the right of the State to discriminate against others in the 
society it governed. 
By early 1935, therefore, Wurm‘s responses to the pro-Nazi GDC had moved from being 
motivated purely by political gain to being influenced by his desire to preserve the 
fundamental dogma of German Protestantism. Once Wurm had recognised the full potential 
of the GDC to destroy the original essence of Christianity epitomised by his ‗intact‘ 
Landeskirche, Wurm was visibly compelled to fight the movement‘s heresy with the very 
pietistic traditions it sought to destroy. Wurm‘s rhetorical musings from the period show that 
his main grievance with the GDC was that it attempted to render the timeless image of God in 
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line with current trends in the temporal arena; hence his question: ―Was soll denn das heißen: 
Gott ist Geist? Es soll heißen: Gott ist kein körperliches Wesen, nicht abhängig von den 
Schranken der Zeit und des Raumes‖.205 Although Wurm‘s eventual opposition to the GDC 
was a result of his objection to its particular heretical doctrine, unlike the actions of 
Marahrens and Meiser, however, it cannot be denied that Wurm‘s verbal protestations against 
the GDC also increasingly brought him into conflict with the discriminatory policies of the 
NSDAP. Even though the nature of Wurm‘s disagreement with the policies of the NSDAP is 
obviously called into question by the fact that he did not object to Nazi political methods 
outright, but rather as a consequence of his opposition to the GDC, already at this early stage 
in the Third Reich, Wurm was evidently edging towards a more radical form of Resistenz to 
Nazi hegemony than his ‗intact‘ counterparts in Hanover and Bavaria. 
 
The Landesbischöfe and the Bekennende Kirche 
Although the general support of Landesbischöfe Marahrens, Meiser and Wurm for the 
NSDAP served to lessen the bishops‘ respective degrees of opposition to the heretical 
practices of the GDC, the contribution of the three men to the historical development of the 
‗Confessing‘ cause is unmistakable. Even though the groundwork for the formation of the 
eventual Bekennende Kirche had already been laid as a result of the efforts of ‗Confessing‘ 
clergymen such as Martin Niemöller, Landesbischöfe Marahrens, Meiser and Wurm were 
nonetheless instrumental in its establishment and initial administration. The aim of this sub-
chapter, therefore, is to investigate the bishops‘ individual reasons for joining the Protestant 
opposition movement in the early years of the Third Reich and to assess the extent to which 
the bishops were both willing and able to contribute to the development of intra-Church 
resistance to Nazism. 
To take the case of Landesbischof August Marahrens of Hanover first, then, it must be 
appreciated that, even though Marahrens had a strong aversion to the unorthodoxy of the 
GDC from the very start of the Third Reich, the ‗German Christians‘ also gave him good 
reason to resist actively their ecclesiastical rule in 1934. Almost immediately after Marahrens 
refused to sign the ELLKH over to the authority of the Reichskirche, August Jäger forced 
Marahrens into continuous negotiations over his right to continue to head the Hanoverian 
Landeskirche. Ludwig Müller also fiercely attacked Marahrens‘ leadership of the ELLKH on 
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3
rd
 September 1934 when he attempted to remove all power of administration from Marahrens 
and line up a replacement bishop to take over his regional powers of governance. To this end, 
Müller even made a personal visit to the territory of the ELLKH in order to incite the 
Hanoverian parishioners and pastorate against Marahrens.
206
 Marahrens, however, used his 
powers of Bevollmächtigung to ensure that he legally retained full authority over the ELLKH. 
His supporters within his Landeskirche also showed dedication to his cause by fighting off 
fifteen GDC insurgents who had broken into church offices.
207
 Not content with Marahrens‘ 
protestations, the GDC nevertheless made one last-ditch attempt to oust Marahrens from 
office when Hanoverian ‗German Christian‘ Dr. Richter took Marahrens first to the 
Hanoverian Land court and then to the Oberlandesgericht in Celle to question his authority to 
continue to govern as Landesbischof.
208
 Although Marahrens came through all of these attacks 
unscathed and with his ELLKH still ‗intact‘, these events marked only the start of his ill-
treatment at the hands of Nazi agents. As Inge Mager confirms, from this point on, ―Er wurde 
bespitzelt, telefonisch abgehört, einmal verhaftet, erhielt Predigt- und Aufenthaltsverbote und 
befand sich in permanenter Gefahr‖.209 
The extent to which Marahrens was able to resist Nazi incursions on both his 
Landeskirche and his personal freedom was, however, limited by the particular socio-cultural 
conditions of his ELLKH. Since the population of the Hanoverian Landeskirche had 
increasingly become predominantly both pro-NSDAP and pro-GDC, any overt expression of 
opposition to either Nazi agency came with the risk of provoking reprisals and further 
endangering the Intaktheit of the ELLKH. Marahrens‘ need to appease Nazi agents was also 
particularly heightened by the proximity of his ELLKH to the Nazi administrative centre of 
Berlin. Since every action Marahrens made was at risk of being observed closely by those 
who were all too ready to denounce him as a traitor to the Nazi State, Marahrens had to 
exercise caution in any attempt to oppose ‗German Christians‘ in his midst. Moreover, despite 
his abhorrence of Reichsbischof Müller and the heretical practices of the GDC in general, 
Marahrens was ultimately reliant on collaboration with his predominantly ‗German Christian‘ 
church senate in order to be able to govern the ELLKH without excessive hindrance. Since 
between eighty and ninety per cent of Hanoverian Kirchenvorsteher belonged by now to the 
GDC,
210
 therefore, Marahrens needed to frame his opposition to ‗German Christianity‘ as 
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resistance to the methods and ambitions of the wider Reichskirche leadership only, rather than 
the intentions and operations of local GDC agents. In this context, it becomes possible to view 
Marahrens‘ headship of the eventual Bekennende Kirche as a means by which he was able to 
convey such ‗partial‘ opposition, since it allowed him to oppose directly the official church 
leadership of Reichsbischof Müller and the DEKK, whilst still allowing him to remain affable 
to local ‗German Christians‘ within his own Landeskirche. 
There can also be no doubt that Marahrens was well equipped to join and lead the 
Bekennende Kirche. Firstly, his past experience on the Kapler Ausschuss meant that 
Marahrens possessed skills that were of immense value to an alternative Church government. 
Not only did Marahrens have familiarity with formulating a new structure and constitution for 
the DEK but his genuine determination to counter the leadership of Reichsbischof Müller 
rendered him a vital asset for the ‗Confessing‘ cause. Moreover, since the ELLKH was the 
only ‗intact‘ Landeskirche in northern Germany, Marahrens found himself in an advantageous 
position to contribute effectively to efforts which resisted the rule of the national GDC 
administration. After all, the geographical positioning of Marahrens‘ Landeskirche meant that 
he was close enough to the severely ‗destroyed‘ churches of the EKApU both to understand 
the concerns of its ‗Confessing‘ clergy and to travel easily to the heart of the action.211 Yet, he 
was also far enough from the Nazi capital so that any illicit operations taking place within the 
ELLKH did not risk attracting as much suspicion from the Nazi government as they risked if 
they continued to take place in Berlin and its immediate vicinity.
212
 The most vital asset that 
Marahrens possessed for the Bekennende Kirche, however, was his status as ―dienstälteste[r] 
Landesbischof‖,213 and also the most prominent Landesbischof of the ‗intact‘ churches owing 
to his previous involvement in the Kapler Ausschuss. As a result of Marahrens‘ distinguished 
reputation within the Protestant Church, then, the ‗Confessing‘ cause undoubtedly carried 
more theological weight against the GDC-led Reichskirche with Marahrens at its helm. 
Fortunately for Marahrens in the midst of intense Nazi surveillance, however, his 
headship of the Bekennende Kirche‘s first VKL also appeared the logical corollary of his 
recent history of high-profile positions within the Protestant Church. Since his primary 
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function in the first VKL was to oversee the establishment of a more appropriate structure and 
constitutional basis for the DEK than that offered by the GDC, Marahrens was able, at least, 
to render his function in the Bekennende Kirche as one of chief conciliator. After all, the 
‗Dahlemitic‘ strand of the ‗Confessing‘ front was already showing signs of a desire to resist 
Nazism in its entirety and this approach obviously risked reprisals for German Protestantism 
at large. Since Marahrens was, by contrast, already co-operating with local GDC agents in his 
Landeskirche and showing loyalty to Nazi secular rule generally, he was ultimately able to 
frame his leadership of the first VKL as an attempt to steer the Church resistance movement 
onto a more amenable course for both the Church and the State. In this context, it must be 
appreciated that, because the NSDAP was engaged in establishing its tyrannical hold over the 
German nation during these early years of the Third Reich, it was not in its best interests to be 
seen to persecute the Church for its non-conformism; especially in light of the fact that the 
Party had so publicly based its ideology upon specifically Protestant precepts. For this reason, 
the glaring disparity between Marahrens‘ moderate leadership style and the radical intentions 
of the ‗Dahlemites‘ helped to save him from rebuttals from the Nazi State, which at the start 
of the Third Reich could not afford to be seen to punish him for efforts that were in line with 
what it was promoting as its ‗Christianised‘ agenda. 
Although Marahrens‘ conciliatory approach to the leadership of the first VKL avoided 
confrontation with Germany‘s Nazi regime, it nonetheless caused friction within the ranks of 
the Bekennende Kirche. Whereas ardent Nazis were always going to view Marahrens as the  
―Fürsprecher der Opposition‖214 once he became Vorsitzender of the first VKL, his leadership 
of the committee did not necessarily meet with the expectations of the more radical 
‗Confessing‘ clergymen underneath him. Not only did Karl Barth object to Marahrens‘ open 
displays of support for the NSDAP,
215
 but Oberkirchenrat Thomas Breit similarly grew 
increasingly frustrated with Marahrens‘ leadership style, allegedly proclaiming, ―Er legt alles 
aufs Eis!‖216 Further to this, it is known that the founder of the Church opposition movement, 
Martin Niemöller, also resented Marahrens‘ deliberations and lack of radical action against 
the Nazis. Private correspondence on the tensions within the VKL only three months into 
Marahrens‘ presidency illustrates that Niemöller and Barth were so unhappy with Marahrens‘ 
tendency to compromise his opposition to the ecclesiastical Nazism of the GDC with 
unrelenting proclamations of support for the NSDAP that they both considered, ―daß nun alles 
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verloren sei‖.217 Marahrens, nevertheless, remained committed to his role as chief conciliator 
and continued to stress that, ―Es müssen jetzt überall Wege zu einer Aussöhnung gefunden 
werden‖.218 The fact that Marahrens proved himself solely concerned to achieve harmony 
between the national Church administration and the Nazi State at the expense of intra-Church 
conciliation, however, raises doubts about the intentions behind his Resistenz, since he only 
objected to the Nazi governance over German Protestantism and not to the NSDAP‘s rule 
over Germany in general. 
Marahrens‘ decision to direct the Bekennende Kirche to display Resistenz against the 
heresy of the GDC only and not Widerstand to the NSDAP at large is also undermined by the 
fact that, by the time the Bekennende Kirche had been established, the aims and ambitions of 
both the NSDAP and the GDC had become closely entwined through the partnership of 
Reichsbischof Müller and Rechtswalter Jäger. Although Marahrens did not hide his aversion 
to Jäger, describing him as ―brutal‖, ―kalt‖ and a ―Gewaltmensch‖,219 his affability toward the 
NSDAP and his reluctance to criticise Nazi secular leaders nonetheless suggests that he did 
not consider Jäger‘s actions to be representative of wider Nazi aims and ambitions in this 
period. Marahrens‘ Rundbrief from 24th May 1934 confirms that he still continued to believe 
in the honourable intentions of the Nazi State. In it, he denied reports that he opposed the 
wider aims of the NSDAP by stating that, ―Die in einer mir eben zugeleiteten Pressenotiz 
vorliegende ungeheuerliche Behauptung, daß der Widerstand gegen das Kirchengesetz betr. 
Eingliederung der Landeskirche ein Kampf gegen den Nationalsozialismus sei, entspricht 
nicht der Wahrheit‖.220 Although this denial of political intent can be seen as a tactical 
manoeuvre to ensure that the Nazi State did not feel threatened by his participation in the first 
VKL, Marahrens‘ reluctance to criticise the NSDAP nonetheless confirms that he was 
prepared to overlook Nazi barbarity even within the Church for the sake of avoiding conflict. 
Marahrens‘ particular predicament of being caught between conflicting desires to oppose the 
administration of Reichsbischof Müller and the DEKK on the one hand, yet to pacify and 
avoid confrontation with the NSDAP on the other, can be seen, then, to have encouraged him 
to render the Bekennende Kirche under his headship a vehicle both to ensure the sanctity of 
the Christian confessions and to convince the Nazi State that there ought to be room for 
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original German Protestantism in its society. Although Marahrens prevented the Bekennende 
Kirche from adopting an early policy of Widerstand against Nazism in its entirety, which 
casts doubt on his sense of Christian scruples since he did not object to the escalating Nazi 
policies of discrimination in this period, there can be no doubt that he nevertheless led the 
‗Confessing‘ front onto a comparatively safe course of Resistenz in the initial years of the 
Third Reich in the face of ever closer co-operation between the GDC and the NSDAP. 
Whilst Marahrens can be seen to have turned to the ‗Confessing‘ cause as a response to 
attacks from the national Reichskirche administration, however, his Bavarian counterpart 
Landesbischof Hans Meiser had to contend instead with more local-level skirmishes, which 
included a notable attempt to seize his office by Wolf Meyer-Erlach. Having once been a 
―radio preacher‖ for the ELKB between 1931 and 1932, Meyer-Erlach had come to align 
himself with the radical branch of the Thuringian GDC during his subsequent position as 
professor of theology at the University of Jena in 1933. Inspired by the ideology of the 
Deutsche Christen, then, Meyer-Erlach publicly denounced Meiser in front of prominent 
GDC and NSDAP members in Nuremberg on 23
rd
 May 1934,
221
 as well as through a 
derogatory article in the Nazi newspaper, the Fränkische Tageszeitung, on 6
th
 July 1934.
222
 
Only after these bottom-up attacks on Meiser‘s bishopric had occurred did the Reichskirche 
leadership under Ludwig Müller attempt to unseat Meiser from the ELKB through an 
Eingliederung decree issued in September 1934. The decree not only demanded the 
assimilation of the ELKB into the GDC-led Reichskirche but also set out plans to divide the 
Bavarian Landeskirche into the two administrative districts of Franken and ‗Old Bavaria‘, 
which were to be headed by two ‗German Christian‘ Kommissar bishops.223 By the time this 
Eingliederung decree was issued, however, the assaults on Meiser‘s leadership by the likes of 
Meyer-Erlach had already served to ‗harden‘ him against Nazi brutality and demonstrate the 
need to oppose outwardly ‗German Christian‘ demands on his leadership. For this reason, 
Meiser was in a strong position to dismiss Müller‘s Eingliederung order but not without 
further enraging Nazi officials, who began to taunt Meiser by erecting placards against him,
224
 
arranging protest parades and publishing scathing articles in the regional press.
225
 Unlike their 
Hanoverian counterparts, however, the Bavarian Nazis were temporarily successful in seizing 
Meiser‘s office in Munich on 11th October 1934 and confining Meiser to house arrest the 
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following day. Meiser remained captive until the end of the month and was only freed by 
Hitler himself as a result of the unwavering support of his Landeskirche.
226
 
By contrast with Marahrens, who had a strategic imperative to pacify ‗German 
Christians‘ on the local level of his Landeskirche if he was to continue to lead the ELLKH 
without undue objection, Meiser governed a Landeskirche without such a strong ‗German 
Christian‘ contingent. Since the GDC had failed to achieve a majority in the ELKB during the 
Church elections of 1933 to warrant its dominance over the Landeskirche, a strong 
undercurrent of hostility, or at least distrust, for ‗German Christian‘ precepts was already 
characteristic of the ELKB. For Meiser to act in accordance with the will of his Landeskirche, 
then, in order to cause the least controversy possible with both his pastorate and parishioners, 
it was only natural that he cemented the Church opposition movement in the form of the 
Bekennende Kirche to display common grievances over the GDC. Moreover, in this context, 
since Meiser had formerly supported the GDC in the Reichsbischof elections of 1933, there 
was no better way for Meiser to compensate for this past misjudgement and realign himself 
with the Christocentric preferences of the Bavarian populace than by showing himself to 
denounce the GDC outright. For these reasons, Meiser‘s decision to join the ‗Confessing‘ 
cause can be seen as the result of both necessity and strategy to ensure he retained control 
over his church. 
Further to this, it should also be noted that, even though political Catholicism had by now 
been rendered inactive in the Third Reich, confessional Catholicism remained as strong as 
ever in the southern German Länder. For this reason, it cannot be assumed that Meiser‘s 
desire to elevate the status of his Landeskirche against that of its more dominant Catholic 
counterpart had completely disappeared with the demise of the BVP. To counter Catholic 
supremacy in the region, however, it was no longer a viable option for Meiser after 1934 to 
form an alliance with the GDC in light of its intentions to oust him from power. Since Meiser 
also rejected a possible merger of the ELKB with the Bavarian Catholic Church and was 
openly opposed to the idea of ―die heimliche Katholisierung der evangelische Kirche‖,227 it 
was only natural that Meiser sought out another high profile establishment to which to align 
his Landeskirche. In the specific context of Meiser‘s continuous endeavours to associate his 
ELKB with the stronger status of a national ecclesiastical organisation in an attempt to add 
weight to its position against the Catholic Church, then, it can be seen as only logical that 
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Meiser, along with his southern German neighbour, Wurm, sought to consolidate the existing 
individual intra-Church resistance movements within German Protestantism into the more 
powerful nationalised structure of the Bekennende Kirche. 
To this end, Meiser and Wurm can thus be seen to issue the Ulmer Erklärung on 22
nd
 
April 1934 as a rallying call to establish an alternative mode of Church governance that was 
not only designed to rival the GDC-led Reichskirche but also held the implicit advantage of 
providing their Landeskirchen with a broader framework that enabled them to rival the 
transnational nature of confessional Catholicism. In their call for a closer Christian 
community, the bishops proclaimed that, 
Darum rufen wir auch alle Gemeinden, Älteste und Kirchengemeinderäte, Kirchenvorsteher und Pfarrer 
auf, mit uns zusammen zu stehen gegen solche Gefährdung der Kirche. [...] Ihr Christen deutscher 
Zunge, steht mit uns allen zusammen, fest gegründet auf Gottes Wort, unverrückt im Gebet, freudig im 
Glauben und in der Liebe!
228 
As well as explicitly condemning the GDC for the dangers it brought to the Church, Meiser 
and Wurm implicitly showed through their use of the formulation ―Christen deutscher Zunge‖ 
that their allegiance to their Christian conscience took precedence over their shared Germanic 
identity. The bishops‘ call to all levels of Church administration further testifies to their 
overarching desire to establish an alternative Church government that was based on a solid 
sense of Christian community and not the nationalistic and hierarchical Volksgemeinschaft of 
the Nazis. 
Unfortunately for the ‗Confessing‘ front, however, it quickly became apparent that 
Meiser and Wurm did not share the same idea of the Christian community that they envisaged 
for the Bekennende Kirche. Meiser‘s ongoing efforts to consolidate the specifically Lutheran 
churches in Germany, as well as his recent turn to confessional Lutheranism as a means to 
convey objection to the GDC without risking comment on secular, political affairs, also 
appeared to influence his design for the ‗Confessing‘ Front. Although Meiser‘s desire to see 
confessional Lutheranism become the cornerstone of institutional Protestantism in Germany 
can be excused by the fact that his ELKB was so far removed from the United Protestant 
tradition common to northern Germany that he had little understanding of a working 
ecclesiastical structure that was based on confessional compromise, he soon began to declare 
openly that Lutheran underpinnings were a prerequisite for the Confessing Church. In a 
Bekenntniswort to pastors and parishioners, Meiser outlined his vision of a specifically 
―lutherische Kirche deutscher Nation‖, stating that, 
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Die evangelisch-lutherische Kirche muß nach ihrem Bekenntnis allen Nachdruck auf die Reinheit der 
Lehre legen. [...] Weil es der lutherischen Kirche nur um die reine Lehre ging, darum wurde sie zur 
Bekenntniskirche.
229 
Although Meiser originally proclaimed the formation of the Bekennende Kirche on the basis 
that, ―Das Bekenntnis ist in der deutschen evangelischen Kirche in Gefahr!‖,230 his 
subsequent revelation that he sought only to protect the specifically Lutheran Bekenntnis of 
the Protestant Church revealed that his particular mission in the ‗Confessing‘ cause was not to 
effect wider and pan-denominational conciliation like his Hanoverian counterpart, Marahrens, 
but rather to promote confessional Lutheranism as the basis for ‗true‘ German Protestantism. 
It is important to note, however, that Meiser did not only call for the Bekennende Kirche 
to adopt confessional Lutheranism as its basis during this period, but also the administration 
of the Reichskirche as well. Parallel to his efforts within the ‗Confessing‘ Front, Meiser sent a 
letter to the Reichsministerium des Innern on 24
th
 August 1934, putting forward a proposal for 
―die Befreiung der DEK‖ which was based on the adoption of Lutheranism as the main 
confession of the Church. In this proposal, Meiser revealed his belief that the main way for 
Reichsbischof Müller to gain credibility amongst the German Landesbischöfe was through the 
adoption of Lutheran precepts. He explicitly stated that, 
Sollte die DEK etwa durch Annahme der Augsburger Konfession als ihres Grundbekenntnisses zur 
lutherischen Reichskirche werden, so könnte das Verhältnis des Reichsbischofs zu den Landesbischöfen 
grundlegend im Sinne einer Verstärkung der Stellung des Reichsbischofs geändert werden.
231 
Meiser‘s sermons from the same period also reveal that he sought to promote confessional 
Lutheranism as a means both to replace the ―Pseudoluthertum‖ of the heretical Reichskirche 
administration and to prevent the DEK from becoming ―eine religiös neutrale Kirche‖.232 The 
fact that Meiser tried to promote the Lutheran cause to both the Bekennende Kirche and the 
leadership of the Reichskirche in parallel, then, demonstrates that he was not exclusively 
committed to the ‗Confessing‘ Front specifically to improve conditions for the ‗destroyed‘ 
Landeskirchen but merely since it represented another vehicle through which he could attempt 
to effect the confessional change that would benefit his own Lutheran Landeskirche. For this 
reason, it is unsurprising that Meiser‘s obvious Lutheran bias was met with criticism from the 
various ranks of the Bekennende Kirche. Reformed and United members of the Confessing 
Church in particular regarded Meiser‘s efforts to push specifically German Lutheranism to the 
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foreground of the movement as running the risk of creating yet another ―Kirche von des 
Staates Gnaden [...], letztlich also eine Staatskirche‖.233 
Like Meiser, Landesbischof Theophil Wurm of Württemberg was also drawn to the 
Bekennende Kirche as a result of bottom-up challenges to his leadership of the ELLKW once 
the Reichsbischof elections of 1933 had left his Landeskirche ‗intact‘. Following the Berlin 
Sportpalast scandal of November 1933 alluded to earlier in this chapter, the GDC lost a 
considerable number of members in the ELLKW.
234
 Local GDC leaders in Württemberg 
attempted, therefore, to take revenge on Wurm for these losses. To begin, they demanded that 
the Oberkirchenrat of the ELLKW comprise a ‗German Christian‘ majority in a bid to 
rekindle the movement‘s influence.235 Since Wurm refused this demand, the Württembergian 
faction of the GDC then attempted to unseat him from his bishopric on 14
th
 April 1934 with 
the assistance of Rechtswalter Jäger. Yet, instead of achieving its aims, the GDC merely 
provoked public remonstrations from Wurm and his supporters, which culminated in the 
notorious protest gathering in Ulm Münster on 22
nd
 April 1934, in which Meiser and Wurm 
together declared the official formation of the Bekennende Kirche and proclaimed it to be the 
―rechtmäßige evangelische Kirche Deutschlands‖.236 Unperturbed by Wurm‘s public 
declaration of opposition to ‗German Christian‘ heresy, however, Reichsbischof Müller 
nevertheless went ahead and issued his Eingliederung decree to the ELLKW on 3
rd
 September 
1934. Further to this, to ensure that Wurm was not able to organise and conduct public 
remonstrations this time around, Müller sought the help of local Nazi agents to hold Wurm on 
two separate occasions under house arrest.
237
 Müller had, however, failed to reckon with the 
considerable amount of support that subsequently arose for Wurm within the ELLKW, which 
saw hundreds of pastors and parishioners take to the streets of Stuttgart in protest. Since 
Germany was already coming under scrutiny from other countries for its treatment of its 
Protestant clergymen during this period,
238
 however, Hitler personally intervened in the 
situation to put an end to the demonstrations. He was, after all, concerned about the ―evidence 
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of mass resistance‖ in two of his core provinces and its subsequent reception by the outside 
world.
239
 
In light of these attacks on his leadership of the ELLKW, then, Wurm undoubtedly had 
proof of the brutality and destructiveness of the GDC. In spite of his initial affability towards 
its Nazi credentials as a means to forge an implicit relationship with the NSDAP, after these 
events Wurm had no choice but to oppose the destructive influence of the GDC in his 
Landeskirche if he were to retain control of his bishopric. Since Wurm‘s particular 
predicament was akin to that of his Bavarian counterpart in this period, it is unsurprising that 
Wurm‘s actions came to converge with those of Meiser. The commonality of cause between 
the two Landesbischöfe had been established, after all, as a result of the relative isolation of 
their Landeskirchen in the predominantly Catholic south, and their similar experiences at the 
hands of the Nazis. Both of these factors caused the bishops to come together to find strength 
in numbers to resist a common threat. Having been forced ultimately into a position in which 
any sign of leniency to the GDC was tantamount to the surrender of their respective 
Landeskirchen, therefore, Meiser and Wurm had no choice but to take a decisive step against 
its policies. In this context, then, it is understandable why the two bishops not only joined the 
‗Confessing‘ cause but also took up the fight against ‗German Christian‘ heresy together.  
Although Meiser and Wurm‘s rejection of the GDC should not be allowed to obscure the 
fact that both bishops remained welcoming of the NSDAP at large, their continuing support of 
the Nazi regime can be explained in part by Hitler‘s intervention on behalf of the two bishops 
in the autumn of 1934. Only a year after coming to power in Germany, Hitler had spoken to 
Meiser and Wurm about their opposition to the GDC-led Reichskirche. On 13
th
 March 1934, 
in particular, Hitler had warned the bishops that he would consider them ―Landesverräter und 
Volksverräter‖ should they continue to oppose the demands of the Reichskirche 
administration.
240 Following Müller and Jäger‘s public aggression towards them, however, 
Hitler had obviously lost cause to punish Meiser and Wurm, since the Reichskirche 
administration had already conveyed a detrimental image of itself to the international 
ecumenical community.
241 
For this reason, after ordering their release and inviting them, 
along with Marahrens, to meet him in Berlin on 30
th
 October 1934, Hitler was careful not to 
express his support for Müller. He was also evidently compelled to let the bishops go and 
conduct their work in the Church as they saw fit for the sake of preserving the external image 
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of German Protestantism.
242
 In this respect, although Hitler had theoretically been obliged to 
reinstate Meiser and Wurm to preserve Germany‘s external image, the fact remains that his 
personal intervention had saved the bishops from GDC aggression. Meiser and Wurm‘s 
continued loyalty to the NSDAP, then, can be seen to a certain degree as a reflection of their 
indebtedness to Hitler for ensuring that they retained control of their bishoprics. Further to 
this, there can also be no doubt that Hitler‘s earlier anger at the bishops for their turn to the 
Church opposition movement prompted the bishops to demonstrate that they were not 
opposed to the political will of Nazism at large. It is for these reasons that the bishops 
founded the Bekennende Kirche as a means to express opposition to the GDC and to foster an 
alternative Christian community that could be presented as being more appropriate to the 
needs of the Nazi State. 
As previously suggested, however, Meiser and Wurm differed in their perceptions of this 
Christian community. Whereas Meiser came to regard the Bekennende Kirche as a vehicle 
specifically to unite the German Lutheran churches, Wurm‘s recent resurgence of pietistic 
tendencies can be seen to have encouraged him to foster a Church union based on an 
adherence to the universal Christian parables. In a sermon of 10
th
 March 1935, Wurm 
reaffirmed the importance of establishing a Christocentric national Church with the words,  
Es schien lange Zeit, als ob Volk und Kirche sich immer weiter trennen wollten. Das ist heute anders. 
Man achtet die Kirche, aber man nimmt es doch schwer, wenn die Kirche nicht bloß das sagt, was man 
aus dem Gebiet der Welt sagt, sondern wenn sie auch das sagt, was von Gott her gesagt werden muß. 
Daraus sind Nöte entstanden, aber das kann uns nicht abhalten, wenn wir Kirche des Herrn Jesus 
Christus bleiben wollen.
243 
In this sermon, Wurm not only justified his turn to the ‗Confessing‘ cause by describing it as 
being in accordance with God‘s ultimate rule but he also appealed to a collective will through 
his use of the pronoun wir, which not only helped to exculpate him from sole culpability for 
the recent strengthening of the Church resistance movement but, more importantly, 
demonstrated that his concept of a Christian community was all-encompassing and 
unrestricted to a particular Protestant denomination. 
Further to this, Wurm‘s sermons and letters from the period also suggest that his idea of a 
Confessing Church was not only one which was universal but also somewhat militant. In an 
effort to promote both a sense of Christian mission amongst the ‗Confessing‘ community and 
an urgent call to stand up for the Word of God against the unorthodoxy of the GDC, Wurm 
can be seen to have used major events in the Christian calendar to raise awareness of the 
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Christian Kampf against the Reichskirche. A particularly striking example of how Wurm 
managed to promote a sense of a Christian crusade against the GDC is found in his 
Christmastide sermon of 1934, in which he not only emphasised the incompatibility of Kampf 
and Krippe within the Kirche, but also played upon the sharp alliteration of these words to 
highlight the inappropriateness of GDC brutality against the soft, innocent image of Christ. To 
illustrate this, Wurm stated that, 
Wir wollen nichts von der uns verpflichtenden Wahrheit von Jesus Christus preisgeben, aber wir 
kämpfen mit entschlossenem Willen um die Befriedung der Kirche, um der Kirche, um unsres Volkes, 
um des Staates willen. So treten wir als eine kämpfende Kirche in dieser Weihnacht an die Krippe.
244 
In light of provocative sermons like these, then, it can be asserted that Wurm desired the 
‗Confessing‘ Front to take the form of a fighting force for universal Christian precepts. This 
ultimately brought his approach to the nature of the Bekennende Kirche closer to Marahrens‘ 
diplomatic endeavour to achieve pan-denominational conciliation than to Meiser‘s efforts to 
effect both passive and specifically Lutheran change in the Church. Unlike Marahrens, 
however, Wurm was already showing signs of militancy against Nazism at large. 
Wurm‘s desire to destroy not only the intra-Church factionalism that had arisen as a 
result of ‗German Christian‘ heresy, but also age-old Protestant denominationalism, is also 
confirmed by his sermon of 15
th
 April 1934. In the Stiftskirche in Stuttgart, Wurm exclaimed 
that, 
Wohl wissen wir, wie sehr die Teilung des deutschen Volkes in zwei christliche Konfessionen sich 
manchmal verhängnisvoll erwiesen hat, und darum verstehen wir es, wenn manche Volksgenossen 
glauben, es sei jetzt der Zeitpunkt gekommen, um auch diese Unterschiede zu beseitigen.
245 
Not only do Wurm‘s words suggest that he believed traditional intra-denominational divisions 
ought to be overcome in order for the Church to assert effective opposition to the GDC but his 
later sermons reinforce the notion that he believed the true essence of the Church to rest solely 
on a universal belief in God and not on any specific confessional order. Speaking on 4
th
 
November 1934, Wurm expressed his objections to the heretical practices of the GDC-led 
DEK, stating that,  
...um Kirche zu sein, braucht man nicht einen unfehlbaren Papst zu haben, braucht man nicht die 
irdische Organisation zu vergöttlichen und für unfehlbar und heilig zu erklären. Um Kirche zu sein, 
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muß man sich nur sammeln um das Wort und dieses Wort in seiner Verheißung und in seinen Geboten, 
in seiner rettenden und richtenden Kraft ganz ernst zu nehmen.
246 
It is thus in the context of Wurm‘s increasing turn away from the self-imposed confessional 
structures of the Protestant Church, together with the unorthodoxy of recent pro-Nazi 
practices, that it is possible to see Wurm‘s vision for the Bekennende Kirche as one which 
spoke up for Christian values per se, irrespective of both confessional and political 
allegiances. 
Just as Marahrens and Meiser did not escape criticism for their respective approaches to 
the Church opposition movement, however, Wurm‘s actions in this period equally set him up 
to receive condemnation from the ‗Dahlemitic‘ strand of the Bekennende Kirche in the next 
stage of the Protestant struggle. This is mainly because his appeal to pietistic values in this 
phase of the Third Reich led the ‗Dahlemites‘ to expect more from Wurm in the ensuing 
years. Contrary to Marahrens and Meiser, who were criticised for not doing enough to unify 
the ‗Confessing‘ cause, Wurm had already begun to arouse the expectation from those hardest 
hit by GDC oppression that he would quickly come to oppose Nazism in its entirety. This 
expectation arose from Wurm‘s sermons in this period in which he claimed, for example, that, 
―Kein Kirchenbau kann vor ihm Gnade finden, der nicht aus dem Dank für sein Wort und 
Werk hervorgegangen ist‖.247 Wurm‘s sudden change in tactics in the ensuing years of the 
Protestant Kirchenkampf, which will be discussed in the next chapter, therefore came to 
disappoint those who had come to expect more of his increasing prioritisation of universal 
Christian values. 
 
 
Chapter Summary 
In order to tie the individual threads of this chapter together, it should be reiterated that 
Landesbischöfe Marahrens, Meiser and Wurm were forced to respond to two distinct 
manifestations of Nazism at the outset of the Third Reich: namely the political and the 
ecclesiastical. Despite sharing a presumed commonality of cause as three Lutheran 
Landesbischöfe, the actual responses of the bishops to both manifestations of Nazism were 
neither congruent nor entirely compatible. 
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To take the bishops‘ reactions to political Nazism first, it becomes clear that, even though 
all three Landesbischöfe endorsed the NSDAP initially, their pro-Nazi sentiments were not 
necessarily a result of their personal support for the Party, since the bishops also had to act in 
accordance with the socio-cultural conditions of their Landeskirchen. Just as it was necessary 
for Marahrens to appease his predominantly Nazi ELLKH as well as his Nazi neighbours in 
Berlin by speaking positively about the NSDAP, it was beneficial for Meiser and Wurm to 
appeal to the NSDAP in the hope of overpowering the force of political Catholicism that had 
long subjugated their respective Landeskirchen. Since all three Landesbischöfe desired to 
retain their positions of leadership once the Intakheit of their churches had been established, 
therefore, it was not possible for Marahrens, Meiser or Wurm to avoid expressions of 
affability and allegiance to Nazi secular rule. 
With regard to ecclesiastical Nazism, however, the responses of the three bishops differed 
dramatically. Whilst Marahrens displayed strong opposition to the GDC from the start of the 
Third Reich, as a result of his personal aversion to the character of Ludwig Müller and his 
prior experience of constitutional matters, Meiser – following the lead of his more politically-
minded neighbour Wurm – initially supported the pro-Nazi GDC as a means to achieve an 
implied union with the NSDAP. Once ‗German Christian‘ heresy had become clear, however, 
Meiser and Wurm soon came to share Marahrens‘ initial rejection of the GDC‘s politico-
ecclesiastical agenda. By this point, Marahrens – although still opposed to the movement – 
nevertheless had no choice but to pacify its proponents in his predominantly pro-Nazi 
Landeskirche if he was to continue to rule with uncontested authority. Whilst the Protestant 
Kirchenkampf can be seen to have begun with Marahrens in steadfast opposition to the GDC, 
and Meiser and Wurm in joint support of the movement, by the end of 1934 the three bishops 
had undergone a paradoxical role reversal, with Marahrens now in a position of pacification 
of the GDC, and Meiser and Wurm completely rejecting its aims. This astonishing turnaround 
in the bishops‘ predicaments was not due to a sudden change in the political or ecclesiastical 
attitudes of the bishops themselves, but rather a response to the changing socio-cultural 
climate of the time, which rapidly saw the crux of the Protestant Kirchenkampf move to the 
southern German Länder. Whilst Meiser and Wurm were therefore obligated to oppose the 
GDC at all cost, Marahrens was in a different position, as Wurm himself confirmed: ―Nur der 
Landesbischof von Hannover konnte sich eine gewisse Bewegungsfreiheit retten‖.248 
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Placing the bishops‘ responses to both the NSDAP and the GDC in relation to their 
eventual turn to the Bekennende Kirche, then, Marahrens‘ decision to agree to assume the role 
of Vorsitzender of its first VKL can be seen to be a result of his new-found 
―Bewegungsfreiheit‖. Not only did he boast prior experience of formulating a national Church 
constitution as part of his work on the Kapler Ausschuss but his relative acceptance by both 
sides of the Protestant Kirchenkampf allowed him to assume a much-needed mediating 
position between proponents of Nazism on the one hand and the ‗Dahlemitic‘ strand of the 
‗Confessing‘ Front on the other. Whilst Meiser and Wurm brought about the official 
establishment of the Bekennende Kirche, as a result of their need to solicit wider institutional 
support for their rejection of the pro-Nazi GDC, their underlying confessional tendencies 
ultimately influenced their involvement in the movement to the benefit of their own 
Landeskirchen and not German Protestantism generally. Whilst Meiser employed the 
framework of the Bekennende Kirche to attempt to establish a specific union of the German 
Lutheran churches, Wurm used his traditional Württembergian pietism to call for a universal 
Christian crusade against the heresy of the GDC. With Meiser and Wurm thus positioned at 
the poles of confessional exclusivity and pietistic inclusivity, therefore, Marahrens must be 
regarded as being the only bishop of the ‗intact‘ churches in this period with the capacity to 
show respect for the three distinct Protestant denominations as well as the pro- and anti-Nazi 
intra-Church factions.    
Although Marahrens‘ leadership of the Bekennende Kirche‘s first VKL was to be 
expected on geographical grounds alone, it is indisputable that both Meiser and Wurm‘s 
respective approaches to the Bekennende Kirche at this stage in the Third Reich were not 
appropriate to the chairmanship of the ‗Confessing‘ cause. Despite the criticism Marahrens 
subsequently received for his moderate leadership style, since he did not object to the Nazis‘ 
unchristian practices in the wider secular arena, there can be no doubt that his credentials 
were more suited to the presidency of the Bekennende Kirche than those of either Meiser or 
Wurm. After all, Meiser‘s staunch Lutheranism had already proven itself to alienate his 
Reformed and United counterparts from the idea of a specifically Lutheran unification, and 
Wurm‘s militant overtones, although not met with overt criticism in this period, risked 
steering the ‗Confessing‘ cause onto the path of the radical ‗Dahlemites‘ too early in the Third 
Reich and thereby provoking reprisals from the State. Although this latter approach is 
undoubtedly the method many of us in the present day with the benefit of hindsight would 
have liked to see the Church adopt, since it opposed Nazism in its entirety and may have 
alleviated the situation of the Jews and other persecuted minorities in the Third Reich, it 
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cannot be denied that Marahrens offered a ‗safer‘ means of protecting the Church through the 
early years of the Protestant struggle against Nazism. This is because Marahrens succeeded in 
earning the respect of moderate ‗German Christian‘ clergymen, moderate members of the 
Bekennende Kirche, and the Nazi State alike, and ultimately facilitated negotiation between 
the respective parties. It is, however, unfortunate that Marahrens‘ power to effect conciliation 
between the Church and the State in this period came at the expense of protecting Christian 
morality in Nazi Germany in general. 
 In spite of its limitations, Marahrens‘ commitment to Protestant conciliation in the first 
phase of the Third Reich cannot be denied. The sincerity of his actions can be confirmed by 
his own proclamation that, ―Als verantwortlicher geistlicher Führer bin ich zu 
durchgreifendem Handeln gezwungen, um das ungestörte Zusammenarbeiten aller 
landeskirchlichen Stellen zu ermöglichen‖.249 It is for this reason that this investigation 
attributes the initial direction of the particular dynamic that the bishops of the ‗intact‘ 
churches represented to Marahrens, who not only succeeded in suppressing GDC influence on 
the regional and the national level but, more importantly, enabled the ‗Confessing‘ Front to 
develop throughout the early years of the Third Reich with the least possible risk of reprisals 
from the Nazi State and also from Protestants of the United and Reformed denominations. 
Adopting the title of a sub-chapter in Waldemar Röhrbein‘s study of the Hanoverian bishop, 
then, this chapter concludes that the years of 1933 to 1935 were indeed ―[d]er Sieg des 
Landesbischofs in der ersten Phase des Kirchenkampfes‖.250 
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CHAPTER TWO – 1935-1939: THE MEISER YEARS 
 
As the previous chapter has demonstrated, the three Landesbischöfe of the ‗intact‘ churches 
clearly ended the early years of the Protestant Kirchenkampf in a position of overt opposition, 
at least to the ecclesiastical Nazism of the GDC. This came about primarily as a result of 
Meiser and Wurm‘s eventual convergence, which led them to proclaim the existence of the 
Bekennende Kirche, as well as Marahrens‘ subsequent conciliatory leadership of its first VKL. 
The bishops‘ positions were, however, to alter dramatically from mid-1935 onwards due to 
two parallel developments in the Church and the State. 
In the first instance, the Bekennende Kirche split in February 1936 over disagreements 
between moderate members of the ‗Confessing‘ Front and the radical ‗Dahlemites‘; the 
former wished to continue to tread carefully within the Nazi State by solely displaying 
Resistenz to ‗German Christian‘ heresy, whilst the latter insisted that the Bekennende Kirche 
adopt a more resolute form of Widerstand to Nazism in general in response to the NSDAP‘s 
rapidly escalating policies of discrimination. After all, during this era, the Nazi State enacted 
the so-called Nuremberg Race Laws against German Jews,
251
 which, amongst others, 
prohibited them to marry or to have sexual relations with deemed ‗Aryans‘, and also 
introduced various categories of ―Mischlinge‖ to determine the precise degree of Jewish 
heritage of every citizen of the Third Reich.
252
 Full ‗Aryans‘ also did not escape the 
implications of Nazi eugenics, since on 26
th
 June 1935 the Nazis passed an amendment to the 
existing law from 1933 to force abortions on German women to prevent them from passing on 
hereditary diseases.
253
 Moreover, on 10
th
 February 1936, just before the Bekennende Kirche 
split, the NSDAP demonstrated that its brutality was to become a fact of life in Nazi Germany 
from this point on, when it placed the Gestapo above the law.
254
 
In spite of these developments, Landesbischöfe Marahrens, Meiser and Wurm continued 
to adhere to the moderate faction of the Bekennende Kirche and objected to resisting Nazism 
in its entirety. As a result of their decision to diverge from their ‗Dahlemitic‘ counterparts in 
this period, Marahrens renounced his leadership of the first VKL whilst Meiser used the split 
in the Bekennende Kirche to build upon his specifically Lutheran design for institutional 
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Protestantism in Germany. Since this had thus far proved a vehicle through which he was able 
to oppose the heretical practices of the GDC without also running the risk of overtly 
appearing to criticise the NSDAP and, thereby, jeopardising German Protestantism at large, 
Meiser built upon his already established Lutheran organisations and networks to found the 
Rat der Evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche Deutschlands (RELKD), which was alternatively 
known as the Lutherrat.
255
 The new Lutherrat superseded the original Lutherischer Rat of 
1934 and became the instrument of Church governance from 1936 onwards for the moderate 
strand of the Bekennende Kirche, which was known from this point on as the lutherischer 
Flügel. 
Parallel to this, the Nazi State had also taken a decisive step to attempt to remedy the 
intra-Church Protestant dispute, hailing in, alongside its intensification of racial laws, a new 
era of staatliche Kirchenpolitik. Since the joint efforts of Müller and Jäger had only created 
further factionalism within the German Protestant Church in the initial years of the 
Kirchenkampf, the Nazi government in Berlin established the Reichsministerium für kirchliche 
Angelegenheiten (RMfKA) under the headship of Reichsminister Hanns Kerrl. It was intended 
that Kerrl would work with moderate Protestant clergymen to bring about a more effective 
and united Reichskirche. Although Kerrl had only been appointed to the post on 16
th
 July 
1935, by 19
th
 December of the same year he had already imposed the Sicherungsgesetz on the 
Church, which gave him full control over Protestant affairs and the power to circumvent any 
synodal authority.
256
 With this, Kerrl set about establishing a national Reichskirchenausschuss 
(RKA) supported by smaller regional Landeskirchenausschüsse (LKA) in the majority of 
Protestant Landeskirchen. These church committees comprised only moderate churchmen 
since Kerrl hoped that their influence would help to demobilise the radical elements of both 
the GDC and the Bekennende Kirche; the latter of which he also officially prohibited from 
engaging in further activity in the Third Reich.
257 
The only churches to remain free from 
LKAs, then, were the three ‗intact‘ Landeskirchen of Hanover, Bavaria and Württemberg, and 
selected GDC-led churches that did not have a very large presence of ‗Confessing‘ 
clergymen.
258
 In essence, Kerrl‘s RKA and LKAs presented the German Protestant Church 
with two options – either to conform and become a working functionary of the State as part of 
its envisaged Staatskirche, or to strictly separate itself from the State, accepting the abolition 
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of State-based funding, a loss of influence in State affairs, and the absence of State protection 
against potential reprisals from the GDC. Whilst the Niemöller strand of the Bekennende 
Kirche opted for the latter at the fourth Reichsbekenntnissynode at Bad Oeynhausen and 
formed its own leadership under the second VKL,
259
 Church moderates Marahrens, Meiser 
and Wurm seized the chance to work with Kerrl and influence the design for the new 
Staatskirche.  
Whether perceived as a consequence of the division of the Bekennende Kirche or, indeed, 
as the reason behind the split in the first place,
260
 there can be no doubt that the emergence of 
the stronger Lutheran alliance between the ‗intact‘ Landeskirchen helped Landesbischöfe 
Marahrens, Meiser and Wurm to continue on their conciliatory course through the Protestant 
Kirchenkampf. Not only did their particular lutherischer Flügel help to pacify the Nazi State 
and its RMfKA at the start of the phase of staatliche Kirchenpolitik, but, once tensions 
increased between the Nazi regime and the ‗Dahlemitic‘ wing of the Bekennende Kirche in the 
face of Nazi violence, it also served as a means to defend the bishops and the ‗intact‘ 
Protestantism that they represented from increasing Nazi aggression. A paradoxical inter-
relationship nonetheless developed between the lutherischer Flügel and the RMfKA during 
this period to the extent that, whilst the bishops‘ common Lutheran obligation to co-operate 
with the State encouraged their partnership with Hanns Kerrl, the increasing encroachment of 
the RMfKA into the affairs of the Church in turn served to reinforce their Lutheran 
disinclination to compromise the essence of Protestant Christianity in Nazi Germany. 
Whilst the lutherischer Flügel was becoming increasingly more protective of the original 
Protestant confessions, however, it is nonetheless important to remember that during the years 
of the Third Reich under investigation in this chapter, Nazi violence and aggression was 
rapidly developing in two ways; firstly through the establishment of the Nazi aim for 
territorial expansion in Europe. This began with the occupation and re-militarisation of the 
Rhineland on 7
th
 March 1936,
261
 and soon included the annexation of Austria (13
th
 March 
1938),
262
 the occupation of the Sudetenland (15
th
 October 1938),
263
 the seizure of 
Czechoslovakia (15-16
th
 March 1939),
264
 and the invasion of Poland on 1
st
 September 
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1939.
265
 In addition to this, the NSDAP intensified its discriminatory policies towards the 
Jews in particular in this period.
266
 Following the Nuremberg Race Laws, German Jews were 
dismissed from professional occupations, prohibited from trading, and forced to adopt the 
Jewish names of ‗Israel‘ and ‗Sara‘ on all legal documents.267 In 1938, the Nazis began to 
employ violence against the Jews on a mass scale, destroying Jewish synagogues and 
initiating the so-called Reichskristallnacht on 9
th
 November, which took the form of a co-
ordinated attack on Jewish homes and businesses, and saw many Jews assaulted, murdered, 
and rounded up for deportation to concentration camps that the Nazis had by now established 
around Germany.
268
 Before war approached in 1939, Hitler also publicly threatened the Jews 
with annihilation in a speech to the Reichstag on 30
th
 January,
269
 German Jews were forced to 
hand over their wealth and properties to the Nazi State,
270
 and plans were being formalised to 
ensure the emigration of the Jews in the Third Reich at large.
271
 
It is against this complex backdrop of escalating Nazi violence, therefore, that this 
chapter seeks to show how Landesbischof Hans Meiser of Bavaria emerged as the forerunner 
within the particular ‗intact‘ dynamic that he shared with Marahrens and Wurm. Although 
Meiser‘s efforts did not facilitate opposition to the wider Nazi aims of expansion and 
persecution at this point in the Third Reich, they nevertheless ensured that the bishops‘ 
general responses to Nazism in this period served to keep their particular ‗intact‘ dynamic in a 
vital position of negotiation between Nazi agents on the one hand, and proponents of 
‗Dahlemitic‘ theology on the other. By encouraging a heightened sense of confessional 
Lutheranism within a particular section of the German Protestant Church, Meiser not only 
steered the ‗intact‘ churches away from both total assimilation to the demands of the RMfKA 
and the radical opposition of the ‗Dahlemites‘ but, by extension, he kept an element of 
German Protestantism away from direct attack by the increasingly brutal and remorseless 
Nazi State in this period. Since Meiser‘s actions ultimately helped to shroud the ‗intact‘ 
dynamic with a distinct confessional status of its own, which freed it from the ever 
intensifying conflict between the ‗Dahlemites‘ and the Nazi State, this chapter is devoted to 
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demonstrating how the ‗Meiser Years‘ of 1935 to the onset of war in 1939 were integral to 
ensuring the continued survival of ‗intact‘ Protestantism in Germany in the face of both 
increasingly confrontational staatliche Kirchenpolitik and Nazi aggression at large.  
 
The Landesbischöfe and the lutherischer Flügel 
Although the lutherischer Flügel had been evolving on Meiser‘s initiative since early 1933, as 
detailed in the introduction to Chapter One of this dissertation,
272
 Landesbischöfe Marahrens, 
Meiser and Wurm only began to consolidate their specific Lutheran niche in mid-1935, once 
they realised the potential of their confessional alliance not only to defy the converging 
demands of the Nazi State and the GDC, but also to neutralize the efforts of their more radical 
counterparts in the Bekennende Kirche. As the encroachment of the Nazi State on Protestant 
affairs increased in this period via Hanns Kerrl and his RKA, and with it the radicalism of the 
Bekennende Kirche as a response to the RMfKA‘s advances, the need of the bishops to seek 
sanctuary in their common Lutheran confession can be seen as a logical consequence of their 
shared desire to protect the Intaktheit of their respective churches and their consequent 
endeavour to strike a balance between outright defiance of Nazi aims and total compliance 
with the radical ‗Dahlemites‘. When consolidating their specifically Lutheran alliance in the 
RELKD of 1936, the Landesbischöfe released a joint statement of intent, which depicted the 
development as a logical consequence of their ever closer union over the initial years of the 
Protestant Kirchenkampf and shared confessional hopes and aspirations for the German 
Protestant Church. Their statement thus read that, ―Durch den lutherischen Pakt [...] haben die 
lutherischen Kirchen von Hannover, Württemberg und Bayern versucht, die Gemeinsamkeit 
des lutherischen Bekenntnisses auch in der Ordnung und im Leben ihrer Kirchen stärker zur 
Geltung zu bringen‖.273 Taking this joint proclamation of presumed ―Gemeinsamkeit‖ as its 
starting point, then, this sub-chapter investigates whether the bishops did, in fact, display a 
commonality of cause via their shared Lutheran alliance or whether, instead, they saw ―in der 
besonderen Vereinbarung zwischen den drei lutherischen Landeskirchen von Hannover, 
Bayern und Württemberg‖,274 a common means to achieve fundamentally distinct ends. 
Since Landesbischof August Marahrens of Hanover had led the particular ‗intact‘ 
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dynamic which the three bishops exemplified into the second stage of the Protestant 
Kirchenkampf, it is only logical that this investigation looks at his response to the advent of 
staatliche Kirchenpolitik first. By mid-1935 Marahrens was not only the leader of the ELLKH 
and the head of the Bekennende Kirche‘s first VKL but he had also become president of the 
Lutherischer Weltbund (LWB) in the international ecclesiastical arena. Given his prominent 
roles on local, national, and now also international platforms, Marahrens entered the second 
phase of the Protestant struggle in Nazi Germany with a heightened need to balance 
considerations from all the sides and of all the levels for which he now worked. For this 
reason, it was only natural that Marahrens‘ actions in the Protestant Kirchenkampf became 
less confrontational and, instead, targeted towards keeping the peace between the various 
Church factions. Although Marahrens‘ move away from the ‗Dahlemitic‘ strand of the 
Bekennende Kirche in this period meant that he rejected the possibility of outright Widerstand 
to Nazism, it was nonetheless a logical means of achieving his true ambition of preventing 
further antagonism between the Church and the State. After all, even though Marahrens‘ 
relative lack of commitment to Widerstand caused friction within the radical ranks of the 
Bekennende Kirche, this was nonetheless a lesser sacrifice than if Marahrens had supported 
the ‗Dahlemites‘ at the risk of aggravating his predominantly Nazi Landeskirche and, of 
course, the nearby Berlin government itself. 
The view that Marahrens‘ departure from ‗Dahlemitic‘ radicalism had become 
increasingly inevitable in this period is supported by Erwin Wilkins, who concludes that the 
‗Dahlemites‘ were not able to offer Marahrens the socio-political security he needed in order 
to keep face with all sides of the Protestant conflict. As Wilkins states, ―Die bruderrätlichen 
Kritiker von Bischof Marahrens haben ihrerseits keine allgemein überzeugenden Alternativen 
gesamtkirchlicher Art entwickeln oder durchsetzen können [...]. Die einzige realistische 
Alternative wäre der Weg in die Freikirche mit einer vereinsmäßigen Gemeindestruktur 
gewesen‖.275 Since Marahrens had always based his Church conciliation efforts upon the 
―Drei-Säulen-Theorie‖ that brought together the Lutheran, Reformed and United elements of 
German Protestantism,
276
 it must be appreciated that his all-embracing unification efforts 
were always going to stand in direct contrast to those of the revolutionary ‗Dahlemites‘. As 
well as being at risk of creating a ―Freikirche‖ away from the main German Protestant 
Church, the ‗Dahlemites‘, in Marahrens‘ opinion, were also in danger of turning into an 
equally heretical movement on par with that of the ‗German Christians‘. In a letter to the 
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Hanoverian pastorate in late 1936, Marahrens wrote that,  
Aufs neue droht innerhalb der Kirche eine Gefahr. Eine Nationalkirche, die alle Konfessionen mit 
Einschluß der katholischen Kirche umfassen soll, erscheint vielen als das große Ziel der nächsten 
Entwicklung.
277 
Marahrens‘ principal fears can be seen, therefore, to have moved in the space of a couple of 
years from a concern to prevent the GDC from destroying the orthodoxy of German 
Protestantism to a worry over the ‗Dahlemites‘ similarly ruining the confessional diversity of 
the German Protestant Church. As can be inferred from his words, Marahrens feared that the 
Bekennende Kirche under the leadership of the second VKL sought to establish yet another 
nationalised Church, although this time, instead of adopting the heretical values of 
ecclesiastical Nazism as its unifying force, it was at risk of sacrilegiously devaluating the 
traditional Protestant confessions in its concern to oppose simply the Nazi Weltanschauung 
through its militant and unsystematic theology. 
Moreover, Marahrens‘ aversion to ‗Dahlemitic‘ practices grew ever stronger once the 
radical strand of the Bekennende Kirche proved itself willing to compromise the three pillars 
of German Protestantism purely to establish a stronger theological force that was more 
appropriate to counter the Nazi threat. In their turn to an ‗eye for an eye‘ mode of rationale to 
justify an outright attack against Nazi hegemony, the ‗Dahlemites‘ reworked the original 
Protestant confessions to defend the use of militarism against the State.
278
 It must be accepted, 
therefore, that these ‗Dahlemitic‘ methods stood in contrast to Marahrens‘ deep-seated desire 
to unite the individual Protestant Landeskirchen without compromising their original 
confessional characters. Whilst the ‗Dahlemites‘ were attempting to counter Nazi heresy with 
their own staunch Christocentrism in the central period of the Third Reich, therefore, 
Marahrens recognised the insufficiency of ‗Dahlemitic‘ theology as an ideological basis for a 
united German Protestant Church. For this reason, when reflecting on a Church led by the 
‗Dahlemites‘, Marahrens declared at the end of 1936 that, ―Solche Kirche könnte aber nur 
eine Kirche / ohne wahre Einheit des Glaubens sein‖.279 Since the ‗Dahlemites‘ based their 
intra-church unity not on the original Protestant confessions but, rather, on a temporal, 
doctrinal aversion to Nazi ambitions, Marahrens viewed the Bekennende Kirche under their 
headship as violating the traditional confessional underpinnings of German Protestantism. It is 
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thus in this context that Marahrens‘ decision to turn to the Lutheran cause in the central years 
of the Protestant Kirchenkampf can be viewed as his means of preserving at least the original 
and most distinctly German Protestant confession to which he and his Landeskirche belonged. 
Marahrens‘ decision to find sanctuary in the lutherischer Flügel did not mean, however, 
that he gave up striving to find compromise between the polarities of the GDC-led 
Reichskirche on the one hand and the ‗Dahlemitic‘ design for a ‗Confessing‘ Nationalkirche 
on the other. Although Marahrens had firmly embedded his ELLKH in the lutherischer Zweig 
of the Confessing Church, his subsequent actions show that this was not an excuse to avoid 
further involvement in the Protestant Kirchenkampf per se. Over one year after the division of 
the Bekennende Kirche at Bad Oeynhausen and Marahrens‘ subsequent resignation as leader 
of the first VKL, for example, Marahrens still stressed the fact that the future of German 
Protestantism lay in the preservation of the original Protestant confessions. Implicitly 
chastising both the GDC and the ‗Dahlemites‘ for their manipulation of traditional Protestant 
doctrine to suit their respective politico-ecclesiastical ends, Marahrens exclaimed, ―Die 
Deutsche Evangelische Kirche kann auch nicht zur ―Sekte‖ oder ―Winkelkirche‖ werden. Sie 
ist die Erbin der größten kirchlichen Überlieferung unseres Volkes und muß es bleiben‖.280  
Despite Marahrens‘ honourable intentions to counter the anti-confessionalism of both the 
GDC and the ‗Dahlemites‘, however, it cannot be denied that the particular structure that 
Marahrens desired for the DEK may well have been based on the three original Protestant 
confessions but was, nonetheless, conceived in full support of the secular aims of the Nazi 
State. Through his turn to the lutherischer Flügel, Marahrens clearly exploited specifically 
Lutheran constraints which allowed him to oppose the doctrinal heresy of the GDC without 
forcing him to comment on the implications of Nazism in the wider secular arena. Although 
this ensured that Marahrens did not jeopardise his relations with the NSDAP which, as the 
following sub-chapter will demonstrate, viewed Marahrens as a credible figure to encourage 
negotiation between the GDC and the ‗Dahlemites‘, Marahrens‘ desire not to lose favour with 
the Nazi regime obviously calls into question his sense of duty to protect Christian morality in 
Germany at large, particularly in light of the Nazi‘s ever-intensifying persecution of the Jews 
and other selected minorities at this point in the Third Reich. Moreover, it was precisely on 
these grounds that the ‗Dahlemitic‘ strand of the Bekennende Kirche rapidly lost faith in his 
leadership credentials. Marahrens‘ decision to follow the non-confrontational course of the 
lutherischer Flügel must be appreciated, nonetheless, from his position as choosing the lesser 
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of two prospective evils: since the Intaktheit of his ELLKH had already been assured in the 
initial years of the Protestant Kirchenkampf, he was no longer actively reliant on the 
‗Confessing‘ Front for his own personal and professional security. Marahrens‘ need to ensure 
that no further revolts occurred within his Landeskirche from either the GDC or Nazi agents 
was, therefore, better served in the context of his highly Nazi bishopric by appearing willing 
to co-operate with Nazi agencies rather than being associated with the increasingly radical 
‗Dahlemites‘. 
Further to this, Marahrens‘ turn away from the ‗Dahlemites‘ was not only in line with the 
highly Nazi sentiments of his pastorate and parishioners, but was also in accordance with the 
strong sense of Lutheranism in his region. A letter sent by Gerichtsassessor Arnold Fratzscher 
to Marahrens following the division of the Bekennende Kirche confirms that the ELLKH in 
general had experienced a resurgence of Lutheran identity in this period. Fratzscher describes 
how, ―die lutherischen Kräfte und das theologische Können gerade der Norddeutschen viel 
größer ist, als wir gedacht haben. Die ganze Frage des Luthertums innerhalb der 
altpreußischen Union hat sich als ein sehr viel schwierigeres Problem herausgestellt‖.281 
Whether this resurgence of confessional Lutheranism prompted Marahrens to tighten the 
Lutheran ties of his Landeskirche, or whether it came about as a result of Marahrens‘ own turn 
to the lutherischer Flügel in this period, the strength of Lutheran sentiment throughout the 
region explains why Marahrens viewed confessional Lutheranism as a force for unification in 
the DEK. Further supporting this notion is the fact that Marahrens knew that confessional 
Lutheranism had experienced a renaissance not just in his own northern German 
Landeskirche, but also throughout the Third Reich generally. As part of his role as ambassador 
for German Protestantism in the international community of the LWK, Marahrens spoke to 
the representative of the Deutsche Englische Gesellschaft about the resurgence of 
confessional Lutheranism in Nazi Germany at large. Marahrens explained that, ―Es handelt 
sich also bei unserer Gefolgschaft um ein großes Gebiet, das nicht territorial bestimmt werden 
kann‖.282 Since confessional Lutheranism had proven itself to Marahrens to be able to attract 
adherents from the entire socio-cultural spectrum of the Third Reich, then, it is unsurprising 
that Marahrens came to view the theological doctrine as no temporal fad in the history of his 
own Landeskirche, but rather as a stable and unwavering component of German Protestantism 
at large, and thereby also a suitable basis for intra-Church conciliation. 
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Due to his own ongoing concern to unite the specifically Lutheran German 
Landeskirchen since early 1933, Landesbischof Hans Meiser of Bavaria obviously approved 
of Marahrens‘ turn towards the Lutheran cause as a means to unify the DEK. Although 
Meiser‘s contemporary Karl Steinbauer argued that Meiser initially voted for Ludwig Müller 
in the Reichsbischof elections of 1933 in the hope that he would unify the DEK by the 
principles of undistorted Lutheranism,
283
 it is obvious that, once Müller‘s leadership was 
exposed in all its heresy, Meiser was quick to define confessional Lutheranism as distinct 
from the unorthodoxy of the GDC. In a letter to the sächsische Kirchenleitung in response to 
its close association with the radical Thuringian faction of the GDC, Meiser outlined his 
opposition to ‗German Christian‘ heresy on the grounds that it specifically distorted the 
Lutheran confession. Meiser  explained that, 
Die Kirchenbewegung Deutscher Christen huldigt, wie die Kundgebungen ihrer maßgebenden Führer 
ausweisen, einem bekenntniswidrigen Chiliasmus, der die Zeit der völkischen Erneuerung in eins 
schaut mit dem ewigen Reich Christi und den Gehorsam der Kirche gegen das Wort ihres Herrn 
umdeutet in die Bindung an die völkischen Grundlagen der Nation. Die biblische Offenbarung ist hier 
preisgegeben und das Bekenntnis der lutherischen Reformation verleugnet.
284
 
By setting out to establish a national Lutheran alliance in opposition to the GDC, which he by 
now perceived as being in no sense ―bekenntnistreu lutherisch‖,285 Meiser demonstrated that 
his invocation of the Lutheran cause was not simply a means to undermine ‗German 
Christian‘ authority in the Third Reich, but, implicitly, also a means of appointing himself 
upholder of ‗pure‘ Lutheranism in Nazi Germany. Moreover, since the GDC reached its peak 
membership in Bavaria during this period,
286
 it can be appreciated that Meiser was more 
compelled then ever to strengthen his opposition to its unorthodoxy. This he did by 
reaffirming his original confessional values. 
Although Meiser theoretically only had to fight against the GDC on the local level of his 
Landeskirche to preserve its Intaktheit, he nonetheless took his campaign to promote 
confessional Lutheranism in Nazi Germany to the national stage early on in the Third Reich. 
Most notably, Meiser attempted to mould the Lutheran confession that was being celebrated at 
the Lutherischer Tag in Hanover in 1935 into an effective mode of opposition to the heresy of 
the GDC. To convince his fellow Lutherans throughout the Third Reich of the righteousness 
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of their confession, Meiser drew directly upon Luther‘s own words in the closing sermon to 
rally and exclaimed that, 
Wir halten es mit unserem Vater D. Martin Luther, der gesagt hat: ―Wo ich Gottes Wort ergreife, so habe 
ich gewonnenes Spiel.‖ Wir spielen nicht / va banque und treiben keine Katastrophenpolitik, wenn wir 
uns an das Wort und an sonst nichts halten.
287
 
Although Meiser addressed a purely Lutheran audience, there is no doubt that his words were 
intended to effect change on the level of national Church administration per se. This is 
particularly apparent since Marahrens, who had offered his Hanoverian Landeskirche to host 
the event, was at the time also chairman of the first VKL, thereby helping to attract 
nationwide attention to the Lutheran cause. Moreover, in implying that churchmen ought 
solely to adhere to the Gospel and avoid the potentially catastrophic effects of mixing its 
message with the secular policies of the NSDAP, Meiser used Luther‘s original phraseology 
of ―gewonnenes Spiel‖ to intimate an acceptable sense of moral victory over the pro-Nazi 
GDC. By carefully avoiding having to describe the intra-Church conflict in terms of the 
Kampf that it was, therefore, Meiser was able to ensure that his proclamation of the 
superiority of confessional Lutheranism was not interpreted as a militant attack on the 
NSDAP as well. Although Meiser‘s reluctance to comment on political affairs calls into 
question his Christian integrity in light of the rapid development of Nazi atrocities, it must be 
accepted that due to Meiser‘s reliance on the NSDAP to keep his Landeskirche free from 
assimilation into the Reichskirche, it was nonetheless imperative that he did not overly 
infuriate Nazi agents in this period. 
Since Meiser had an unwritten need both to appease the NSDAP yet to reject its ‗German 
Christian‘ henchmen, he began to employ stringently the dictates of the Lutheran confession 
and, in particular, those of the Zwei-Reiche-Lehre. Following the establishment of the 
RELKD, Meiser sent a message to his Landeskirche in which he framed his commitment to 
the specifically Lutheran instrument of unofficial Church governance as no threat to the Nazi 
State. There he explained that, 
Die politische Gestaltung unseres Reiches und die Verantwortung für das Leben unseres Volkes ist in 
die Hände unseres Führers und Reichkanzlers gelegt. [...] Wir bitten Gott, daß er das Werk des Führers 
segne und unser Land weiter in Gnaden ansehe. [...] Vor allem aber lasse Er unserem Volk die Predigt 
des Evangeliums als die Quelle seiner innersten Kraft und seines tiefsten Trostes, damit auch in Zukunft 
der Herr Christus unter uns wohne und unser Volk und Land reichlich segne!
288
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By asking God to protect and to guide Germany‘s secular leaders alongside pleas that the 
original Christian confessions continue to form the ideological basis of German society, 
Meiser was strategically able to employ traditional Lutheran logic to demonstrate that he was 
content to see Germany led by Nazi secular principles, so long as Christian precepts not only 
continued to prevail in the spiritual arena but also came to direct Nazi secular polices 
themselves. In this respect, Meiser can be seen to begin to call for the precise opposite of the 
‗Nazified‘ Christianity of the GDC in this period. By encouraging the preservation of the 
original and specifically German Protestant confessions, Meiser ultimately called for the 
eventual Christianisation of the Nazi State. 
A speech Meiser gave to the LWK in Paris on 13
th
 October 1935 further testifies to his 
insinuation that only the Christianisation of German society held the key to harmonious 
relations between the German Protestant Church and the Nazi State. By continually 
emphasising the adage that, ―Glaube ist Sieg über die Welt‖,289 Meiser not only demonstrated 
that he sought to bolster Christian awareness in the Third Reich but also that he implicitly 
regarded a reaffirmation of Christian precepts as the only way by which Germany was to 
overcome its current politico-ecclesiastical crisis of the Kirchenkampf. Although there can be 
no doubt that the connotations of the word ―Sieg‖ imbued Meiser‘s proclamation with an air 
of militancy against Nazi secular principles, it must be acknowledged that, should he have 
been met by reprisals from the NSDAP, Meiser was free to invoke the particular Lutheran 
context in which he made his speech, which ultimately demanded that he separate the two 
realms of the Church and the State anyhow and speak about them as contrasting entities. In 
any case, the fact that Meiser chose to make his speech on foreign soil not only lessened the 
amount of criticism he received from the Nazis since they were not the predominant audience, 
but, conveniently, also served to portray to the international Lutheran community an image of 
German Protestantism trying to defend itself against Nazism at large.  
Just as for Marahrens, however, the framework of confessional Lutheranism was as 
limiting to Meiser as it was liberating. Even though Meiser‘s High Lutheranism allowed him 
to co-found and to contribute to the Bekennende Kirche in the initial years of the Protestant 
Kirchenkampf, it soon came to prevent him from co-operating with the so-called 
‗Dahlemites‘, who were more lenient about their particular confessional identity and more 
concerned with using United Protestant principles as an ideological weapon against Nazism. 
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Since Meiser saw in the ‗Dahlemitic‘ design for the Bekennende Kirche an institution which 
threatened confessional compromise in the style of the United tradition of the EKApU, it can 
be said that Meiser contributed highly to the Church opposition movement before its division 
at Bad Oeynhausen in an effort to keep the ‗Confessing‘ Front ―as open as possible‖ and 
acceptable to the strictest of confessional Lutherans.
290
 As Wolf-Dieter Hauschild confirms, as 
a result of his vision of a Bekennende Kirche as one which had to be built upon the original 
German Lutheran confession, Meiser knew that, ―Eine Bekennende Kirche, wie die meisten 
der Bündnis-Brüder meinten, konnte jene ―Bekenntnisfront‖ nach seiner Auffassung 
grundsätzlich nicht sein, weil ihr als einer Kooperation von Lutheranern, Unierten und 
Reformierten das entscheidende Merkmal des Kircheseins fehlte, die Übereinstimmung in 
Bekenntnis und Lehre gemäß Art. 7 der Confessio Augustana‖.291 For Meiser, then, a 
Bekennende Kirche that was united simply through a shared desire to oppose Nazism in its 
widest sense and not through the common German Lutheran confession was not a Bekennende 
Kirche at all. 
It is in this specific context that Meiser‘s strengthening of his Lutheran identity during 
the second stage of the Protestant Kirchenkampf must be seen as the logical corollary of both 
his original desire to effect a specifically Lutheran Church union, which he showed as early as 
1933, and the change in atmosphere of the conflict that had forced Meiser to develop an 
effective means by which he was not only able to resist the GDC but now also the 
increasingly ‗unionistic‘ theology of the ‗Dahlemites‘ as well. Although Meiser‘s eventual 
decision to form the RELKD was seen by the ‗Dahlemites‘ as a treacherous move away from 
the essence of the Bekennende Kirche,
292
 it must be remembered that, by contrast, Meiser 
himself believed that he led the only truly confessional, if not Confessing, Church in the Third 
Reich. In an attempt to reassure the national Protestant community of the righteousness of his 
actions, therefore, Meiser explained, ―daß Klarheit darüber bestehen müsse, daß der 
lutherische Zusammenschluß nicht von solchen nachträglich zur Rehabilitierung im 
Kirchenkampf mißbraucht werden dürfte, die den Entscheidungen der letzten 2½ Jahre 
ausgebogen sind‖.293 As far as Meiser was concerned, his eventual establishment of the 
Lutherrat ought not to be thought of as exacerbating the Protestant struggle in Nazi Germany 
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but, rather, offering a solution to the recent intra-Church conflict, since it provided churchmen 
from all factions with common confessional ground on which to build a more formal alliance. 
The extent to which we are inclined to view Meiser‘s attempt to create a confessional 
union of Lutherans as either a beneficial or detrimental contribution to the historical 
development of the Protestant Kirchenkampf per se ultimately depends, however, on the 
alternative approach to Lutheran unification efforts that was being propagated at the time by 
Meiser‘s southern German counterpart, Landesbischof Theophil Wurm of Württemberg. Even 
as early as March 1936, as the split in the Bekennende Kirche was still being formalised, the 
differences between the confessional characters of the three ‗intact‘ Landeskirchen of 
Hanover, Bavaria and Württemberg were apparent. The Nazi newspaper, Der Reichsbote,
294
 
characterised the clergy of the ELKB and the ELLKH as ―die Hochlutheraner‖ due to their 
similarity of approach to the Lutheran alliance. Conversely, however, the ELLKW found itself 
branded alongside the Landeskirche of Saxony and the reformierter Bund
295
 as a result of its 
comparatively ―mildere[s] Luthertum‖.296 Moreover, only a month later Arnold Fratzscher 
reaffirmed these confessional differences, proclaiming, ―Denn Württemberg ist ja fraglos in 
keiner Weise lutherisch bekenntnisgebunden. Ja, die Württemberger sind fraglos viel weniger 
lutherisch als die unter so scharfe lutherische Kritik genommenen norddeutschen 
Lutheraner.‖297 
At first glance, however, at least in appeals to his pastorate, Wurm framed his decision to 
join the lutherischer Flügel in the second phase of the Protestant Kirchenkampf no differently 
to either Marahrens or Meiser – namely as a matter of doctrinal urgency to quell the assault of 
the ever more radical ‗Dahlemites‘. For example, in a speech to the Pfarrverein of the 
ELLKW in April 1936, shortly after the RELKD had been established, Wurm exclaimed that, 
...unser Diffensus von den Dahlemern [ist] wirklich von Voraussetzungen aus zu verstehen, die im 
lutherischen Verständnis von Schrift und Kirche liegen. Der eigentliche Gegensatz zwischen 
lutherischem und reformiertem Denken liegt doch in der Bestimmung der Verhältnisses zwischen Zeit 
und Ewigkeit, in der verschiedenartigen Betonung von Transzendenz und Immanenz.
298
   
Although Wurm‘s failure to endorse the ‗Dahlemitic‘ line took many by surprise, particularly 
in light of the pietistic tone of his efforts to resist the GDC during the preceding ‗Marahrens 
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Years‘, his words clearly show that, much as Wurm wanted to establish a broad community of 
Christians to oppose Nazi heresy, he nonetheless recognised the need to retain the original 
confessional underpinnings of German Protestantism in order for the Church to retain its true 
essence. By drawing upon the specifically Lutheran belief that, "das Ewige [ist] ins Zeitliche 
eingebettet‖,299 Wurm can be seen to recognise that the timeless nature of German 
Protestantism needed to be preserved in the particular material age of the Third Reich at all 
costs. By characterising the ‗Dahlemites‘ as being influenced by the principles of Reformed 
Protestantism, Wurm not only implicitly charged them with building a temporal Church to 
resist the secular Nazi fad, but also with endangering the eternal nature of God‘s spiritual 
reign on earth. For these reasons, it can be seen that Wurm was drawn closer towards 
Marahrens and Meiser in the central years of the Third Reich, and was attracted to their 
specifically Lutheran endeavours to preserve the status of the original German Protestant 
confession in Nazi Germany. 
In this respect, it should be noted that the main target of Wurm‘s opposition in the second 
stage of the Protestant Kirchenkampf had moved from the GDC to the radical element of the 
very Bekennende Kirche he had once helped to found. Wurm‘s predicament in the two distinct 
stages of the conflict was, however, very different, since the initial years of the Third Reich 
demanded that Wurm turn to universal Christianity to resist the influx of the GDC in his 
Landeskirche. As the behaviour of the ‗Dahlemites‘ nonetheless shows, this radical and 
universalist mode of resistance was not suitable to the central years of the Protestant struggle 
in Nazi Germany since, although it purported to resist Nazi crimes against humanity in the 
wider secular arena, it risked overriding the very essence of the Church that it was trying to 
defend. As a result, it was only logical that Wurm turned to the more moderate Lutheran line 
of Resistenz outlined by his Bavarian counterpart Meiser in order to undermine what he saw 
as the new ―Alles-oder-Nichts-Politik‖ of the ‗Dahlemites‘.300 By condemning the radical 
‗Dahlemitic‘ line as detrimental to the ―positive erreichbare Ziele‖ of the lutherischer 
Flügel,
301
 therefore, Wurm demonstrated that he viewed confessional Lutheranism as the most 
reliable means by which he was not only able to convey opposition to the two extreme Church 
factions, but also to effect small yet significant change to the state of national Protestant 
Church affairs. 
Testifying to this view is Wurm‘s subsequent attempt to justify his adherence to 
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confessional Lutheranism by contrasting specifically Lutheran doctrine to Catholicism on the 
one hand and reformierter Protestantismus on the other – both of which Wurm regarded as 
being too tolerant of the Nazi Weltanschauung and precariously permitting ―die Vermischung 
des Göttlichen und des Kreatürlichen‖.302 In clarifying the benefits of the Lutheran position, 
Wurm stated that, 
Die lutherische Lehre steht in der Mitte zwischen diesen Extremen; [...] sie legt [...] höchsten Wert 
darauf, daß die gloria dei in der Fleischwerdung des Sohnes, im Eingehen des Ewigen in die Zeit, des 
Geistes ins Fleisch gesehen und anerkannt werde.
303
 
By appealing to the Lutheran recognition of the timelessness of God‘s presence on earth once 
again, Wurm managed to show how the fundaments of the Lutheran confession prevented the 
incorporation of heresy into its doctrine. Moreover, since Marahrens‘ ELLKH was the only 
‗intact‘ Landeskirche to share its territory with a Reformed Protestant church, and Meiser‘s 
ELKB was forced to operate in highly Catholic surroundings, Wurm‘s decision to place 
himself and his ELLKW firmly ―in der Mitte zwischen diesen Extremen‖ can also be seen as 
an implicit attempt by Wurm to emphasise that the particular manifestation of confessional 
Lutheranism epitomised by his own Landeskirche was the only example of undistorted 
Lutheranism in the lutherischer Flügel. In this context, then, even though Wurm did not 
necessarily claim to be the staunchest Lutheran within the ‗intact‘ dynamic which he shared 
with Marahrens and Meiser, his focus on the importance of confessional traditions not only 
confirms initial suspicions that his contribution to the lutherischer Flügel differed inherently 
from those of his Hanoverian and Bavarian counterparts, but already shows the theological 
awareness coming to the surface that was to lead Wurm to the fore of the ‗intact‘ dynamic in 
the third and final stage of the Protestant Kirchenkampf. 
The most important difference that Wurm‘s particular branch of confessional Lutheranism 
brought to the lutherischer Flügel was that it saw him commit to a closer Lutheran union 
without completely excluding the prospect of expressing opposition to political developments 
in Nazi Germany. Whereas Marahrens and Meiser can both be seen to have couched their 
arguments for a Lutheran-dominated Protestant Church in assertions that reveal the potential 
of Lutheranism to complement and guide Germany‘s secular leadership, Wurm tended to view 
his own particular interpretation of confessional Lutheranism as one which directly opposed 
Nazi ideology in general. For example, in a chain of sermons throughout Württemberg in 
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early 1935, Wurm demanded of the ELLKW: ―Lass uns dafür sorgen, [...] daß wir ein Leben 
haben, das nicht von dieser Welt ist‖.304 By issuing such rallying calls to his pastors and 
parishioners, Wurm ultimately reinforced the need of the Church to assert itself against the 
increasingly despotic Nazi State to ensure that the timeless presence of God‘s kingdom 
continues to have a place in the secular arena of the Third Reich. In this respect, it can be 
claimed that, although Wurm did not go far enough in explicitly objecting to Nazi policies of 
discrimination and persecution in this phase of the Protestant Kirchenkampf, he was 
nonetheless beginning to employ specifically Lutheran principles to achieve more common 
and universal Christian ends, which included his desire to ensure that there continues to exist 
―innerhalb der Kirche Toleranz im Sinne des Liberalismus‖.305 
In spite of the fact that Wurm‘s own interpretation of confessional Lutheranism was more 
relaxed than that of either Marahrens or Meiser, however, it must be acknowledged that Wurm 
was not without his detractors. Most significantly, the Kirchlich-theologische Sozietät in 
Württemberg (KTSW), which was a working group of pietistic theologians with connections 
from their student days at Tübingen,
306
 branded Wurm‘s decision to take his Landeskirche into 
the RELKD to be ―im Gegensatz zum Beschluss des von der Synode beauftragten 
Reichbruderrats‖.307 The KTSW thus pledged adherence over and above Wurm‘s powers of 
regional administration to the ‗Dahlemitic‘ leadership of the second VKL. As well as claiming 
that the ELLKW‘s membership of the Lutherrat rendered impossible ―das offene Gespräch 
zwischen den Konfessionen innerhalb der DEK‖, the KTSW also condemned Wurm for not 
displaying traditional Württembergian pietism in his approach to the Protestant struggle. In its 
decision to oppose the formal establishment of the lutherischer Flügel, then, the KTSW stated 
that, 
Was sich bei diesem Zusammenschluß ―Luthertum‖ nennt, ist nicht durch das lutherische Bekenntnis 
zusammengekommen, sondern lediglich durch Subtraktion von jenen Teilen der DEK, die sich an die 
Bekenntnissynode und die durch sie bevollmächtigte Leitung gebunden wissen.
308 
In recognising Wurm‘s tendency to employ the particular Lutheran confession to justify only 
minimal participation in the Bekennende Kirche in the central stage of the Protestant 
Kirchenkampf, the KTSW criticised Wurm for the fact that he too had allowed the politico-
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ecclesiastical atmosphere of the time to impact on his chosen interpretation of what it meant 
to be a confessional Lutheran. For all Wurm‘s flaws in this period, however, it should be 
acknowledged that he never interpreted Lutheran doctrine in such a way so as explicitly to 
appease Germany‘s Nazi regime like Marahrens and Meiser, and he still ensured that his own 
interpretation of confessional Lutheranism was at least acceptable to and did not ostracise 
completely the ‗Dahlemitic‘ strand of the Bekennende Kirche. 
Further to this, the press releases of the ELLKW from the period show that Wurm‘s own 
interpretation of confessional Lutheranism was influenced by his awareness of the importance 
of presenting an image of German Protestantism that was in accordance with the expectations 
of the international ecumenical arena. Since his fellow member of the ‗intact‘ dynamic, 
Marahrens, had by now not just been head of the first VKL but also the LWB as well, a 
statement from the ELLKW shows that Wurm appreciated the need to appease the Protestant 
community both inside Nazi Germany and abroad. The press release stated that, 
Eine Weiterentwicklung in dieser Richtung würde sicherlich auch im evangelischen Ausland, das 
soeben durch die Wahl des Vorsitzenden der VKL zum Vorsitzenden des lutherischen Weltbundes dem 
Landesbischof Marahrens ein unüberhörbares Vertrauensvotum erteilt hat, freudig begrüßt werden, und 
würde den Beziehungen Deutschlands zu den vorwiegend evangelischen Nachbarvölkern zustatten 
kommen.
309
 
Even whilst Wurm was a member of the specifically German lutherischer Flügel, then, he 
recognised the importance of maintaining wider ecumenical relations abroad. Even though 
Marahrens became the face of German Lutheranism on the international level, and Meiser the 
spokesman of confessional Lutheranism on the national level, it cannot be denied that, 
through his particular brand of more universalised Lutheranism, Wurm was already showing 
potential to become the face of a Protestant confession that was set to transcend all forms of 
secular boundaries in the subsequent years of the Protestant Kirchenkampf. 
 
The Landesbischöfe and the Kirchenausschüsse 
Even though an analysis of Landesbischöfe Marahrens, Meiser and Wurm‘s reaction to the 
lutherischer Flügel during the central stage of the Protestant Kirchenkampf serves to clarify 
the bishops‘ confessional concerns for the future of the German Protestant Church, it only 
provides us with one half of the situation facing the bishops during the years of staatliche 
Kirchenpolitik. In addition to the strengthening of the ‗Dahlemitic‘ strand of the Bekennende 
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Kirche and the bishops‘ subsequent increasing involvement in the lutherischer Flügel, the 
Nazi State extended its encroachment into the affairs of the Protestant Church via the RMfKA 
and its leader Hanns Kerrl. As a result of the commonality of cause fostered by their shared 
lutherischer Flügel, Marahrens, Meiser and Wurm initially adopted an agreed 
accommodationist approach to Kerrl‘s staatliche Kirchenpolitik and his establishment of 
regional and national church committees. Although all three bishops generally accepted the 
measures of the Nazi State as an opportunity to establish a model for the German Protestant 
Church which was acceptable to both spiritual and secular administration, however, their co-
operation with Kerrl‘s RKA did not equate to a decisive turn away from the ‗Confessing‘ 
cause and submission to Nazi principles. As is often overlooked in accounts which focus on 
the ‗Dahlemitic‘ strand of Protestant resistance during these years, neither Marahrens, Meiser 
nor Wurm took the oath of allegiance to Hitler which was proposed for all churchmen in 1935 
in an effort to bring them into line with other professionals working within the system of the 
Third Reich. Writing on behalf of all three men, Marahrens justified the bishops‘ joint 
decision to reject the oath with Lutheran logic. He explained that they had already sworn 
loyalty to God and, because God‘s kingdom is also present on earth, they did not need to 
swear further loyalty to His instruments of secular rule.310 With all three bishops therefore 
agreeing in principle to co-operate with the Nazi State to formulate a new design for the DEK, 
yet nonetheless careful not to display outward support for the Nazi regime in any other 
context, this sub-chapter investigates the individual impetuses behind the bishops‘ common 
move to support the State‘s official involvement in Church affairs. 
Since the RMfKA came into existence during Marahrens‘ leadership of the first VKL, and 
particularly in view of the fact that his decision to support Kerrl‘s RKA was pivotal not only 
to the continued existence of his own Landeskirche but also to the direction of the national 
‗Confessing‘ cause per se, this chapter deals with the predicament of the Hanoverian 
Landesbischof first. In light of August Marahrens‘ wider function as Vorsitzender of the 
unofficial national Church administration, it must be appreciated that the fate of the DEK was 
an issue of great importance to Marahrens, not only due to his endeavour to protect the 
sanctity of the specifically Lutheran confession which he shared with Meiser and Wurm, but 
also since his national leadership role rendered him partly responsible for any potential 
damage to the Protestant Church in general. Whereas Marahrens had been relatively free in 
his role as leader of the first VKL to oppose the GDC, his predicament altered dramatically 
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when Kerrl become officially involved in Church affairs. On coming to office, Kerrl himself 
had stated that, 
Ich werde nicht Staat und Kirche trennen, weil ich nicht will, daß auf diesem Gebiet alles 
zusammenfällt. Ich will Staat und Kirche miteinander verbunden sein lassen. [...] Sollte der Weg nicht 
zu diesem Ziele führen, dann müßte ich die Trennung von Staat und Kirche vollziehen. Dann hätte die 
Kirche keine Staatszuschüsse und keine Besteuerungsmöglichkeiten mehr, auch nicht mehr den 
Religionsunterricht.
311
 
Since Marahrens had long desired to impose positive change on the DEK where his long-time 
adversary Reichsbischof Müller had failed, Kerrl‘s threat to disable completely institutional 
Protestantism in Germany heightened the need to resolve the Protestant struggle and, thereby, 
Marahrens‘ longing to put an end to the conflict. Since he was at the time one of the most 
prominent figures in the German Protestant Church, it can be appreciated that Marahrens did 
not want to be left with a legacy of being the bishop who had led German Protestantism into 
an era of isolationism from the State and, thus, brought about the financial and ideological 
demise of the Church. For reasons of his personal pride and professional ambitions, then, it 
becomes understandable why Marahrens welcomed Kerrl‘s offer of co-operation with the 
Church, since this not only protected his own ecclesiastical reputation but also German 
Protestantism generally from impending annihilation. 
Since Marahrens had chosen to make the best of the only realistic choice that was 
available to him to keep the prospect of a fully functioning DEK alive, therefore, it was only 
natural that he began to emphasise the positive aspects of the RKA, as this not only served to 
convince the rest of the Bekennende Kirche of his chosen direction, but most certainly also 
helped to keep up his own morale with regard to his controversial decision. Although scholars 
have painted Marahrens as an ardent pro-Nazi, willing to seize any opportunity to work with 
the Nazi State,
312
 there can be no doubt that he was initially uncertain of his decision to take 
the Bekennende Kirche into co-operation with the RMfKA. This apprehension clearly came 
through in an interview with Mr. Wygall of the Deutsche Englische Gesellschaft, during 
which Marahrens spoke about Hanns Kerrl and explained, 
Ich habe dem Minister geschrieben, weil ich der Überzeugung bin, daß der gute Wille da ist, um 
wirklich den Dienst zu tun und so zu leiten, wie es von der Kirche und vom Staate aus geleitet werden 
muß. Aber die Sorge bleibt, daß wirklich nichts dazwischen kommt.
313
 
As can be seen from this comment, although Marahrens displayed faith in Kerrl to formulate a 
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design for the DEK that would be amenable to the Protestant Church and the Nazi State alike, 
he was nonetheless concerned that other forces might potentially influence Kerrl‘s efforts to 
the detriment of German Protestantism. This leaves us in no doubt, therefore, that Marahrens 
was well aware of the risk he was taking when agreeing to co-operate with the RMfKA in this 
period. 
Further to this, although critics have seen Marahrens‘ willingness to engage with Kerrl 
and his church committees as an indication that he was ―blind obrigkeitsgläubig‖,314 his 
concerns of the time reveal that he was worried, in spite of Kerrl‘s seeming sincerity, about 
whether the full freedom of German Protestantism could be truly ensured in any attempt to 
bring it into line with the expectations and ambitions of the Nazi State. In an exchange with 
Mr. Wygall, Marahrens outlined his personal concern to ensure that co-operation with the 
RMfKA did not result in an unnecessary sacrifice for the German Protestant Church. 
Marahrens thus stated that, 
Gerade ist das unser Anliegen, daß diese Freiheit auf jeden Fall bleibt gewahrt. Die Tendenz des Aufrufs 
ist in diesem Punkt klar und gut. Aber das ist nun ein ungeheuer großer Fragenkomplex, wie es gelingen 
kann, diese Tendenz so klar herauszustellen, daß zwischen der Freiheit der Kirche nach ihrem Wesen 
und den staatlichen Interessen der rechte Ausgleich durchgeführt werde.
315
 
By demonstrating that his willingness to compromise the essence of German Protestantism 
was not without limits, then, Marahrens revealed that he intended Protestant principles to have 
a stronger influence on Kerrl‘s RKA than secular Nazi precepts. Marahrens also subsequently 
reaffirmed that, ―Wir suchen die rechte Gestaltung des Verhältnisses zwischen Staat und 
Kirche. Nach welchen Normen muß es gestaltet werden? Die Antwort kann nur in 
Übereinstimmung sein mit dem Evangelium‖.316 In the particular context of Marahrens‘ 
prioritisation of Christian values, it may be asserted that, although on the surface it might 
appear that he had agreed to compromise the essence of German Protestantism by co-
operating with the Nazi State, in practice he expected the proponents of Nazism to give up 
their own secular ideology in their co-operation with the Church. It is for reasons of 
Marahrens‘ resolve and unwillingness to compromise Christianity, therefore, that his decision 
to lead the first VKL into collaboration with the Nazi State must not be equated with the 
actions of the GDC, which incessantly compromised age-old Christian traditions for temporal 
Nazi beliefs. 
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The strong presence of the GDC in Marahrens‘ own Landeskirche undoubtedly 
influenced his decision to collaborate with the Nazi state, however. In the same way as the 
demographics of the highly-Nazi ELLKH forced Marahrens to compromise his rejection of 
Nazism in the initial years of the Third Reich, his decision to engage in co-operation with 
Kerrl and his RKA in the central years of the Protestant Kirchenkampf can also be seen, in 
part, as a result of the politico-ecclesiastical composition of his Landeskirche. In a letter 
written in May 1935, Superintendent Stumpenhausen described the ELLKH as comprising a 
large majority of ‗moderate‘ churchmen. He explained that, 
In der Bischofsfront unserer Landeskirche befinden sich etwa 170 Amtsbrüder, die nicht Mitglieder der 
Bekenntnisgemeinschaft sind. Entweder haben sie nie einer kirchenpolitischen Gruppe angehört oder 
waren früher einmal bei den Deutschen Christen.
317
 
Since Hanns Kerrl obviously preferred to co-operate with men of the so-called Church 
‗middle‘ and, where possible, moderate members of the GDC, it must be accepted that 
Marahrens, as leader of the moderately ‗German Christian‘ ELLKH at this stage, was in a 
sense compelled to heed Kerrl‘s demands. Not only can it be appreciated that Marahrens felt a 
personal obligation to engage with Kerrl and his RKA in a last-ditch attempt to preserve his 
own status and that of institutional Protestantism in Germany at large, but the socio-cultural 
conditions of his own Landeskirche, which comprised very few ‗Dahlemites‘, meant that his 
co-operation with the RMfKA was in line with the desires of its predominately moderate 
pastorate.  
Despite the favourable conditions of Marahrens‘ Landeskirche for collaboration with the 
RMfKA, however, it was never forced to construct a regional LKA of its own due to its 
established Intaktheit. Although Marahrens was undoubtedly more involved than most in the 
administration of the Bekennende Kirche, his relative unaffectedness by church committees on 
the regional level inevitably caused him to lose touch with the reality of life within the 
‗destroyed‘ Landeskirchen which, increasingly facing the brunt of Gestapo persecution, 
understandably did not see the best solution to the Protestant Kirchenkampf to be compliance 
with the secular ambitions of the Nazi State. Most notably, the Bishop of Breslau wrote to 
Marahrens at the beginning of the years of staatliche Kirchenpolitik, in an effort to ensure that 
he did not overlook the reality of the situation for the majority of the DEK. The bishop thus 
warned Marahrens of the potentially damaging repercussions of co-operating with Kerrl‘s 
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RKA, and prophesied that, ―Diese Politik der Mitte wäre der Tod der Kirche.‖318 In spite of 
such warnings, Marahrens nevertheless showed determination to pursue the RKA line on a 
course which was eventually to see him split, not only from the representatives of the 
‗destroyed‘ Landeskirchen, but also from his Lutheran counterparts Meiser and Wurm during 
the third and final stage of the Protestant Kirchenkampf. This will be discussed in detail in the 
next chapter of this dissertation. 
In his account of Marahrens‘ actions in this period, however, Kurt Schmidt-Clausen 
attributes Marahrens‘ unfailing co-operation with the RMfKA to the underlying influence of 
his regional identity. This he believes rendered him more cautious and contemplative in 
nature, as well as more inclined to respect the law. In describing Marahrens, Schmidt-Clausen 
suggests that, 
Sein Handeln war zunächst dadurch bedingt, daß er Niedersachse war. [...] Der Niedersachse ist 
langsam und bedächtig. [...] D. Marahrens führt seine Kämpfe so, daß er die Dinge reifen und zur 
inneren Auswirkung ihrer eigenen Gesetze kommen läßt. Er besitzt das tiefe Vertrauen auf das Recht 
und die Kraft des Rechtes, die dem Niedersachsen eigen ist.
319
 
Although such regional stereotypes cannot be relied upon to explain every decision 
Marahrens made during this period, there can be no doubt that the specific demographics of 
his Landeskirche encouraged him to embrace the ‗safer‘ and least confrontational route 
through the Protestant Kirchenkampf offered by Kerrl and his RKA. This, together with 
Marahrens‘ longstanding concern to appease all sides of the Protestant struggle and to arouse 
the least amount of friction possible between the Church and the State, further encouraged 
Marahrens to heed Kerrl‘s ‗all or nothing‘ threats to the Church.  
Finally, no attempt to explain Marahrens‘ attitude to the policies of the RMfKA can be 
made without reference to his own adherence to the Lutheran confession, which demonstrably 
strengthened in line with his determination to work with Kerrl‘s church committees. Although 
Marahrens‘ Lutheran conscience existed long before the advent of staatliche Kirchenpolitik, it 
cannot be denied that Marahrens‘ parallel commitment to both the Lutheran and the RKA 
lines worked to reinforce each other mutually, to the extent that Marahrens‘ final view of the 
State was thoroughly based upon ―ein[e] unkritisch[e] Staatsnähe des späteren 
Luthertums‖.320 It is for this reason that Marahrens‘ position of unwavering co-operation with 
the Nazi State worked to distance him from less radical Lutherans like his counterpart Wurm, 
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for example, who eventually came to use his own milder interpretation of Lutheran doctrine to 
strengthen and to contribute to the opposition efforts of the ‗Dahlemitic‘ strand of the 
Bekennende Kirche. To illustrate Marahrens‘ uncompromising interpretation of confessional 
Lutheranism, we need only to look to a comment of fellow Lutheran pastor Hans Asmussen in 
1939. Even before Marahrens began to display extreme support for the Nazi State after the 
onset of war, as will be explained in the next chapter of this dissertation, Asmussen described 
Marahrens‘ commitment to the RMfKA in this period as being detrimental to the future of the 
DEK. He exclaimed that, ―Ich [halte] nach theologischer Erkenntnis und praktischer 
Erfahrung den hannöverschen Weg für kirchlich unmöglich und strategisch und taktisch 
unklug‖.321 Since Marahrens ended the second stage of the Protestant Kirchenkampf 
upholding a particular politico-ecclesiastical position that threatened to undermine the very 
Lutheran alliance that he had consistently helped to develop, Marahrens can therefore be seen 
to have transferred his faith in confessional Lutheranism increasingly over to his confidence 
in the RMfKA in a bid to seek a resolution to the Protestant struggle. By the onset of the 
Second World War, then, Marahrens‘ commitment to the Lutheran cause and his dedication to 
the RMfKA had virtually become indistinguishable from each other, to the extent that his 
Lutheran conscience prescribed his support of the Nazi State, and his co-operation with State 
measures reinforced his particular manifestation of obedient Lutheranism against that of his 
more pietistic or ‗Dahlemitic‘ contemporaries. 
Marahrens was, however, not alone in initially agreeing to co-operate with the RMfKA 
for doctrinal reasons. Landesbischof Hans Meiser of Bavaria also supported the Hanoverian 
bishop in his willingness to work with the secular authorities. This is unsurprising, since 
Meiser had not only displayed the strongest commitment to the creation of a specifically 
Lutheran course through the Protestant Kirchenkampf to date but had, inadvertently, also 
become the mouthpiece for confessional Lutheranism on the national level, engaging in 
discussions with the State alongside Marahrens. Whereas Marahrens clearly had a duty to 
engage with Nazi authorities as leader of the first VKL at the start of this second phase of the 
Protestant struggle, however, Meiser‘s emergence as a force for negotiation on the national 
level came about out of personal enthusiasm rather than obligation from any specific position 
of national Church leadership. In an early discussion involving Meiser, Marahrens, and 
Reichsminister Kerrl, Marahrens inevitably took a less antagonistic approach to the 
Reichsminister, whilst Meiser usurped the occasion to instruct Kerrl vehemently on how he 
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ought to conduct his staatliche Kirchenpolitik from the perspective of the Lutheran churches. 
Meiser is on record as having said, 
Machen Sie sich, Herr Reichsminister, zum Anwalt der ungeheuren Gewissensnot vieler Pfarrer und 
Gemeindeglieder! Sorgen Sie dafür, daß die ―Deutschen Christen‖ nicht fortfahren, für ihre eigenen 
machtpolitischen Bestrebungen die Authorität der Partei und des Führers zu stehlen. Eine 
Neutralisierung der Gegensätze vom Staat her müßte uns in neue Gewissenskonflikte bringen.
322
 
As well as demonstrating that he viewed the GDC as the main source of antagonism in the 
Protestant Kirchenkampf, and that he in no way viewed its actions as equivalent to those of 
the Nazi State, Meiser clearly demonstrated that he regarded Kerrl as a neutralising force in 
the conflict. Despite apparently turning a blind eye to the NSDAP‘s displays of brutality 
against the Jews and other persecuted minorities to date, Meiser‘s words nonetheless reveal 
that he did not accept Kerrl‘s involvement in the affairs of the Church without reluctance. 
After all, the crisis of conscience of which Meiser speaks here did not necessarily refer to the 
dilemma caused by the GDC, but also to the problematic fact that Kerrl was ultimately an 
instrument of the NSDAP. Since, under Lutheran doctrine, the State should not be seen to 
interfere in matters of the Church, Meiser‘s reference to the concerns shared by many pastors 
shows that he knew Kerrl‘s involvement in ecclesiastical affairs was in breach of Lutheran 
teachings.  
In an attempt to lessen potential Lutheran disgruntlement over co-operation with the 
RMfKA, then, Meiser was careful in this period to emphasise the positive outcome which 
Kerrl was supposed to bring to the Church. For example, Meiser continually stressed Kerrl‘s 
agreed function to repair relations between the Protestant Church and the Nazi State, and to 
establish a structure for the Church which was acceptable to both the NSDAP and the 
staunchest of Protestant clergymen. In expressing his optimism that the recent collaboration 
between the Church and the RMfKA would find an amenable solution to the Protestant 
struggle in Nazi Germany, Meiser exclaimed, ―Ich hoffe, daß die von Herrn Reichsminister als 
mögliche angedeutete Trennung von Kirche und Staat nur die ultima ratio wäre‖.323 In doing 
so, however, Meiser not only offered Kerrl the high-profile Lutheran endorsement he needed 
to ensure the support of other confessional Lutherans in the Third Reich. In addition, Meiser‘s 
inversion of Kerrl‘s original threat to the Church, by which he warned churchmen that they 
would be punished by a complete separation of the Church from the State in the event of non-
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co-operation,
324
 worked to ‗turn the tables‘ in the partnership and implicitly put Kerrl as much 
under the service of the Church as under that of the State. Although, on first glance, it may 
appear that Meiser unquestioningly submitted to Kerrl‘s authority to bring about an end to the 
Church in the worst instance, there can be no doubt that his instruction to Kerrl to seize every 
possible measure to unite the Church and the State saw him begin to dictate the conditions of 
partnership between the DEK and Kerrl‘s RKA. As the openly pro-Nazi Bishop of Bremen, 
Heinrich Weidemann, confirmed at the time, ―In die kommende Kirche marschieren nicht 
zuerst Organisationen, so notwendig sie auch sind, sondern einige beherzte Männer, die es mit 
dem Evangelium ernst nehmen, ganz ernst und ganz ursprünglich‖.325 As can be demonstrated 
by his actions in this period, then, Meiser was ultimately able to become one of these 
‗courageous‘ churchmen to foreground Protestant precepts in the new Church administration, 
since he was not bound by the same position of Church leadership as Marahrens and, as a 
result, his interventionist approach and domineering attitude in this period were not at risk of 
jeopardising the reputation of the wider German Protestant Church at large. 
Meiser was nevertheless careful not to punch above the weight granted to him by his 
relatively detached position from the DEK and both its official and unofficial modes of 
governance. To encourage the RMfKA to heed his specifically Lutheran aims, therefore, 
Meiser continued to show that his objections were to the heretical practices of the GDC only 
and not to Nazism in general. Although this tactic called his wider Christian scruples into 
question, since he proved himself to be willing to ignore demonstrations of Nazi violence in 
the wider secular arena, it nonetheless helped him to retain his leadership over the ELKB. 
This is primarily because Meiser‘s silence towards the secular policies of the State at least 
allowed him to demonstrate to the increasingly Nazi-dominated territory of Bavaria that his 
Landeskirche continued to remain ‗intact‘ primarily as a result of an intra-Church dispute and 
not a wider disagreement with the NSDAP. To convey exactly this message, Meiser released a 
statement to his ELKB which stated that,  
Eine Kirchenleitung, die sich gebunden weiß an das Evangelium, muß gegen solche Irrlehre aufstehen, 
muß sich mit aller Kraft, die ihr geschenkt ist, gegen solche Irrlehre zur Wehr setzen. Die Leitung der 
Bayerischen Landeskirche weiß um diese ihre Pflicht und wird im gegebenen Augenblick das tun, was 
notwendig ist.
326
 
The steadfast objection to the heresy of the GDC that Meiser conveys here can also be seen as 
another implicit threat to Hanns Kerrl and his RMfKA. Since Meiser revealed himself as 
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being willing to employ any means necessary to rid the Church of anti-doctrinal Christianity, 
Meiser implicitly demonstrated to Kerrl and his church committees that he was not prepared 
to accept any further distortions of the Christian confessions on any level of Church 
administration. Since Meiser‘s rejection of ‗German Christian‘ unorthodoxy had already 
proven a substantial hindrance to the creation of a fully united DEK in the first stage of the 
Protestant Kirchenkampf, it was in the best interests of the RMfKA to keep Meiser on side to 
prevent similar damage to its own attempts at ecclesiastical unification in the ensuing years of 
the Protestant struggle. 
Despite Meiser‘s newfound ability to use his Landeskirche as a bargaining chip to 
threaten the RMfKA into heeding his concerns, particularly in light of Bavaria‘s increasing 
importance to the Nazi regime as its chosen spiritual homeland, like Marahrens, Meiser was 
not without his critics. These critics began to attack Mesier for failing to view the Protestant 
Kirchenkampf from the perspective of the ‗destroyed‘ Landeskirchen. In an anonymous letter 
sent to Dekan Schieder, for example, the sender who was evidently from a Landeskirche 
under the control of a LKA complained of Meiser‘s lack of understanding for the predicament 
of the ‗destroyed‘ churches. The sender thus wrote that, 
Was soll werden, wenn er so wenig Verständnis für unsere Lage hat, die wir doch jetzt eben die 
Ausschüsse haben, also das System Jäger, aus dem doch wir damals ihn und Wurm ganz wesentlich mit 
befreit haben. Wie kann er uns dies System zumuten, das er für sich damals als untragbar erklärte, und 
demgegenüber er selbst in Ulm feierlich erklärte, daß wir die rechtsmäßige Evangelische Kirche 
Deutschlands seien...
327
 
In a chain of rhetorical questions, the sender not only expressed opposition to Meiser‘s 
decision to work with the RMfKA, but manifestly framed Meiser‘s actions as a betrayal of 
both the ‗destroyed‘ Landeskirchen that had formerly helped him to establish the Intaktheit of 
the ELKB, and of his previous commitment to the Bekennende Kirche as an autonomous 
mode of administration based solely on the Word and Will of God. For the author of the letter, 
Meiser‘s decision to co-operate with the RMfKA appeared both offensive and unreasonable. 
Although Meiser‘s decision to formalise the lutherischer Flügel met with such criticism, 
it is nonetheless important to recognise that, in spite of Meiser‘s willingness to co-operate 
with the Nazi State to find a solution to the Protestant Kirchenkampf, he was not prepared to 
allow Nazi precepts to infiltrate into any aspect of Church life. Speaking in Ansbach on 16
th
 
December 1936, Meiser most notably warned of the dangers that would occur if Nazism was 
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allowed to supersede the Christian faith to become the only religion in Germany.
328
 Unlike 
Marahrens, then, who strove for the success of Kerrl‘s church committees as the new form of 
administration for the German Protestant Church, Meiser‘s underlying suspicion of Nazism 
proved that he was committed only to the victory and survival of the lutherischer Flügel in 
this period and not to staatliche Kirchenpolitik per se. As will hopefully become clear in the 
next sub-chapter of this dissertation, Meiser‘s commitment to the State‘s involvement in 
Church affairs between 1935 and 1939 was only evident so long as he was free to pursue the 
Lutheran line. As soon as the State began to threaten Meiser‘s freedom to maintain a Lutheran 
element to the DEK, however, Meiser‘s endorsement of the State‘s interference in the Church 
clearly diminished.
329
 
Meiser‘s southern German counterpart, Landesbischof Theophil Wurm of Württemberg, 
also shared Meiser‘s heightened displeasure with the methods of the RMfKA. Wurm‘s 
mounting disenchantment with the RKA line was at least commensurate with his 
comparatively ‗looser‘ definition of confessional Lutheranism in this period, however. At the 
start of the central phase of the Protestant Kirchenkampf, Wurm was nevertheless as 
seemingly enthusiastic about the advent of staatliche Kirchenpolitik as his Hanoverian and 
Bavarian counterparts. Believing that the first VKL ought to embrace the opportunity for co-
operation with the Nazi State provided by the RMfKA, Wurm exclaimed that, 
...die VKL [sollte] nicht gehindert werden, im Zusammenwirken mit dem RKA die Zusammenfassung 
alles dessen, was wirklich auf den Namen Kirche Anspruch erheben darf, tatkräftig zu fördern und 
dadurch dem für Staat und Kirche gleich erwünschten Ziele einer neuen wahren kirchlichen 
Gemeinschaft im evangelischen Deutschland zu dienen.
330
 
Like Marahrens and Meiser, then, Wurm too initially expressed faith that Kerrl and his church 
committees had the potential to succeed in fostering a fully unified German Protestant Church 
that was appropriate to the particular temporal framework of Nazi Germany. 
Just as Meiser had attempted to assert influence over Kerrl in an effort to render him a 
servant of the Church as well as of the State, Wurm too did not offer his support to the RKA 
line without attempting to mould it first into the design that he saw fit for the Church. In an 
effort to extract a clear statement of intent from the national RKA and to free it from radical 
‗German Christian‘ elements, Wurm participated alongside Meiser and visibly took the lead in 
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a meeting with representatives of the national RKA on 10
th
 January 1936.
331
 During the 
meeting, Wurm raised objections to three main character traits of the GDC, namely that it 
considered Hitler to have ―heilsgeschichtliche Bedeutung‖, that it was attempting to re-write 
Christianity according to Nazi precepts, and that the totalitarian mentality of the GDC left no 
room for the confessional and dogmatic differences between the original Protestant 
denominations.
332
 After highlighting these points, Wurm then raised the following direct 
questions: 
Steht der Reichskirchenausschuss mit uns auf demselben Boden der Verurteiling dieser Sätze? Wenn 
auch er dieselben als bekenntniswidrig ansieht, was tut er, um dem Bekenntnisanliegen Geltung zu 
schaffen, auch wenn er seinem Auftrag gemäß in erster Linie Ordnung in der Kirche zu schaffen 
versucht?
333
 
By adopting such a direct interrogative approach, there can be no doubt that Wurm tried to 
force the representatives of the national RKA, through a form of rhetorical blackmail, to agree 
with both him and Meiser in their condemnation of the GDC‘s methods if it wanted to ensure 
the bishops‘ continued support. Similarly, his insinuation that the RKA ought to work towards 
a Church union that was based on an awareness of the Protestant confessions only and was 
not simply amalgamated in the style of the United EKApU also put pressure on the RKA to 
set its methods in contradiction to those of the GDC. 
In spite of his disdain for ‗German Christianity‘, however, Wurm was nonetheless well 
aware that it was precisely because of the three main characteristics of the GDC to which he 
took exception that the NSDAP offered the Church its support in the first place. For this 
reason, despite his personal dislike for the GDC, Wurm reluctantly acknowledged that a 
considerable Deutsche Christen presence was needed in the church committees in order to 
ensure that the Nazi State continued to engage with Church affairs. In other words, whilst 
Wurm still continued to view the GDC as the main cause of the Protestant struggle, he 
nonetheless knew that its proponents in the RKA had to become a pawn in his national 
endeavour to dupe the Nazi State into believing it was successfully transplanting Nazi 
precepts into the Protestant Church. All the while, however, Wurm intended the Church to 
neutralise the heretical practices of the GDC by asserting the overarching influence of the 
original Christian confessions over Nazi precepts within the church committees. In this 
particular context, then, it can be appreciated that Wurm eventually gave his support to the 
RKA line, not out of disrespect for the condition of the ‗destroyed‘ Landeskirchen, but since 
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he saw in the church committees a hidden means for the Protestant Church to assert much-
needed influence over the RMfKA. Moreover, since staunch Lutheran Wilhelm Zöllner had 
already been chosen to head the national RKA, Wurm was able to trust in Zöllner‘s strong 
confessional beliefs to lead him away from accepting Nazi heresy and to govern the RKA 
according to Lutheran doctrine first and foremost. Speaking directly to Zöllner at the meeting 
with the RKA, Wurm thus reiterated the need for Christian doctrine to overpower Nazi 
ideology within the national Church committee and explained that, 
Man hat den Eindruck, daß es für den Reichskirchenausschuss außerordentlich schwer ist, sich im 
Reichskirchenministerium durchzusetzen. [...] Deshalb aber brauchen Sie unsere Unterstützung. Wir 
geben sie mit freudigem Herzen; es muß nur klar werden, daß sich der Reichskirchenausschuss 
durchsetzt.
334
 
In light of Wurm‘s insistence that his support for the RKA was only guaranteed as long as it 
asserted itself against the might of the RMfKA, then, it can be inferred that Wurm was only in 
favour of co-operation with the Nazi State in Church affairs as long as the Protestant Church 
remained the dominant party in the partnership. 
Further to this, Wurm‘s belief in the RKA as a means for the Church to influence the 
State can also be demonstrated by his willingness to imitate the RKA system on the regional 
level. Although Wurm‘s ELLKW was never forced to institute a regional LKA of its own due 
to its established Intaktheit, Wurm nonetheless oversaw theological negotiations between the 
official administration of his Landeskirche and representatives of the regional GDC in an 
effort to co-ordinate his Landeskirche with the new administrative structure of the DEK.
335
 
The principal reason for doing so was that moderate Württembergian Deutsche Christen had 
expressed a desire to work towards a solution to the conflict on the level of regional 
administration.
336
 There can be no doubt, however, that Wurm‘s presiding over these regional 
synodal discussions also served to benefit him, not only by demonstrating his commitment to 
ecumenical negotiation but also by strategically allowing him to display to the Nazi State a 
willingness to conform to its new style of Church governance – the latter of which 
undoubtedly served to reassure the NSDAP that the Intaktheit of Wurm‘s ELLKW did not 
threaten to jeopardise its wider efforts to consolidate the DEK in this period. Since Wurm 
succeeded in diverting the suspicion of the NSDAP away from his Landeskirche through 
voluntary co-operation with the GDC, this ultimately left Wurm free to ensure that the 
Christian confessions took precedence within the administrative decisions of his 
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Landeskirche, and it was through the prevalence of Christian precepts that he hoped to 
convert the GDC. 
Inevitably, however, whilst Wurm‘s efforts pleased many in the ‗destroyed‘ 
Landeskirchen, who saw in his voluntarily embracing of the LKA line an attempt at least to 
empathise with their complex predicament, more radical ‗Dahlemites‘ viewed Wurm‘s 
negotiations with the GDC as treacherous to the stability of the ‗Confessing‘ cause. Yet, as 
Wurm himself confirmed in his memoirs, 
Wir in Württembeg versuchten es, eingedenk der Fabel vom Wettstreit der Sonne und des Windes um 
den Mantel des Wanderers, nicht mit dem Hinauswerfen, sondern mit dem Heranziehen der Deutschen 
Christen, indem wir einige von ihnen zu einem theologischen Gespräch einluden...
337
 
Unlike Marahrens, who theoretically had no choice but to appease the GDC in his 
predominantly Nazi Landeskirche, two options existed for Wurm during the years of 
staatliche Kirchenpolitik – namely either to reject or to welcome the GDC into negotiations 
concerning the design for the DEK. Wurm‘s eventual decision to work with the GDC should 
not be taken as an expression of his sympathies for the movement, however, especially since 
it had originally provided the impetus for Wurm‘s original move to the Bekennende Kirche. 
Rather, in light of Wurm‘s allusion to the ―Wanderer‖ who has to grapple with the competing 
influences of the sun and wind with only his coat for protection, it should be recognised that 
keeping the GDC in negotiations at this point was a safer option, by which Wurm was able to 
attempt to impose his confessional principles on the LKA, than if he had removed it from the 
equation so early on. Just as the ―Wanderer‖ to whom Wurm alludes might have ditched his 
coat, leaving himself with no protection against further ravages of the weather, Wurm was not 
prepared, despite his aversion to GDC aims, to reject the movement completely just yet for 
fear that he might once again require the strategic protection of the movement against more 
brutal attacks from the Nazi State on the traditional affairs of the Church.  
 
The Landesbischöfe and the Acquiescing Church 
In spite of the inter-connection between the lutherischer Flügel and staatliche Kirchenpolitik 
that had been building up since mid-1935, the Protestant struggle in Nazi Germany 
dramatically changed direction in 1937. As Wurm states in his memoirs, ―Das Jahr 1937 
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brachte eine überraschende Wendung in der Kirchenpolitik des Staates‖.338 The peaceful co-
operation between the Church and the RMfKA that all three of the Landesbischöfe had 
envisaged came to an abrupt end with the demise of Kerrl‘s regional and national church 
committees. Not long after the church committees had been established throughout the 
majority of the DEK, a local church crisis in the diocese of Lübeck caused the national 
Church unification effort to crumble just over a year later, demonstrating the power of 
regional events to influence the national Church line. In short, a dispute occurred in the 
Evangelisch-Lutherische Kirche in Lübeck concerning the unlawful dismissal of nine 
‗Confessing‘ pastors from its regional administration by its Deutsche Christen bishop. In an 
attempt to resolve matters, the national RKA decided to send its leader, Wilhelm Zöllner, to 
Lübeck to facilitate negotiations between the regional ‗Confessing‘ clergy and its ‗German 
Christian‘ leadership. Unhappy with the attempt of the RKA to re-empower members of the 
Bekennende Kirche, however, since the committee had originally been designed to foster 
moderate politico-ecclesiastical positions only, the Nazi State intervened to prohibit Zöllner 
from travelling to Lübeck. In response to the State‘s aggressive intervention in Church affairs 
and use of secular law to hinder a spiritual mission, the national RKA resigned in protest on 
12
th
 February 1937, which only served to intensify the anger of the Nazi State towards the 
Protestant Church.
339
 
Following this, the Nazi State and its Gestapo agents stepped up measures against the 
DEK which, in the absence of the national RKA, was forced to revert to its former 
instruments of Church governance. The DEKK thus came to represent the official Church 
administration of the GDC once more, yet it was now forced to engage in the Protestant 
struggle on its own since Reichsbischof Müller had disappeared from the national stage 
altogether following the controversies he had caused in the pre-RKA years. By contrast, 
although the two strands of the Bekennende Kirche continued to be governed by the Lutherrat 
and the second VKL respectively, the unofficial Church administration also laid claim to the 
Kirchenführerkonferenz (KFK), which was originally established by the RKA between 19
th
 
and 20
th
 November 1936 as an additional instrument of pan-confessional governance. 
Consisting exclusively of non-‗German Christian‘ church leaders from throughout the DEK, 
the KFK was the only moderate Protestant organisation in a position to take over the 
leadership of the alternative national Church. Initially, the KFK appointed an ad-hoc 
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executive committee known as the Gremium
340
 to manage its affairs and to engage with the 
State. However, due to Hanns Kerrl‘s refusal to acknowledge the Gremium and his insistence 
on speaking only with August Marahrens of Hanover in his capacity as ―dienstälteste[r] 
Landesbischof‖,341 the KFK soon replaced the Gremium with the Kirchenführerausschuss 
(KFA) under Marahrens‘ leadership.342 The KFA-led KFK thus assumed unofficial Church 
leadership from 12
th
 February 1937, just before the State upped its attack on the DEK. Most 
notably, Hitler personally intervened in the Protestant struggle against Nazism on 15
th
 
February 1937 to announce the Kirchenwahlerlass. This forced the Church to design its own 
national constitution and to hold elections for its own Generalsynode, despite Kerrl‘s repeated 
assurances to the KFK that no such elections would be called. In addition to this, the State 
also began to disable the Bekennende Kirche financially. Following a fruitless letter of protest 
from the second VKL to the highest ranking ministers of the NSDAP on 29
th
 April 1937,
343
 
the RMfKA forbade Church collections and, in the most direct expression of its hostility to 
the ‗Confessing‘ cause to date, the Gestapo arrested the founder of the Protestant resistance 
movement, Martin Niemöller, on 1
st
 July 1937.
344
 
In order to offer a more unified response to the State‘s heightened persecution of the 
Church in this phase of the Protestant struggle, then, the KFK, the RELKD and the second 
VKL came together and agreed to form a further pan-organisational executive committee 
called the Kasseler Gremium,
345
 which was intended to prepare the DEK for the promised 
Church elections. These elections were never to materialise, however, due to the State‘s 
increasing focus on territorial expansion during this period and its relative loss of interest in 
Church affairs. Nevertheless, the fact remains that, by the onset of the Second World War, the 
Protestant Kirchenkampf had radically changed in consistency, no longer being a relatively 
contained intra-Church conflict concerning the survival of the original Protestant confessions 
only, but now further complicated by an added battle for survival against the increasingly 
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brutal Nazi State. By the time Nazi Germany invaded Poland on 1
st
 September 1939, the 
NSDAP had done its best to disable the DEK with both a top-down and bottom-up assault on 
the Church. Amongst other things, it disbanded the remaining LKAs between 23
rd
 August and 
30
th
 September 1937,
346
 limited the collection of Church taxes to State and local authorities on 
the insistence of DEKK leader Dr. Friedrich Werner,
347
 and cruelly forced clergymen to 
display their allegiance to the Third Reich over that of their Christian faith following the 
annexation of Austria to Germany.
348
 
Despite the efforts of the Kasseler Gremium to unite the separate ‗Confessing‘ factions 
against this fresh Nazi onslaught, it was not long before intra-Church divisions re-emerged. In 
particular, on 27
th
 September 1938, three ‗Dahlemitic‘ pastors349 issued a new Gebetsliturgie 
to the entire DEK as a response to the so-called Czechoslovakian crisis.
350
 This liturgy 
appeared to attack not just the State‘s encroachment into Church affairs but also the 
fundaments of Nazi secular rule itself.
351
 Although Landesbischöfe Marahrens, Meiser and 
Wurm all attempted to distance themselves from this liturgy, stressing that it was channelled 
solely through the organisation of the second VKL and not their Lutherrat or even the 
common Kasseler Gremium, all three men nevertheless refused to sign a formula prepared by 
Kerrl, which accused the writers of the liturgy of treason to the Third Reich.
352
 In this context, 
then, although the outcome of the dispute over the Gebetsliturgie served to re-establish the 
divisions between the RELKD and the second VKL of old, almost mirroring the division of 
the Bekennende Kirche at Bad Oeynhausen, the three bishops did not turn their backs on their 
colleagues in the Confessing Church altogether. In this respect, therefore, although the 
incident undoubtedly tested the bishops‘ true allegiances in this phase of the Protestant 
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Kirchenkampf, all three of the bishops remained true to the ‗Confessing‘ cause and continued 
to maintain a position of churchly compromise. 
Looking at the individual reactions of the Landesbischöfe to the drastic change in 
staatliche Kirchenpolitik after 1937, however, it becomes clear that, although the bishops 
were united in response within their particular lutherischer Flügel, the reasons behind their 
Resistenz and the extent to which they were committed to this ‗middle‘ line differed 
considerably from bishop to bishop. Most interestingly, it was Landesbischof August 
Marahrens of Hanover who was once again thrown into the front line of the Kirchenkampf 
during this period to find a solution to the conflict after the intensification of Nazi violence 
against the Church. This time his elevation in Church affairs was, however, due to the specific 
request of the Nazi State, since Hanns Kerrl insisted on talking to no other clergyman. 
Although scholars attribute Kerrl‘s insistence on talking to Marahrens to the latter‘s standing 
as the longest-serving Landesbischof,
353
 the clear connection between Kerrl‘s partiality for the 
Hanoverian Landesbischof and Marahrens‘ steadfast adherence to Kerrl‘s former RKA in the 
preceding years must also be borne in mind. Since Marahrens‘ recent conciliatory conduct 
suggessted that he was the most approachable and accommodating Landesbischof in the eyes 
of the Nazi State, it is understandable that those in the RMfKA who were so eager to succeed 
in the task to reform the Church that had been delegated to them by Hitler came to view 
Marahrens as the ‗bishop of last resort‘ in the Protestant Church. 
Further to this, Marahrens‘ strict adherence to the dictates of confessional Lutheranism 
and his subsequent commitment to honour his secular leaders as instruments of God can 
equally be seen to have trapped Marahrens and put him in a paradoxical position in which his 
staunch Protestantism actually compelled him to work with the NSDAP. With Kerrl singling 
him out as his negotiator of choice on the one hand, and his Lutheran confession obliging him 
to work in harmony with Germany‘s secular leaders on the other, there can be no doubt that 
the parallel demands of Marahrens‘ specifically Lutheran and national-conservative 
conscience rendered his co-operation with the Nazi State virtually inevitable. It must also be 
acknowledged that, since Kerrl had pinned his hopes for collaboration solely on Marahrens on 
the national stage, Kerrl had placed Marahrens in the awkward public position which forced 
all those who wanted to see a resolution to the Protestant Kirchenkampf to look to Marahrens 
as a means of last resort to bridge the Protestant divisions. Since Kerrl had intimated that he 
was only prepared to engage with Marahrens or cut all ties with the Church, it is 
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understandable that Marahrens felt compelled to act on behalf of the DEK. After all, any 
refusal to co-operate with Kerrl looked set to result in the instantaneous demise of 
institutional Protestantism in Nazi Germany at large. Moreover, in addition to being rendered 
single-handedly responsible for the fate of the DEK, Marahrens‘ eagerness to conform to the 
demands of the State was also enhanced by the ever-worsening plight of his colleagues in the 
nearby EKApU, who were by now on the receiving end of more vigorous Gestapo 
persecution. In consideration of the fact that the Nazi State had already demonstrated the 
extent of its power by imprisoning Martin Niemöller, and that Dr. Werner of the DEKK was 
already curbing finances for the alternative Church government,
354
 it must be appreciated that 
Kerrl‘s initial threat to suffocate the Church by cutting off its provisions and restricting its 
freedom to operate appeared very real at this point in the Third Reich. 
 Whereas Klaus Scholder, for example, has characterised Marahrens as ―politisch ein 
gläubiger Anhänger Hitlers und kirchenpolitisch ein überzeugter Vertreter des 
reichskirchlichen Zusammenschlusses‖,355 this investigation views Marahrens‘ continued co-
operation with the RMfKA to formalise a Staatskirche as a necessary consequence of many 
factors, which ultimately prevented him from refusing personal participation in the Church 
conflict. In the first instance, Marahrens had been concerned to effect change in the DEK 
since his participation in the Kapler Ausschuss of 1933. Since the essence of the DEK was 
now in more jeopardy than ever before in light of intensified Nazi violence against the 
Church, it is understandable that Marahrens grasped Kerrl‘s offer of co-operation in this 
period to keep German Protestantism in Nazi Germany alive. Even though Marahrens‘ 
decision to continue to work with Kerrl ended up with him being ostracised by the very 
Bekennende Kirche to which he essentially belonged, it must be appreciated that a chain of 
socio-political causality was ultimately responsible for taking Marahrens in a different 
direction through the Protestant Kirchenkampf to that of his ‗Confessing‘ colleagues. 
Speaking about these divergent directions within the Bekennende Kirche, Ministerialrat 
Stahn drew upon Marahrens‘ conduct to typify the actions of those who diverged most from 
the ‗Dahlemites‘. Stahn thus stated that, ―Auch die Bekenntnisfront ist nicht einheitlich. Es ist 
ein weiter Weg von Karl Barth bis Marahrens. Auch da gibt es zersetzende Kräfte. Das 
Vorhandensein einer starken Mitte ist wichtig‖.356 By singling out Marahrens as the member 
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of the Bekennende Kirche whose stance was furthest away from that of ‗unionistic‘ Karl 
Barth, Stahn‘s words reveal that Marahrens‘ conduct had by now come to be viewed as 
detrimental to the stability of the ‗Confessing‘ Front. Although Marahrens‘ conciliatory 
approach had been regarded in the first phase of the Protestant Kirchenkampf as appropriate to 
the needs of the ‗Confessing‘ cause, the sudden change in the pace and the nature of the 
Protestant conflict had rendered Marahrens‘ relatively accommodating approach to the Nazi 
State insufficient in the eyes of the ‗Dahlemites‘. Since the more radical ‗Dahlemites‘ by now 
perceived a need to respond to Nazism in its entirety and not just its policies with regard to 
the Church, it was inevitable that they began to move away from Marahrens, whom they 
ultimately saw as being more accommodating of the Nazi cause than of their own. 
Despite ‗Dahlemitic‘ disgruntlement with Marahrens‘ methods, however, by this phase in 
the Protestant struggle his theoretical function had nevertheless become one of being a ‗man 
for all sides‘. As a result, his own aims and aspirations subsequently became shaped 
accordingly. After all, Marahrens‘ continued participation in national Church administration 
demonstrates that he truly believed he was able to achieve a compromise solution that was 
acceptable to the Protestant Church and the Nazi State alike. Marahrens‘ insistence on 
creating a thoroughly Christocentric Church within a deeply Nazified German State was 
nonetheless met with criticism, particularly from those in the so-called ‗destroyed‘ 
Landeskirchen. For example, in a letter to Marahrens in June 1939, Pastor Asmussen wrote 
that, 
Darum bedaure ich auch, daß ich immer wieder hören muß, wie stark in Hannover die Verschiedenheit 
gegenüber den preußischen Brüdern verharmlost wird, sobald man für eine bestimmte Kirchenpolitik 
eine möglichst breite Front darstellen möchte. Ich kann Ihnen gar nicht sagen, wie etwa in den letzten 
Wochen angesichts Ihrer besonderen kirchenpolitischen Pläne alle Brüder hier in Berlin-Brandenburg 
innerlich gebangt haben!
357
 
When Pastor Asmussen‘s refers to Marahrens‘ work in this period as creating a type of 
―Kirchenpolitik‖, this characterises Marahrens‘ attempt to fuse the political will of the Nazi 
State with a traditional Church structure very well. As a result of his increasing entrapment 
between the parameters of defiance and compliance in the Protestant Kirchenkampf – first 
through the Intaktheit of his Landeskirche, then via the hopes of the DEK, before finally being 
appointed official spokesman for the Church by the RMfKA – Marahrens ultimately left the 
second stage of the Protestant struggle firmly committed to an unrealistic fusion of unchristian 
Nazism and confessional Lutheranism. Since Ministerialrat Stahn had insisted that a strong 
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mediating force was needed between the two extremes of Marahrens and Barth, however, the 
floor was nonetheless open in this period for another moderate churchman to come to the 
forefront of the Protestant struggle with a more amenable attempt to bridge existing divisions. 
Landesbischof Hans Meiser of Bavaria certainly looked set to fulfill this mediating role, 
since he had come to the forefront of the Protestant struggle against Nazism voluntarily over 
the preceding years, and not as the result of requests from either the Church or the State like 
Marahrens. Meiser‘s self-instigated establishment of the lutherischer Flügel and his natural 
elevation as spokesman for the Lutheran confession on the national stage demonstrated his 
personal commitment to seek a resolution to the Protestant Kirchenkampf, yet did not render 
him subservient like Marahrens to either the pan-confessional ‗Confessing‘ cause or the 
increasingly brutal Nazi State. As a result, the freedom that had been afforded him by the 
Intaktheit of his Landeskirche ensured that Meiser was not trapped by pressures, whether from 
the DEK or from the NSDAP. If anything, Meiser‘s own voluntary entrapment as spokesman 
for the Lutheran cause only served to reiterate his deep-seated commitment to this specific 
denomination of German Protestantism. It is in this context, then, that Meiser‘s commitment 
to both developing and leading the lutherischer Flügel truly reflected the strength of his 
dedication to finding an alternative solution to the Protestant Kirchenkampf that avoided 
fruitlessly having to unite the polar opposites of Nazism and universal Christianity, just as his 
counterpart Marahrens was ultimately forced to do. 
In spite of the NSDAP‘s increasing hold over the infrastructure of the DEK, Meiser was 
able to use his relative freedom to conform to and to reject simultaneously the demands of the 
Nazi State. For instance, on the occasion of Hitler‘s birthday in 1939, it was ordered that all 
Protestant churches in the Third Reich ring their bells in celebration of the event. Despite his 
Landeskirche not officially coming under the jurisdiction of the official administration of the 
DEKK in this period, Meiser nonetheless issued the declaration that ―am 20. April 1939 in der 
Zeit von 10.15 bis 10.45 Uhr, wie in der gesamten Deutschen Evangelischen Kirche, alle 
Glocken geläutet werden‖.358 Since Meiser was undoubtedly the most prominent 
representative of the Lutheran cause in Nazi Germany at this point, his decision to co-operate 
with DEKK demands ought not, however, to be seen as endorsement of the Nazi line, but 
rather as a convenient means of appeasing the State to ensure the continued Intaktheit of his 
ELKB and also to fulfill his Lutheran obligation to give thanks for Germany‘s secular 
leadership. 
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It is important to recognise, however, that Meiser only gave praise for Germany‘s Führer 
in contexts where it did not threaten to overrule his overarching allegiance to God. When the 
DEKK officially ordered the constituent churches of the DEK to take an oath of allegiance to 
the Nazi State on 20
th
 April 1938, for example, Meiser publicly refused to do so, aligning 
himself instead with his counterpart Theophil Wurm in rejecting the action as an infringement 
of the rights of confessional Lutherans.359 In this respect, Meiser‘s seemingly contradictory 
response to the Nazi State during the immediate pre-war years can be seen to be influenced 
largely by his clear dedication to the Lutheran line, namely offering praise to the State only to 
the extent that it was God‘s administrative instrument on earth. In accordance with Lutheran 
doctrine, Meiser never allowed his commitment to the Nazi State to supersede his overarching 
dedication to God‘s eternal spiritual kingdom. It is also worth noting how Meiser presented 
this stance as one he shared with his Württembergian neighbour Wurm, not only in an effort to 
rekindle the commonality of cause between the ELKB and the ELLKW of the early 
Kirchenkampf years, but strategically to avoid singling himself out for persecution in the 
event of potential reprisals by the NSDAP. 
Such a ‗safety in numbers‘ approach, in fact, became typical of Meiser‘s actions during 
the years of intensifying Nazi violence against the Church. As can be determined from his 
appeal to the Bruderrat of the EKApU just before the State increased its persecution of the 
wider DEK, Meiser continued to assert his status as part of the ‗Confessing‘ cause. In spite of 
the relative detachment brought about by his insistence on pursuing a specifically Lutheran 
way through the Protestant struggle, Meiser explicitly called for the Bekennende Kirche to 
patch up its differences for the sake of presenting a united front against Nazism. With the 
threat of imminent Church elections, Meiser thus exclaimed that, 
Dringend empfehle ich deshalb, doch noch einmal einen Versuch auf dem Wege persönlicher 
Verhandlungen mit Vertretern des preußischen Landeskirchenausschusses zu machen. Unsere Kirchen 
und Gemeinden ertragen es nicht, daß die bestehenden Spannungen bis in den Wahlkampf 
hineinreichen, so daß es u. U. dazu kommt, daß die verschiedenen Teile der Bekennenden Kirche in 
diesem Kampf gegeneinander statt miteinander gegen den gemeinsamen Gegner antreten.
360
 
Although Meiser tried to enforce ideological change on the Bruderrat of the EKApU and 
encouraged it to engage with the Nazi State during this tumultuous time, he did this because 
he wanted to arouse as little confrontation as possible from the Nazi State. For Meiser, 
appearing to accept the NSDAP was the most convenient means to achieve a peaceful 
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resolution to the Protestant Kirchenkampf which was in accordance with the dictates of 
confessional Lutheranism and not in total contradiction to the aims of the RMfKA. As is 
implied by the words quoted above, Meiser believed the activism of the ‗Dahlemites‘ against 
Germany‘s Nazi regime served only to intensify the conflict. As can be reasonably inferred 
from his parallel Lutheran unification efforts, the underlying implication of Meiser‘s 
instruction to the churches of the EKApU was for them to look to their common Lutheran 
element in an effort to bridge the divisions of the Bekennende Kirche. Although there can be 
no doubt that Meiser issued this directive in an attempt to strengthen the DEK as an effective 
force to protect German Protestantism in the pre-war years, his encouragement of the 
Bruderrat of the EKApU to foster amical relations with the rest of the DEK through its 
underlying Lutheran identity was undoubtedly advantageous to his wider plan of reasserting 
the Lutheranism behind the United EKApU and, ultimately, establishing a national German 
Lutheran Church. 
Further to this, it is clear to see that, whereas the change in the State‘s policy towards the 
Church in 1937 provoked Marahrens to ‗soften‘ his approach to the Protestant Kirchenkampf 
into one of all-round conciliation, the intensification of State measures against the Church in 
this period served only to strengthen Meiser‘s adherence to the lutherischer Flügel and 
encouraged him to retreat from the frontline of the battle. Whereas Meiser originally justified 
his support for Kerrl‘s RKA via the dictates of confessional Lutheranism, from 1937 onwards 
he came to use the Lutheran confession as a means of defence against the intrusive Nazi State 
by continually attempting to transform the DEK into a specifically Lutheran entity which 
could not be harmed by secular measures. In a completely opposite manner to Marahrens, 
then, Meiser used the freedom afforded him by the Intaktheit of his ELKB to build a wider 
‗free‘ Lutheran space on the national level of ecclesiastical administration which, instead of 
trapping Meiser between the ‗Dahlemites‘ and the NSDAP, actually helped him to continue to 
foster a more moderate position that satisfied both the Church and the State even during the 
immediate pre-war years. 
Following the fall of the Third Reich, Meiser reflected on his position in the Protestant 
Kirchenkampf during the central years of Germany‘s Nazi administration and confessed that, 
Wenn ich einmal wegen meiner Stellung zur Kirche und zu unserer lutherischen Kirche zur 
Rechenschaft gezogen werden sollte, dann würde ich mich lieber dem Vorwurf aussetzen, zu lutherisch 
gewesen zu sein, als daß man mir vorwerfen möchte, ich sei meiner lutherischen Kirche etwas schuldig 
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geblieben.
361
 
As is clear from his reflections, then, Meiser considered his fostering of the lutherischer 
Flügel as the best means by which he was able to honour the Intaktheit of his own 
Landeskirche, namely by attempting to spread the very model that had ensured its freedom to 
the rest of the DEK. This involved emphasising the common confessional element of 
Lutheranism prevalent in the ‗intact‘ and ‗destroyed‘ Landeskirchen alike. Even though his 
southern German neighbour, Theophil Wurm, was the only other representative of the 
lutherischer Flügel at this stage who was committed to the unification of the DEK in the 
interests of the Protestant Church alone, since Marahrens had been forced by now into 
heeding the aims for German Protestantism of the Nazi State, Meiser intended the new 
German Protestant Church to be specifically Lutheran in nature. 
As much as Meiser looked to his Württembergian neighbour for support with his 
fostering of a specifically Lutheran Protestant community in Germany, however, it cannot be 
denied that, even at this stage in the Protestant Kirchenkampf, Landesbischof Theophil Wurm 
had a far wider agenda for the future of the DEK. That is not to say that Wurm did not also 
offer demonstrations of acquiescence to the Nazi State though, particularly in light of its 
intensifying hostility, which provoked increasingly more churchmen to toe the Nazi line in an 
effort to save themselves from reprisals. For example, in response to Hitler‘s annexation of 
Austria in 1938, Wurm issued a public declaration of gratitude for the expansion of the Third 
Reich, framing the annexation as an expression of God‘s Will. Wurm proclaimed that, 
Wir freuen uns von Herzen, daß Gott es dem Führer des deutschen Volkes geschenkt hat, seine Heimat 
zurückzugewinnen und mit dem Reich der Deutschen wieder zu vereinigen. [...] Wir freuen uns, daß 
durch die Befreiungstat des Führers auch für unsere Glaubensgenossen in Österreich der Weg in die 
deutsche evangelische Kirche frei geworden ist. Und wir bitten Gott, daß er uns bald eine geeinte 
deutsche evangelische Kirche schenken, die im Gehorsam gegen ihren Herrn Jesus Christus und in 
voller Freiheit ihren Dienst am Volk ausrichten darf.
362
 
Although Wurm clearly portrayed Hitler, not only as God‘s divinely-appointed leader on 
earth, but also as the saviour of the pan-Germanic Church, there can be no doubt that Wurm 
usurped the occasion as a public, yet subtle, platform to reinforce the urgency for a firmly 
united German Protestant Church that was free to serve the Germanic people independently of 
the dictates of the Nazi State. In spite of the fact that Wurm‘s words of praise for Germany‘s 
Führer can be seen as an expression of his underlying support for the NSDAP, it must not be 
overlooked that, by framing his appeal for a solution to the Protestant Kirchenkampf within 
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such an expression of gratitude for Germany‘s secular leadership, Wurm was ultimately able 
to instrumentalise a moment of national fervour to his own advantage, namely to raise 
awareness of the DEK‘s predicament on the national stage. To a certain extent, then, Wurm‘s 
ability to turn the public focus from the elation at the annexation of Austria to the uncertain 
predicament of the DEK can also be seen as an implicit attempt to convey his dissatisfaction 
with the so-called Anschluss and to criticise the State for its failure to make sure that the 
appropriate infrastructure was in place before it proceeded with its territorial aims. The 
underlying hostility of Wurm‘s words are testified to by his subtle reference to Hitler‘s own 
‗foreignness‘ as an Austrian and as someone who Wurm paints as having hedonistically 
satisfied his own needs first without full consideration of the effects this was to have on 
institutional Protestantism in Germany at large.  
Despite his underlying disgruntlement with the expansionist aims of the NSDAP, 
however, Wurm was nonetheless careful not to target his aggression in this period directly at 
Hitler himself who, owing to his top-down mode of governance, had delegated the care of 
Church affairs to the supervision of the RMfKA. Most notably, in response to plans to 
demolish the Matthäuskirche in Munich in 1938, Wurm appealed directly to Hitler on behalf 
of all three bishops of the ‗intact‘ churches to stop the destruction. He pleaded that, 
Wir müssen darüber Beschwerde führen, daß die staatliche Stelle, die zur Ausführung des Willens des 
Führers in den kirchlichen Angelegenheiten berufen ist, diesem Willen zuwiderhandelt und die 
Volksgemeinschaft gefährdet. / [...] Die Mißachtung der evangelischen Kirche von seiten staatlicher 
Organe wird dadurch in verletzender und aufreizender Weise zum Ausdruck gebracht. [...] Wir können 
nicht glauben, daß die planmäßige Entrechtung und Zerstörung der evangelischen Kirche Ihre Billigung 
findet.
363
  
Wurm‘s words clearly convey the sentiment that, although the bishops were infuriated by the 
decision of the State to demolish the Matthäuskirche, they still had faith that Hitler himself 
neither instigated nor endorsed the ruling. By distinguishing Hitler‘s leadership from the 
actions of his RMfKA henchmen in his protestations, Wurm was conveniently able to convey 
the bishops‘ displeasure at the State‘s measures without criticising the ‗core‘ of the NSDAP 
itself, and thereby avoid accusations of high treason such as those levelled against the second 
VKL as a result of its Gebetsliturgie of the same year. Although Wurm‘s reluctance to criticise 
the nucleus of Germany‘s Nazi movement in this period for its demonstrations of violence 
both in and outside the Church undoubtedly casts doubt on his sense of Christian morality, it 
must ultimately be appreciated that this was a necessary tactic to avoid the abolition of the last 
remaining example of ‗intact‘ Protestantism in Germany protected by all three bishops 
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represented in his letter. 
Moreover, it is significant that it was Wurm who protested to Germany‘s Führer on 
behalf of the lutherischer Flügel in this instance. Even though this may initially appear 
surprising, particularly since the Matthäuskirche fell firmly within Meiser‘s ELKB, it can be 
argued, nevertheless, that Wurm was the only Landesbischof in a position to complain to 
Hitler at this point in the Third Reich. After all, Marahrens by now had too much to lose with 
the weight of the Nazi State scrutinising his every move, and Meiser, as the self-appointed 
head of the lutherischer Flügel, could not afford to infuriate the NSDAP and thereby endanger 
his Lutheran unification efforts. As a result of Marahrens‘ enforced participation in the 
national Protestant conflict as chief negotiator between the Church and the State, then, and 
Meiser‘s parallel, albeit voluntary, involvement as spokesman for the specifically Lutheran 
unification effort in Nazi Germany, Wurm was the only bishop left in the ‗intact‘ dynamic 
who could realistically protest on the national level without bringing down any part of the 
wider Protestant conciliation effort. 
Without such a central role on the national stage, since his participation in the KFA had 
ultimately been superseded by Marahrens‘ representation of the KFK in the Kasseler 
Gremium, it can be argued that Wurm‘s contribution to the Protestant Kirchenkampf in the 
central years of the conflict served purely to maintain equilibrium between the responses of 
the lutherischer Flügel and the more radical elements of the Bekennende Kirche to the 
intensification of Nazi secular policies. Once the Nazi regime began to increase its attack on 
the DEK in 1937, Wurm continued in his protests on behalf of Protestant interests, yet 
increasingly turned toward the Lutheran line established by Meiser and away from the appeal 
to universal Christian values typical of his protestations in the early years of the Protestant 
struggle. The extent to which the increasing hostility of the NSDAP towards German 
Protestantism forced Wurm to temper his protestations and adopt specifically Lutheran 
arguments is demonstrated by his own description of his Landeskirche in 1938. Despite his 
initial milder interpretation of confessional Lutheranism during the preceding phase of RKA 
administration, Wurm saw his Landeskirche at this point in the Third Reich as belonging 
firmly to the lutherischer Flügel. Describing the ELLKW in the immediate pre-war era, 
Wurm stated that, 
Aus ihrem Charakter als lutherische Kirche folgt notwendig, daß sie sich innerhalb der DEK, die einen 
Bund bekenntnisbestimmter Kirchen darstellt, den lutherischen Kirchen zurechnet, die eine 
Neugestaltung der DEK unter Wahrung des Bekenntnisstandes und einen engeren Zusammenschluß der 
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lutherischen Kirchen unter einheitlicher Leitung erstreben.
364
 
By positioning his Landeskirche alongside Meiser‘s ELKB in this period of heightened Nazi 
violence, therefore, Wurm found a convenient means by which he could soften his open 
protestations to the State and, thereby, avoid incurring revenge attacks from Nazi agents. 
Unlike Marahrens and Meiser, then, who were both involved in negotiations with the 
Nazi State on the national level during this period, Wurm‘s relative lack of obligation to 
proponents of Nazism meant that he was free both to issue subtle protests over the NSDAP‘s 
secular policies and to work solely within the parameters of the Bekennende Kirche, between 
Resistenz and Widerstand, to foster unity within the ‗Confessing‘ cause. Although Marahrens 
and Meiser were both at the forefront of the Protestant struggle against Nazism during this 
period, whether involuntarily or willingly, their respective attempts at engaging with the Nazi 
State left Wurm free to work solely on resolving the intra-Church conflict – an effort which, 
as the subsequent chapter of this dissertation will demonstrate, was to prove crucial to the 
third and final stage of the Protestant Church Struggle in Nazi Germany.    
 
Chapter Summary 
To begin to summarise the findings of this chapter, it must first be accepted that it deals with 
undoubtedly the most complicated stage of the Protestant struggle in the Third Reich, 
particularly in light of the advent of staatliche Kirchenpolitik and its transition from moderate 
negotiation to brutal persecution in the space of only a few years. For this reason, 
Landesbischöfe Marahrens, Meiser and Wurm, despite all being members of the lutherischer 
Flügel, were forced to develop different roles within their particular dynamic of ‗intact‘ 
churches. These differences in their positions during this period ultimately came about as a 
result of the politico-ecclesiastical tendencies they had displayed in the initial years of the 
Protestant Kirchenkampf. 
Taking Marahrens‘ predicament first, then, it is evident that his conciliatory approach 
during the first stage of the Protestant struggle saw him enthusiastically embrace the prospect 
of co-operation with Hanns Kerrl and his RKA in the central years of the conflict. Once the 
church committees failed, however, and Kerrl blatantly blackmailed Marahrens publicly to 
                                                          
364
 ‗Wurm zur kirchlichen Lage Württembergs‘, Brief an sämtliche Dekanatämter, 11/03/1938, EZA, 50/182, 
Nr.20. 
121 
 
compel him to continue to work with the RMfKA, since he made clear that any failure to do 
so would result in the instant annihilation of the DEK, Marahrens‘ power to move the ‗intact‘ 
dynamic back into a force for negotiation in the best interests of German Protestantism had 
naturally diminished. Having been trapped by his earlier successes in the Protestant 
Kirchenkampf, therefore, Marahrens ended the phase of staatliche Kirchenpolitik fruitlessly 
balancing the polarities of ambitions for German Protestantism of both the Church and the 
State. Although Marahrens‘ continued commitment to achieving conciliation between Church 
and State authorities must be commended in light of the increasing difficulty after 1937 of 
maintaining such a ‗middle-grounded‘ position, it must nonetheless be acknowledged that the 
politico-ecclesiastical atmosphere of the time allowed Marahrens to practise no other stance. 
After all, since all factions of the German Protestant Church and the Nazi State equally looked 
to Marahrens during this period in the hope that he would work in favour of their own design 
for German Protestantism, it is no wonder that Marahrens was reluctant to move towards a 
more polarising position in the Protestant Kirchenkampf for fear of destroying his Church 
unification efforts. This reluctance was also enhanced by the fact that Kerrl had put the fate of 
institutional Protestantism in Germany in Marahrens‘ hands alone in the immediate pre-war 
years. 
Like Marahrens, Wurm was also forced to quell his protestations against Nazi agents in 
this period as Nazi violence rapidly intensified. Even though Wurm had never practised High 
Lutheranism like his counterparts Marahrens and Meiser, he was increasingly forced to frame 
his arguments against Nazism during this phase within specifically Lutheran logic to ensure 
that he was able to continue to appeal for the benefit of the Protestant Church on the national 
level without evoking undue reprisals from the Nazi State. Although his lack of connection to 
national Church governance afforded him the freedom to comment on political developments, 
Wurm nonetheless had to do so subtly via Lutheran doctrine. This allowed him to distance 
himself from the more direct defiance of the ‗Dahlemites‘ and, thereby, to avoid persecution 
from Nazi agencies. Wurm‘s lack of involvement in national Church administration was, 
however, no negative development in this period, since his relative lack of prominence in 
national Church affairs left him free to work firmly within the Bekennende Kirche. Since 
Wurm had not lost as much respect as Marahrens and Meiser in the eyes of the ‗Dahlemites‘, 
who viewed the bishops‘ co-operation with the NSDAP during this period as traitorous to the 
‗Confessing‘ cause, Wurm was able to lay the foundations for his eventual rise to the 
leadership of the ‗intact‘ dynamic in the third and final stage of the Protestant Kirchenkampf. 
By ultimately positioning himself at the less radical end of the lutherischer Flügel, Wurm 
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may not have been able to influence the Church line to the extent of his Bavarian neighbour 
Meiser, yet his constantly oscillating appeal to both the High Lutherans and the more 
unionistic ‗Dahlemites‘ was to prove crucial in earning Wurm the respect he needed to move 
the ‗intact‘ dynamic on after the onset of the Second World War. 
As the founder of the lutherischer Flügel, however, Meiser used the phase of staatliche 
Kirchenpolitik to develop further his commitment to confessional Lutheranism as a solid 
foundation for Church conciliation. While Marahrens was busy holding the polarities of 
Church and State ambitions at arm‘s length, and Wurm was pre-occupied ‗backstage‘ 
reconciling the conflicting branches of the Bekennende Kirche, Meiser was free to come to the 
forefront of the ‗intact‘ dynamic as chief representative of the Lutheran cause. In developing a 
uniquely confessional approach to the Protestant Kirchenkampf which did not openly 
contradict the designs for German Protestantism of both the Nazi State and the Church, 
Meiser ultimately devised an effective means both to encourage intra-Church unification and 
to protect the essence of institutional Protestantism in Germany at large. Whereas both 
Marahrens and Wurm were forced to ‗soften‘ their responses to Nazism in line with the State‘s 
increasing persecution of the Church from 1937 onwards, Meiser was able to draw on the 
protection afforded to him as leader of the lutherischer Flügel to continue his own Lutheran 
unification efforts and, in doing so, undermining the power of the State over Church affairs. 
Although the last section of this chapter suggests that the ‗Meiser Years‘ of 1935 to 1939 
may indeed be seen as a move towards an ‗acquiescing‘ Church, Meiser‘s instigation of a 
specifically Lutheran way for German Protestantism was, in fact, no negative development in 
the history of the Protestant Kirchenkampf itself, even though it controversially provided the 
bishops with a theological rationale for not commenting on the State‘s escalating persecution 
of the Jews in this period. Looking at the Protestant predicament alone, then, it can be seen 
that Marahrens‘ ability to put an end to the Protestant struggle in Nazi Germany for the 
benefit of the Church ceased after Hanns Kerrl recruited him to serve the interests of the Nazi 
State. Similarly, although the lutherischer Flügel provided Wurm with a means to ‗soften‘ his 
inherent pietism and continued associations with the more universalised Protestantism of the 
wider Church resistance movement, these underlying preferences still shone through in 
Wurm‘s work. Meiser‘s ability to transform and subsequently lead the ‗intact‘ dynamic into 
the specifically lutherischer Flügel in this period, however, ultimately allowed the ‗intact‘ 
churches to act as a bulwark to prevent the Nazi State from completely destroying the DEK. 
Whereas Victoria Barnett once characterised the ―concessions made to the official church‖ as 
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―symbols of acquiescence to the Nazi regime‖;365 a quotation that provided the inspiration for 
the title of the final sub-section of this chapter, the compromises fostered by the confessional 
Lutheranism of the ‗Meiser Years‘ must be seen, rather, as necessary manoeuvres that helped 
to preserve the essence of German Protestantism through the most brutal era of Nazi violence 
towards the Church. By establishing the lutherischer Flügel during this period, Meiser not 
only revealed himself as ―spiritus rector und Promoter des lutherischen Zusammenschlusses, 
Sprecher der Lutheraner im Kreis der deutschen Kirchenführer,‖366 but, more importantly, 
succeeded in shielding the ‗intact‘ dynamic which he shared with Marahrens and Wurm with a 
strong sense of faith and spirituality that was impenetrable even by the most violent secular 
policies. 
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CHAPTER THREE – 1939-1945: THE WURM YEARS 
Although Landesbischöfe Marahrens, Meiser and Wurm still continued to lead the only three 
‗intact‘ Protestant Landeskirchen in Nazi Germany, by the onset of the Second World War in 
1939 it was apparent that their membership of this special ‗intact‘ club did not hold the same 
benefits for each of the three men. August Marahrens of Hanover, for instance, had started out 
in 1933 as the only bishop of an ‗intact‘ church to object outwardly to the GDC-led 
Reichskirche. By 1939, however, Marahrens had been incrementally pulled into co-operation 
with both the ‗German Christians‘ and the NSDAP as a result of his steadfast dedication to the 
Church and his parallel loyalty to the German nation state. This had the result that, by the time 
war broke out in Europe, Marahrens‘ politico-ecclesiastical policies edged ever closer to the 
Nazi line. By contrast, Landesbischöfe Hans Meiser of Bavaria and Theophil Wurm of 
Württemberg had moved from an initial, albeit strategic, acceptance of the GDC in the initial 
years of the Third Reich to attempts to maintain distance from the increasing radicalism of the 
movement in the immediate pre-war period. Whereas Meiser had found protection from 
escalating Nazi violence via the constraints of his Lutheran confession, however, Wurm 
evidently became ever more galvanised by the potential of German Protestantism to act as a 
united force against the might of Nazism. This had the result that, by 1939, the original 
commonality of cause between the two southern German Landesbischöfe was rapidly 
diminishing. With the tensions of war about to add to the crisis of conscience experienced by 
all three of the bishops, this chapter initially assesses the effect of the Second World War on 
the actions and attitudes of the Landesbischöfe, and demonstrates how the conditions of war 
in Germany served to reinforce the bishops‘ individual politico-ecclesiastical positions as they 
had been developing since 1933.  
Before this part of the investigation can begin, however, it should be noted that, although 
the breadth of time covered in this chapter is considerably larger than in the previous two 
sections of this inquiry, this disparity is largely due to a change in pace and atmosphere of the 
specifically Protestant Kirchenkampf. Despite the increased tensions between the German 
Protestant Church and the Nazi State following the collapse of Kerrl‘s church committees, the 
NSDAP rapidly lost interest in staatliche Kirchenpolitik from late 1939 onwards
367
 as it began 
to turn its attentions to the very real prospect of eastward expansion and the fulfilment of its 
desire to eliminate Jewish influence in Europe. Although the NSDAP had been gradually 
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increasing its policies of violence and discrimination against the Jews since coming to power 
in 1933, it was in the period after 1939 that Nazi policies visibly began to head towards 
extermination.
368
 After invading and capturing Poland in September 1939, the Nazis began to 
deploy SS Einsatztruppen in its captured territories to force the Jews into ghettos.
369
 On 12
th
 
February 1940, the first German Jews were deported to Poland.
370
 As ever more nations fell to 
Nazi troops in the ensuing months and the Nazis forged alliances with eastern European 
nations,
371
 mass deportations of Jews to the east begin in earnest. Most poignantly, on 1
st
 
September 1941, German Jews were ordered into forced labour and were forced to wear the 
Star of David on their chests.
372
 During this year, the mass murder of Jews also became 
commonplace by SS Einsatztruppen in seized lands, with almost 34,000 Jews shot near Kiev, 
and 23,000 in the Ukraine in September alone.
373
 On 23
rd
 October 1941, the fate of the Jews 
in captured territories was sealed when the Nazis forbade their emigration from the Reich.
374
 
In 1942, mass killings of the Jews began in Auschwitz and other extermination camps erected 
by the Nazis.
375
 As well as brutally murdering their prisoners, the Nazis conducted brutal 
experimentations, sterilisations and castrations in the camps.
376
 However, on 2
nd
 February 
1943, the Nazis suffered their first major military defeat at Stalingrad, which marked the 
beginning of the end of the Third Reich.
377
 By 1944, in light of increasing German military 
defeats,
378
 the Nazis ceased to use the gas chambers in Auschwitz and ordered their 
destruction. As Allied troops advanced into German territories from both the eastern and the 
western fronts in 1945, the Nazis ordered their prisoners on ‗death marches‘ out of the camps 
to ensure that ―not a single prisoner from the concentration camps falls alive into the hands of 
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the enemy‖.379 Although there is much debate over exactly how many people lost their lives at 
the hands of Nazi brutality in this era,
380
 it cannot be denied that millions of Jews, Soviet 
prisoners of war, Roma and Sinti gypsies, Jehovah‘s Witnesses, homosexuals, the 
handicapped, and political and religious dissenters fell victim to the Nazi killing machine, as 
well as both military personnel and civilians in the war. 
Although the specifically Protestant struggle against Nazism did not cease during these 
tumultuous years, the conflict developed at a much slower speed than during the early stages 
of the Third Reich. Since the NSDAP was by now targeting its aggression at other societal 
groups, the measures of the Nazi State against the DEK in particular had become relatively 
subdued during this period. For these reasons, even though this chapter deals with exactly half 
of the chronology of the Protestant Kirchenkampf, the issues affecting the Protestant Church 
during the final six years of the Third Reich are roughly equivalent in number to those of the 
earlier but shorter stages of the Protestant conflict. The structure of this chapter nonetheless 
shows that a reduction in the State‘s interest in the fate of German Protestantism did not bring 
a simplification of the conflict for the DEK. On the contrary, due to the intensification of the 
State‘s policies of racial discrimination and its persecution of those societal groups judged 
‗unworthy of life‘ in the Third Reich,381 the nature of the Protestant struggle naturally 
expanded from one of a purely Church-based conflict to one concerned with the wider moral 
obligation of the Christian Church to protect God‘s people on earth. To accommodate this 
widening of the character of the Protestant Kirchenkampf, then, the second section of this 
chapter deals with the responses of Landesbischöfe Marahrens, Meiser and Wurm to pressing 
humanitarian concerns. Although the bishops arguably had ample opportunity in the pre-war 
years to protest to the NSDAP about its violations of human rights, it must be appreciated that 
it was only in this period that the bishops were actually forced to take position on Nazi 
violence and discrimination when Nazi racial laws intruded directly into Church governance 
once the DEKK endorsed the segregation of non-Aryans Christians and declared Nazi racial 
laws as no business of the Church. For this reason, this chapter will first examine the bishops‘ 
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reaction to the ‗German Christian‘ position towards non-Aryan Christians, before moving on 
to investigate the bishops‘ positions towards wider violations of human rights, including the 
NSDAP‘s programme of euthanasia for the severely disabled and the elderly, and the 
persecution of the Jews of Europe. 
It is only against this doubly-reinforced backdrop of hardship and mass-murder, fostered 
both by the conditions of war and the ruthless Nazi killing machine, that the reactions of the 
Landesbischöfe to the original disunity of the German Protestant Church can ultimately be 
assessed in the final section of this investigation. Taking the universal despondency of the 
time as its impetus for intra-Church unification, then, the third section of this chapter assesses 
the capacity and capability of each of the Landesbischöfe to enact structural change within 
German Protestantism. Since Marahrens eventually proved himself unable to retreat from his 
course of mediation between Church and State interests, and Meiser found himself stuck on 
the course of Lutheran isolation he had established in the pre-war years, this chapter traces the 
origins of Theophil Wurm‘s national Church leadership credentials, which were ultimately to 
give rise to the ‗Wurm Years‘ of ecumenical reconciliation. 
 
The Dictates of War 
To begin this investigation into the effect of war on the bishops‘ individual politico-
ecclesiastical positions in this phase of the Third Reich, it must be appreciated that 
Landesbischöfe Marahrens, Meiser and Wurm did not only have to contend with the 
challenges that war brought to Germany, but also the particular developments which increased 
Nazi aggression brought to the Church. On the same day as Nazi Germany invaded Poland, 
namely 1
st
 September 1939, Hanns Kerrl inflicted further structural change on German 
Protestantism as revenge for the collapse of his church committees and the continued refusal 
of the Church to heed State demands. In an effort to gain further control over the 
administration of the DEK, Kerrl began to compartmentalise Church authority and, to this 
end, formally decreed the separation of the administrative governance of the DEK from the 
organisation of its spiritual affairs.
382
 Kerrl‘s actions did not come as a complete surprise to 
the DEK, however, which had been left ever since the collapse of the RKA under the official 
leadership of the predominantly ‗German Christian‘ DEKK. The implication of a Church 
controlled solely by the DEKK was that its leader, Dr. Werner, was able to combine his 
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headship of the organisation with his parallel leadership over the Finanzabteilungen of the 
EKApU. This resulted in the ‗Dahlemitic‘ strand of the Bekennende Kirche viewing the 
Church under Werner‘s governance as nothing more than an ―Einmannkirche‖.383 
Since Werner had already been asserting increasing control over the finances of the DEK 
since 1937, once he got wind of Kerrl‘s plan to divide formally the administration of Church 
affairs into spiritual and bureaucratic matters, Werner began to establish a suitable team to see 
to the spiritual governance of the Church which did not threaten to impair his likely 
domination over national Church finances. Already a week before the outbreak of war, 
therefore, Dr. Werner called for Landesbischof August Marahrens of Hanover, 
Oberkonsistorialrat Friedrich Hymmen of the EKApU and Landesbischof Walther Schultz of 
Mecklenburg to form ―ein Kreis führender kirchlicher Männer‖ to complement his 
administrative leadership of the DEK with spiritual instruction.
384
 Although debate ensued 
throughout the ranks of the KFK as to the suitability of this new governing structure for the 
national Protestant Church, principally fuelled by the fact that Werner, Hymmen and Schultz 
were all prominent Deutsche Christen, by the time Kerrl issued his decree, the three men 
already felt themselves bound to Werner‘s call, and the Geistlicher Vertrauensrat (GVR), as 
envisaged by Werner, was thus formed.
385
 
Inevitably conceptualised, despite Marahrens‘ presence, as a specifically ‗German 
Christian‘ instrument of Church governance, the GVR assumed spiritual leadership over the 
DEK from 1940 onwards.
386
 In an effort to quell opposition, however, Dr. Werner was quick 
to rebrand the GVR as ―kein geistliches Ministerium [...], sondern ein Gremium von 
Vertrauensleuten der hinter ihnen stehenden Kreise von Landeskirchenführern―.387 With 
Marahrens on side, who was by now representing a multiplicity of various interests of both 
the Church and the State, there can be no doubt that Dr. Werner manipulated Marahrens‘ 
apparent status as ―pastor pastorum‖388 at the start of this phase of the Protestant 
Kirchenkampf, both to persuade Kerrl to endorse his GVR and to appease the KFK. Even 
though Marahrens technically led the KFK through his presidency of its executive committee, 
the KFA, it must not be overlooked that by now Meiser had also become a prominent 
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―Wortführer‖ in the organisation,389 owing to the authority gained through his recent ability to 
present himself as leader of the lutherischer Flügel. Since Meiser had personally called for a 
prominent member of the KFK to sit on the proposed GVR to keep the Deutsche Christen in 
check,
390
 Marahrens was doubly obligated to join the spiritual Gremium by both top-down 
pressure emanating from the RMfKA and the bottom-up demands of the KFK. Confirming his 
inescapable sense of duty to the GVR in this period,
391
 Marahrens told his fellow Church 
leaders that he found himself, ―angesichts der augenblicklichen Lage [...] verpflichtet […], 
von [seinen] Bedenken abzusehen und diesem Ersuchen zu entsprechen‖.392 
To view Marahrens as the KFK‘s representative of choice for the GVR is, however, 
problematic, since relations between Marahrens and the other Protestant church leaders, 
including his counterparts Meiser and Wurm, had undoubtedly soured over recent months. 
Not only had Marahrens lost the respect of the more radical members of the Bekennende 
Kirche in the autumn of 1938 when his refusal to sign the Confessing Gebetsliturgie in 
response to the Czech crisis was seen as a major blow to the Church resistance movement,
393
 
but his open endorsement of Kerrl‘s Fünf Grundsätze for the DEK in the summer of 1939 had 
caused a major rift between Marahrens on the one hand, and Meiser and Wurm on the other. 
Kerrl‘s Fünf Grundsätze were essentially a modified form of the Godesberger Erklärung, 
which was originally issued by the GDC on 4
th
 April 1939 in an attempt to assert the 
superiority of the Christian tradition over Judaism.
394
 Kerrl‘s Grundsätze, by extension, 
attempted to formulate a working agreement between the fundamentally incompatible Nazi 
Weltanschauung and specifically Protestant Christian doctrine.
395
 Kerrl claimed that his 
Grundsätze reinforced the supremacy of the Nazi Weltanschauung over the secular sphere, 
whilst they sought to prevent this Weltanschauung becoming a religion in its own right.
396
 
Moderate churchmen nonetheless viewed the Grundsätze as detrimental to the infallible status 
of the Word and Will of God. Due to the claim of Kerrl‘s first Satz, which stated that the Nazi 
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Weltanschauung was also ―für den christlichen Deutschen verbindlich‖,397 many saw Kerrl‘s 
Grundsätze as a direct intrusion of earthly principles into spiritual affairs.
398
 Marahrens 
eventually gave his endorsement to the Grundsätze on 23
rd
 June 1939 in his capacity as 
Landesbischof of the ELLKH, but he did not do so before holding an emergency meeting of 
the KFK on 31
st
 May 1939 to negotiate the Grundsätze with his fellow Church leaders. He 
subsequently presented to Kerrl a list of amendments which would be necessary before the 
KFK could guarantee its commitment to the reform.
399
 Unsurprisingly, however, in light of his 
insistence that Marahrens push through his reform on the national Church level, Kerrl refused 
the KFK‘s amendments on 1st June 1939. In order to appease the State, Marahrens went ahead 
and agreed to the original Grundsätze, along with two other ‗German Christian‘ clergymen,400 
rendering him not only unpopular with the ‗Dahlemites‘ but also with his more moderate 
counterparts in the Lutherrat. As Heidrun Becker confirms, ―Selbst mit den lutherischen 
Landesbischöfen Meiser und Wurm und dem Lutherrat kam es aufgrund des Alleingangs von 
Marahrens zu schwerwiegenden Differenzen‖.401 Marahrens‘ signing of the Grundsäatze thus 
brought about a situation in which he came to be stuck ―in einer kirchenpolitisch recht 
isolierten Position‖.402 
Since Meiser and Wurm had both flatly refused to sign in acceptance of Kerrl‘s Fünf 
Grundsätze, then, the distance between Marahrens and his ‗intact‘ counterparts in this period 
became ever more apparent. As Gertraud Grünzinger explains, in giving his agreement to the 
Grundsätze, Marahrens ―zog den Unwillen des bayerischen Landesbischofs Meiser und seines 
württembergischen Amtskollegen Wurm auf sich‖.403 Whilst Meiser and Wurm were 
evidently uneasy about Marahrens‘ increasing willingness to co-operate with prominent 
members of the GDC, as well as his tendency to succumb to State demands, they nonetheless 
knew that a GVR without Marahrens‘ presence could prove fatal to German Protestantism. In 
short, then, as long as Marahrens remained part of their ‗intact‘ dynamic, Meiser and Wurm 
had to have faith in his capacity to moderate the extreme ‗German Christian‘ tendencies of his 
colleagues, Hymmen and Schultz, on the national level. At the same time, however, 
Marahrens was also aware that he had to keep Meiser and Wurm on side if he was to regain 
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the trust of the more radical ‗Dahlemites‘ and to convince them that he was not submitting to 
the aims of the GDC, but rather working in defence of the original Protestant confessions. 
Although Marahrens viewed Meiser and Wurm‘s refusal to co-operate with Kerrl‘s latest 
attempt at Church reform as edging dangerously close to ‗Dahlemitic‘ radicalism,404 he 
nonetheless had to have faith that the limitations imposed by their common membership of 
the ‗intact‘ club prevented Meiser and Wurm from crossing the boundary towards more direct 
defiance. In view of the bishops‘ entanglement within their ‗intact‘ dynamic, then, it is 
incorrect to view Marahrens as having directly opposed the politico-ecclesiastical positions of 
Meiser and Wurm at the start of the Second World War. Instead, an underlying mutual 
interdependency between the Landesbischöfe must be seen as keeping the three men working 
within the remit of moderation and, ultimately, as holding the ‗intact‘ dynamic together. Karl-
Heinrich Melzer has summed up this unspoken yet strategic bond between Marahrens on the 
one hand, and Meiser and Wurm on the other. As he put it, 
Wenn [Marahrens] auch von Meiser und Wurm keinen Gang nach Canossa verlangte, so forderte er 
doch eine einmütige Vertrauenskundgebung seitens der süddeutschen Bischöfe. Weil aber weder Wurm 
noch Meiser selber Neigung verspürten, in dieses Gremium einzutreten, blieb ihnen nichts anderes 
übrig, als Marahrens zu bestätigen, daß man seine bekenntnismäßige Haltung nie habe anzweifeln 
wollen.
405
  
Although it is impossible to gloss over the glaring disparity between the politico-
ecclesiastical positions represented by Marahrens and by Meiser and Wurm in this phase of 
the Third Reich, the bishops‘ initial commonality of cause established by their headships of 
the only three ‗intact‘ Protestant Landeskirchen in Nazi Germany had created metaphorical 
‗barriers‘ for the bishops, which not only prohibited them from venturing outside the middle 
ground between defiance and compliance but also worked to reassure each bishop that no 
member of their ‗intact‘ club was able to break through the constraints of their dynamic, 
regardless of the strength of external socio-cultural pressures. It is for this reason that, despite 
Marahrens‘ entrapment within the framework of the GVR during the final six years of the 
Third Reich, his contribution to resolving the specifically Protestant struggle in Nazi Germany 
must be viewed as being pitched firmly within the area of remit of the ‗intact‘ dynamic, albeit 
closer to the parameter of clear-cut compliance. 
The implications of Marahrens‘ structural obligation to the GVR during the wartime 
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years also work to explain many more of his controversial actions from 1939 onwards. For 
example, one of his first acts as a member of the GVR was to send a telegram to Hitler on 9
th
 
November 1939, in which he thanked God for saving Germany‘s Führer from the attempt on 
his life by Georg Elser at the Bürgerbräukeller in Munich the previous day.
406
 Since 
Marahrens was by now working for an organisation of GDC members, who described 
themselves as having to come to decisions and to take measures, ―die sich aus der 
Verpflichtung der evangelischen Kirche gegen Führer, Volk und Staat ergeben‖,407 it is 
unsurprising that Marahrens was obligated to express public praise for Hitler‘s survival in this 
instance. 
Once Nazi Germany found itself at war, Marahrens began to issue words of support for 
the Nazi war effort on behalf of the GVR in line with his newfound function to serve the Nazi 
State, its Führer, and its people. After sending an initial letter of praise to Hitler to 
congratulate him for the successes of the Polish campaign, the GVR consistently issued 
messages of congratulations for each subsequent German military victory.
408
 In its most direct 
outpouring of support for the Nazi war effort, the GVR sent a telegram to Hitler which stated 
that, 
Die Deutsche Evangelische Kirche [...] ist mit allen ihren Gebeten bei Ihnen und bei unseren 
unvergleichlichen Soldaten, die nun mit so gewaltigen Schlägen daran gehen, den Pestherd zu 
beseitigen, damit in ganz Europa unter Ihrer Führung eine neue Ordnung entstehe und aller inneren 
Zersetzung, aller Beschmutzung des Heiligsten, aller Schändung der Gewissensfreiheit ein Ende 
gemacht werde.
409
 
Although such blatant expressions of political support for Nazi secular ambitions paint 
Marahrens as a proponent of both the expansionist and genocidal aims of the NSDAP, it must 
nonetheless be borne in mind that Marahrens was compelled to join in with the ‗German 
Christian‘ chorus of strong support for the Nazi war effort to avoid damage to his 
ecclesiastical reputation and, by implication, to the status of his thus far ‗intact‘ Landeskirche.  
Further to recognising Marahrens‘ obligation to support Nazi troops as being a result of 
his involvement in the GVR, it must also be appreciated that it was part of Marahrens‘ role as 
a Protestant clergyman to see to the spiritual needs of his parishioners, which by now included 
the ―im Felde stehenden Gemeindegliedern‖ as well as their families ‗at home‘.410 The 
strength of Marahrens‘ duty to his congregation, both within and outside of German borders, 
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is best shown by his reaction to the ban on the DEK from sending religious writings and 
providing spiritual guidance to frontline soldiers, issued by the Oberbefehlshaber der 
Wehrmacht on 12
th
 July 1940. In discussing the ban with fellow GVR member Friedrich 
Schultz, Marahrens described it as being, ―den schwersten Schlag gegen eine um der 
seelischen Haltung der Heimat und der Front willen unentbehrliche und von der Kirche aus 
unaufgebbare Aufgabe‖.411 To understand Marahrens‘ anger over the matter, it must be 
acknowledged that Marahrens had himself once served as a Lazarettpfarrer to German troops 
during the First World War and had voluntarily travelled to Belgium in November 1918 to 
tend to the spiritual needs of German prisoners of war.
412
 In light of his past work in the 
trenches, it can be appreciated that Marahrens had more understanding than most of the need 
to make pastoral provisions for those in battle. He had no illusions, therefore, as to what 
another major war entailed for German soldiers, who were at particular risk of both mental 
and physical injury from the brutality of machine warfare in this period. 
Further to this, it ought not to be forgotten that Marahrens himself lost a son to battle at 
the very start of the Nazis‘ ‗Polish campaign‘, which explains why the subject of providing 
pastoral care to frontline troops was close to his heart. Although Marahrens‘ public silence on 
the matter
413
 means that it is impossible to determine whether the personal turmoil 
experienced by Marahrens over the death of his son actually contributed to his 
uncompromising politico-ecclesiastical stance in this stage of the Third Reich, which fought 
for the right of the Church to provide for German troops, it cannot be denied that his in-depth 
experience of war, both as a firsthand witness to the injuries suffered by soldiers and as a 
grieving parent, provided Marahrens with considerable emotional authority to moderate the 
views of his colleagues in the GVR. Although it must be remembered that Marahrens‘ desire 
not to appear an outright adversary of the State to his ‗German Christian‘ counterparts meant 
that the scope by which he could influence the activity of the GVR was extremely limited, 
Marahrens‘ attempts to persuade the GVR to campaign for the Church‘s right to provide 
spiritual support to German soldiers nonetheless highlighted his unpreparedness to overlook 
the true essence and function of the Christian Church during this critical stage in the Third 
Reich. 
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Landesbischof Hans Meiser of Bavaria was even clearer in his opinion regarding the role 
of the Church and the State in this period, however, since his strict adherence to confessional 
Lutheranism did not allow the dictates of war to influence his loyal obedience to the Zwei-
Reiche-Lehre. Immediately concerned that the war would bring about a change in the nature 
of Protestant sermons and services, namely by tempting clergymen to select biblical texts 
which would easily support a commentary on the military developments, Meiser issued to the 
pastorate of the ELKB on 30
th
 October 1939 specific guidelines for Protestant preaching 
during the war.
414
 Not only did Meiser emphasise that the nature of preaching in this period 
ought not to differ from that in times of peace but, as his personal correspondence confirms, 
he was ―überzeugt, daß nur eine Predigt[,] die aus reiner Quell schöpft und ihrem göttlichen 
Auftrag treu bleibt, ausrichten kann, wozu sie gesendet sei‖.415 Thus, even for soldiers on the 
frontline of the conflict, Meiser insisted that only undistorted Christian parables were 
appropriate for their encouragement. 
True to his own precepts, then, Meiser was careful not to overstate his support for the 
NSDAP and its war effort in this phase of the Third Reich, even when faced with having to 
issue obligatory prayers for Germany‘s Führer and messages of congratulations on the 
occasion of Hitler‘s birthday. To illustrate just how effectively Meiser managed to moderate 
these expressions of support for the regime by setting them within a specifically Lutheran 
framework, we need only look to his prayer for the Führer, which he issued on behalf of his 
Landeskirche towards the end of 1939. In a direct appeal to God, Meiser stated that, 
Wir danken Dir, daß Du in einer Stunde ernster Gefahr Deine schützende Hand über den Führer unseres 
Volkes gehalten hast. Wir bitten Dich von Herzen, Du wolltest ihn auch weiter in Deinen gnädigen 
Schutz nehmen und ihn täglich zu seinem schweren Werk ausrüsten mit Kraft aus der Höhe.
416
 
In complete contrast to the style of the GVR, which addressed its gratitude for past military 
victories and its hope for future successes directly to Hitler himself, and also claimed to be 
with Hitler in thought and prayer, Meiser‘s words were directed exclusively to God in an 
implicit recognition of His ultimate authority. Although these words can inevitably be used to 
show that Meiser was in full support of the German war effort, as well as having been grateful 
for the continued existence of Germany‘s secular Führer, Meiser remained faithful to the view 
that the fine line between victory and defeat in the current war lay firmly in the hands of God. 
By evoking the image that God‘s protective hand had continued to rest over Germany‘s 
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Führer, Meiser consciously acknowledged the supreme presence of God in the world and, in 
doing so, declined to endorse the Nazi image of Hitler as Germany‘s sole saviour. Whereas 
the GVR anchored its praises for Nazi military victories firmly within the secular sphere, 
commending the military might of the Third Reich as well as the racial superiority of its 
Aryan troops, Meiser‘s constant appeal to a higher authority leaves no doubt of his ultimate 
allegiance to the supreme Will of God. 
Although Meiser‘s overarching loyalty to Lutheran precepts prevented him from 
speaking out against the violent aims of the Nazis in this phase of the Third Reich, a partially 
redeeming factor is that it nonetheless ensured that he did not explicitly encourage Nazi 
ambitions either. As such, his attitude towards the Nazi war effort remained constant at times 
of both victory and defeat. At the start of Germany‘s military successes, for example, Meiser 
issued a press release on behalf of the ELKB in the Bavarian Amtsblatt to commemorate 
Hitler‘s birthday. Although this was an occasion on which the individual Protestant 
Landeskirchen were expected to honour Hitler for his leadership of the Third Reich, Meiser 
was unwilling, nonetheless, to acknowledge the supposed secular achievements of Germany‘s 
Führer in isolation from God‘s ultimate power. He thus stated that, 
Die Gemeinden unserer Landeskirche [...] sehen darin [den] Beitrag [des Herrn der Kirche] zum Werke 
des Führers, daß sie durch die Botschaft von Jesus Christus den deutschen Menschen hinführen zu den 
Quellen aller Kraft, ihn stark machen für den Kampf, ihn freudig machen zu allem Opfer.
417
 
Although Meiser recognised the supposedly valuable contribution of Hitler to the life of the 
German people, he only did so to the extent that he framed Hitler as being an instrument of 
God‘s reign on earth. Consequently, his tone was no different even after the major defeat of 
German troops at the battle of Stalingrad. On the occasion of Hitler‘s birthday only two 
months later, Meiser showed no emotion over the military setback and still continued in 
formulaic terms to ask God to empower Hitler and, ―daß er ihm mit seinem Geist und seiner 
Hilfe zur Seite stehe und sein Werk mit seinem Segen kröne‖.418 Although this can be 
interpreted as Meiser having made a conscious decision not to demoralise his parishioners, 
who due to the demands of war were predominantly female at this point, with their sons, 
husbands and fathers serving on the frontline, the fact that he did not comment on the defeat 
can also be seen as signalling his implicit submission to God‘s Will in swaying the war effort 
against his own country. 
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It is as a result of Meiser‘s continuing strict adherence to the principles of confessional 
Lutheranism, then, that he did not and, more significantly, could not allow the German war 
effort to alter his work within the Church. Fully aware of his Lutheran remit to support the 
Nazi government as an instrument of God‘s secular rule only and to accept the political 
changes of the time as a reflection of God‘s overriding Will, Meiser was compelled to refrain 
from comment on developments in the secular arena. After the war had commenced, in fact, 
Meiser himself acknowledged the extent to which his adherence to confessional Lutheranism 
had taken him and his Landeskirche into a position of unquestionable isolation from political 
developments in this stage of the Third Reich. He thus exclaimed that, ―Es wurde jetzt nur 
offenbar, daß die Haltung unserer Landeskirche auch in den zurückliegenden Jahren niemals 
politisch bedingt war; es ging uns stets nur um ein religiös kirchliches Anliegen‖.419  Although 
Meiser‘s reluctance to address any issues outside the remit of the Church calls into question 
his wider Christian morals, as he showed himself prepared to sit back whilst the NSDAP led 
the German nation into violence and desolation, it nonetheless demonstrates his unswerving 
dedication to a specifically Lutheran confessional way through the Protestant Kirchenkampf 
and his determination to protect at least one facet of German society from Nazi domination. 
Landesbischof Theophil Wurm of Württemberg did not have to exercise the same degree 
of caution in response to the German war effort as his counterparts Marahrens and Meiser, 
however, since he had neither ties to the Deutsche Christen-led GVR nor such a strict 
adherence to confessional Lutheranism in this period. Sharing Marahrens‘ concern that ―der 
Dienst der Kirche an den Gliedern der Wehrmacht nicht begehrt war‖,420 Wurm used his 
comparative freedom from both the GDC and the constraints of High Lutheranism to begin to 
complain about the issue to Nazi authorities. Even before the NSDAP implemented an official 
ban on the distribution of Church literature to frontline troops, Wurm raised concerns over the 
NSDAP‘s policies towards the pastoral care of German troops with Württembergian 
Reichsstatthalter Wilhelm Murr. Wurm explained that, 
...[E]s ist nicht bloß eine selbstverständliche Verpflichtung des Heimatpfarramts, sondern eine ebenso 
selbstverständliche Erwartung der Ausmarschierten, daß gerade das Heimatpfarramt sich nicht bloß der 
Familie, sondern auch der Ausmarschierten selbst annimmt und ihnen, wie in Friedenszeiten, in 
schweren Stunden hilft, die für jeden kommen und in denen der seelsorgerliche Zuspruch aus dem 
Worte Gottes und aus den Liedern / unserer Kirche die größte Stärkung bedeutet.
421
 
Since Wurm recognised the obligation of the Protestant Church to serve its members ‗at 
                                                          
419
 ‗Brief an Kreisdekane‘, 11/10/1939, LKAB, Bestand 506. 
420
 Wurm, 1953, p.156. 
421
 ‗Brief an Murr‘, 05/06/1940, reproduced in Sautter, 1960, pp.63-64. 
137 
 
home‘ as well as those away at war, Wurm demonstrated that he was not prepared to sit back 
and allow Germany‘s Nazi regime to destroy the fundamental essence of the Church. In his 
particular adherence to universal Christian principles, Wurm saw the Church‘s function as 
being to serve all God‘s people on earth, regardless of geographical location and, as will be 
discussed in the next sub-chapter, also race, age and ability. Since Wurm openly negated the 
State‘s authority to take away the basic right of German soldiers to spiritual provisions from 
the Protestant Church, however, Wurm implicitly undermined the totality claim of the 
NSDAP on the German nation and its Volk. By emphasising the fact that heightened 
developments in the secular arena did not negate the presence of the spiritual realm in the 
everyday life of the nation, Wurm ultimately rejected the NSDAP‘s claim over its soldiers as 
property of the Third Reich and, thereby, emphasised the need for the parallel presence of the 
Church in their lives. In this respect, then, the onset of war for Wurm meant less a literal battle 
between Nazi Germany and its surrounding territories, and more an ideological battle between 
the totality claim of the Nazi Weltanschauung and the illimitable presence of the Christian 
Church. 
It is for this reason that, as Nazi military gains intensified and State demands on the 
German people for military service increased, so too did Wurm‘s protestations against the 
NSDAP‘s right to monopolise demands on human life. At the height of Nazi supremacy in 
Europe, therefore, Wurm opted not to praise the Nazi regime for its impressive series of 
military victories to date, but rather to object to the State‘s efforts to increase its ideological 
hold over German soldiers. In its attempts to almost ‗dehumanise‘ its troops, the Nazi state 
had by now not just prohibited the distribution of religious literature to its frontline forces, but 
was actively encouraging the allocation of pseudo-religious Nazi material in its place. This it 
had justified with the argument that, due to the requirements of battle, the Nazi government 
had to preserve the economy from demands not deemed necessary to the German war 
effort.
422
 Angered at the obvious intrusion of the Nazi State into Church affairs and its 
attempts to restrict the DEK‘s ecclesiastical influence outside German borders, Wurm sent an 
―offene Aussprache‖ to Propagandaminister Goebbels on 1st April 1942, in which he wrote 
that, 
Nicht bloß die kirchliche Gemeindepresse ist völlig unterdrückt worden; auch die ganze christliche 
Literatur ist schweren Hemmungen unterworfen; selbst der Druck der Bibel und der Gesangbücher ist 
unmöglich gemacht. Dagegen kann antichristliche Literatur in Massen auf den Markt geworfen und an 
die Front geschickt werden. Der große christliche Volksteil fügt sich gerne jeder sachlich notwendigen 
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Einschränkung; aber er verlangt Gerechtigkeit in der Verteilung der Lasten...
423
 
In addition to sending this letter to Goebbels, Wurm also handed a copy of it over to 
Swedish authorities, from where it ultimately found its way into the Swedish press and was 
distributed worldwide. The Gestapo deemed this manoeuvre traitorous to the Third Reich and 
had intended to use it as grounds for arrest. As Ernst Christian Helmreich reports, however, 
Hitler ruled against Wurm‘s detention and prosecution in this period.424 This is because Wurm 
had formulated his letter to Goebbels in such a way that, although it accused the NSDAP of 
injustice towards its frontline soldiers and the Christian Church, it did not criticize Nazi 
secular precepts per se. Since the outside world was by now focused on Wurm following the 
dissemination of his letter in the foreign press, any attempt by the NSDAP to punish Wurm 
for his mere expression of objection would only have served to confirm his initial accusations 
of prejudice and discrimination to the entire international arena. Moreover, since German 
military resources were already stretched to their limits during this period, as Germany was by 
now engaged in battles on both its eastern and western fronts, any reprisals on Wurm risked 
creating yet more opponents of the regime and, thereby, opening up further battles which the 
Nazi regime simply was not able to afford. As a result of Wurm‘s focus on defending the 
principles of universal Christianity, then, together with his ability to find security in the wider 
ecumenical community, Wurm was ultimately able to turn the Nazi war effort to his advantage 
to ensure that no further incursions of the Nazi State on the operations of the German 
Protestant Church took place without public knowledge. 
As in the case of Marahrens, Wurm‘s passion about this matter was reinforced by the fact 
that he had lost his son, Friedler, to the Second World War.
425
 Since Wurm had personally 
experienced the sorrow of losing a child to war, he therefore had greater empathy with the 
feelings of his grieving parishioners. Unlike Marahrens, however, whose entrapment in the 
GVR during this period limited the extent to which he was able to critique the German war 
effort which he was employed to defend, Wurm was able to use his comparative freedom to 
assess openly the human cost of the war and to begin to contemplate the very real prospect of 
German defeat. After German troops had lost the battle for Stalingrad in 1943, for example, 
Wurm used a sermon to emphasise the fact that it was also possible for the sun to set on the 
German nation as much as it had set on the Jews in recent years.
426
 Wurm also criticised 
Marahrens and his colleagues in the GVR for their unnecessary and overt endorsement of the 
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NSDAP. By complaining that Marahrens and the rest of the GVR had loaded their 
―Kundgebung mit Ausführungen politischen Inhalts [...], die aus dem Bereich eines rein 
kirchlichen Aktes hinausführen‖,427 Wurm was able to utilise the German war effort in this 
phase of the Third Reich to render himself the only true spokesman for universal Christendom 
amongst the Landesbischöfe of the ‗intact‘ churches. 
 
The Landesbischöfe and Responses to Nazi Terror 
Even though it may be difficult for us to appreciate today with the benefit of hindsight, many 
Protestant churchmen in the Third Reich did not make an effort to protest against the Nazi 
regime‘s policies of discrimination and persecution which had been increasingly intensifying 
since 1933. This is because the gross reality of the situation meant that many clergymen were 
either unable or unwilling to risk their own lives to be seen to object to Nazi ambitions in the 
face of escalating Nazi brutality, or simply because they did not feel it the job of the Church to 
comment on secular methods of administration. Those few churchmen who were both 
inclined and able to do so, however, began to discuss, comment on, and even protest against 
Nazi measures on the grounds of the universal Christian belief that the Church ought to look 
out for the wellbeing of God‘s people on earth. During the years of the Second World War in 
particular, Nazi racial policies became ever more brutal and began to test the ethics of 
Protestant churchmen in different ways, both directly through the exclusion of non-Aryan 
Christians from the Protestant Church, and indirectly through the Nazis‘ persecution of the 
Jews and other selected minorities in the supposedly ‗Christianised‘ society of the Third 
Reich. As figureheads for their respective ‗intact‘ Landeskirchen, as well as spokesmen for 
Church affairs in both the national and the international arenas, Landesbischöfe Marahrens, 
Meiser and Wurm were therefore no longer able to avoid comment on the issue of Nazi racial 
terror in this period. This sub-chapter thus examines the attitudes of each of the 
Landesbischöfe to three distinct areas of Nazi eugenic policy to ascertain to what extent their 
stances on the matters were affected by their political and religious conditioning, their socio-
cultural positioning and, above all, their wider sense of obligation to universal Christian 
morality. 
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The Persecution of ‘Non-Aryan’ Christians 
The Nazi racial law that affected the Church most directly in this stage of the Third Reich was 
undoubtedly the exclusion of non-Aryan Christians from the German Protestant Church. 
Although the Arierparagraph had been adopted in the DEK as early as 1934, as Chapter One 
has already explained,
428
 it was not until late 1941 that the issue of non-Aryan Christians in 
the Church resurfaced in line with the NSDAP‘s escalating discriminatory policies against the 
Jews. In particular, the Nazi decree to all German Jews to wear a yellow Star of David on 
their chests was seen by the predominantly ‗German Christian‘ leadership of the DEK at this 
point to be a positive move towards the exclusion of all Jews from the German Protestant 
Church.
429
 Since Marahrens was by now already implicated in all official decisions and 
opinions emanating from the administrative instrument of the GVR, he at least was forced to 
address the issue of so-called nichtarische Christen as part of national Church administration 
in this period. Moreover, since Meiser and Wurm were also at liberty to decide whether 
intensified measures of Nazi discrimination be introduced into the administration of their own 
Landeskirchen, this sub-chapter examines the positions of all three of the bishops towards the 
imposition of Nazi racial laws on Church governance. 
In consideration of his dual obligations to the official leadership of the DEK through the 
GVR and his headship of the subsidiary organisation of the KFK, Landesbischof August 
Marahrens of Hanover was obviously forced to formulate a policy towards the exclusion of 
so-called non-Aryan Christians from the German Protestant Church, which was suitable for 
both his predominantly ‗German Christian‘ colleagues and his more moderate ‗Confessing‘ 
counterparts. This, however, Marahrens was unable to do, and the issue of nichtarische 
Christen therefore stretched his policy of moderation on the national stage to its limits. As 
part of his role on the GVR, Marahrens ended up agreeing to a statement issued on 22
nd
 
December 1941 by the DEKK, which concluded that, 
Wir bitten daher im Einvernehmen mit dem Geistlichen Vertrauensrat der Deutschen Evangelischen 
Kirche die obersten Behörden, geeinigte Vorkehrungen zu treffen, daß die getauften Nichtarier dem 
kirchlichen Leben der deutschen Gemeinden fernbleiben. Die getauften Nichtarier werden selbst Mittel 
und Wege suchen müssen, sich Einrichtungen zu schaffen, die ihrer gesonderten gottesdienstlichen und 
seelsorgerischen Betreuung dienen können.
430
 
Although Marahrens‘ endorsement of the above proposal makes him appear a proponent of 
Nazi racial policy in the Church, the fact must not be overlooked that, only a week 
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beforehand, Marahrens had agreed to a Denkschrift on behalf of the KFK, which expressed 
disagreement with the State‘s ―steigernde Härte in der Behandlung der Nichtarier‖.431 
Marahrens‘ responses to the exclusion of nichtarische Christen on the national level of 
Church administration in this period were therefore nothing more than an expression of two 
separate, vain attempts to appease the competing factions of the Church for which he now 
worked. 
Further to this, Marahrens‘ attitudes towards the exclusion of non-Aryan Christians from 
the Church were no clearer on the regional level of church governance. In spite of his 
agreement to the statement of the DEKK that nichtarische Christen be forced to fend for 
themselves in terms of finding an alternative place of Christian worship, Marahrens never 
implemented this measure in his ELLKH. Rather, not only did Marahrens issue a 
Rundschreiben to his pastorate which confirmed the responsibility of the Church to provide 
for ―die betroffenen Männer, Frauen und Kinder‖,432 but as the complaints of the GDC from 
this period show, Marahrens had not even fully heeded the Arierparagraph directive from 
1934 to exclude all non-Aryan clergymen from his Landeskirche. For this reason, ‗German 
Christians‘ were obviously concerned that Marahrens would not easily exclude non-Aryan 
parishioners from the ELLKH during this period of escalating policies of discrimination. A 
letter written in 1942 effectively conveys the GDC‘s anxiety over Marahrens‘ compromising 
position towards non-Aryan Christians. It reads, 
Die Gegnerschaft des Landesbischofs gegen den Nationalsozialismus dürfte sich beispielsweise daran 
zeigen, daß 1938 in der unter der Leitung von Herrn D. Marahrens stehenden Hannoverschen 
Landeskirche noch drei Volljuden und drei Halbjuden als ordentliche Pfarrer im Dienst waren. Selbst 
jetzt hat sich Herr D. Marahrens nicht dazu entschließen können, die Juden aus seiner Landeskirche 
auszuschließen.
433
 
Moreover, in spite of Marahrens‘ agreement to the declaration of the DEKK in 1941 that 
non-Aryan Christians be excluded from the Church, he nonetheless subsequently protested to 
Reichsinnenminister Frick on behalf of the KFK on 19
th
 January 1943 and argued that the 
Church was ―verpflichtet‖ to provide for its non-Aryan members.434 Of significance is the 
way in which Marahrens presented his argument to Frick. Firstly, he never admitted to 
knowing anything concrete of the Nazi regime‘s persecution of non-Aryan Christians, but 
rather portrayed himself as having been privy to ―Gerüchte‖ surrounding the brutal handling 
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by the Nazi State of those affected by its Nürnberger Gesetze.
435
 This was undoubtedly a 
convenient rhetorical vehicle through which Marahrens avoided accusing and thereby overly 
infuriating the NSDAP in order to protect German Protestantism at large, since his reliance on 
vague rumours served to lessen the accusatory tone of his general argument. This effect was 
further enhanced by Marahrens‘ acknowledgement of the NSDAP‘s ultimate right of decision 
over secular policies, when stating that, ―Bei unserer Stellungnahme sind wir uns dessen 
bewußt, daß wir nicht etwa politische Entscheidungen der Staatsführung zu beurteilen 
haben‖.436 Marahrens‘ submission to Nazi authority therefore enabled him to maintain 
influence in the DEK against its predominantly ‗German Christian‘ leadership. 
Marahrens‘ conflicting responses to the entire issue of nichtarische Christen in this phase 
of the Third Reich must not, however, be seen simply as a reflection of his personal position 
towards the actual racial policies at hand, but rather as a purely strategic means to retain the 
trust of the competing Church factions for which he by now worked. His constantly 
oscillating positions towards the implementation of Nazi racial policies in the Church 
ultimately serve to portray Marahrens as a reluctant messenger for all sides of the Protestant 
conflict during this period. As Jörg Thierfelder confirms, once Marahrens had become 
officially associated with both the GVR and the KFK from 1939 onwards, ―Im einzelnen wird 
man hier genau unterscheiden müssen zwischen dem, was Marahrens wirklich meinte und 
dem, was er aus taktischen Gründen zum Ausdruck brachte.‖437 Marahrens‘ attitudes towards 
secular racial policies obviously differed from those of his counterparts, Meiser and Wurm, 
who belonged solely to the moderate KFK and, as such, had no strategic need to make 
allowances for the pro-Nazi demands of the DEKK. In actual fact, Meiser and Wurm‘s 
complete lack of obligation to the official national Church administration in this period 
endowed the two southern German bishops with a genuine sense of freedom either to rebel 
against the discriminatory policies of the national Church leadership or to criticise the DEKK. 
Nevertheless, Landesbischof Hans Meiser of Bavaria did not use his comparative liberty 
in this period to voice outright objection to the measures of the DEKK. Since this policy of 
silence was in keeping with his past tendencies to exercise caution in the Protestant struggle 
so as not to endanger unnecessarily the ‗intact‘ Protestantism of his Landeskirche and the 
lutherischer Flügel at large, Meiser‘s lack of direct protest over the exclusion of non-Aryan 
Christians must not necessarily be taken to demonstrate his indifference in the matter 
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altogether. In fact, Meiser‘s actions in this period reveal that he did recognise his wider moral 
commitments as a Christian bishop to provide for his entire community of believers. 
However, he was nonetheless aware of the parameters in which he could effectively 
contribute to the cause of the non-Aryan Christians without infuriating the Nazi State and 
consequently endangering his Landeskirche and the ‗intact‘ Protestantism which it epitomised. 
To this end, even though Meiser‘s approach to the discrimination of so-called non-Aryan 
Christians from the Church did not include outright protestations against their dismissal, his 
indirect and clandestine involvement in ‗underground‘ relief efforts in this period shows that 
he considered this to be the best means to address the plight of the nichtarische Christen. 
Since Meiser‘s Landeskirche was not bound by the directives of the DEKK due to its 
continued Intaktheit and since, unlike Marahrens, he had no unspoken ties to the policies of 
the GDC, Meiser was at least able to get away without implementing the Arierparagraph 
within the ELKB in this phase of the Third Reich.
438
 He also began to assist the Büro Grüber 
financially within his region. The Büro Grüber was an aid organisation that had been 
clandestinely established within the ELKB by Pastor Heinrich Grüber to assist those most 
affected by Nazi racial laws. It had first set up Hilfsstellen in Nuremberg and Munich which 
were run by local clergymen.
439
 By May 1939 the Büro Grüber had more than twenty-one 
subsidiary offices throughout most of the DEK, with the exception of the predominantly 
‗German Christian‘ church of Thuringia and, most notably for this investigation, Marahrens‘ 
ELLKH.
440
 Whilst the establishment of the Büro Grüber in Bavaria obviously serves to 
demonstrate Meiser‘s preparedness to alleviate the plight of non-Aryan Christians in his 
Landeskirche as well as possible without attracting undue attention from the NSDAP, the fact 
that the Büro Grüber was not able to establish a permanent branch in the territory of the 
ELLKH further works to call into question Marahrens‘ Christian scruples in this period. 
Despite the fact that Marahrens never actively expelled all non-Aryan Christians from his own 
Landeskirche, his unwillingness to ease their predicament via the Büro Grüber meant that he 
did not ensure they received sufficient assistance either. Heinrich Grüber himself described 
Marahrens as being ―in keiner Weise in dieser Sache mitzuarbeiten geneigt‖.441 
Meiser, by contrast, was the only Protestant bishop in Nazi Germany to finance the 
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efforts of the Büro Grüber with funds from his Landeskirche.
442
 Through his clandestine 
financing of the organisation, then, Meiser at least helped to make provision for at least two 
thousand non-Aryan Christians to overcome their financial and spiritual oppression by the 
Nazis. In many cases, Meiser‘s money even helped to finance plans for the oppressed to flee 
the Third Reich.
443
 Although Meiser did not protest openly against Nazi racial laws in this 
period or directly participate in efforts to relieve so-called non-Aryans from persecution, his 
indirect involvement in an ‗underground‘ rescue mission within the ELKB must nonetheless 
be seen as the most effective way in which he could fulfil his Christian duty to serve all God‘s 
people within his Landeskirche without overly jeopardising the status of its ‗intact‘ 
Protestantism. The fact that Meiser was also actively engaged in conversation with Bishop 
Bell‘s sister-in-law in England, Laura Livingstone, as well as Heinrich Grüber himself, in an 
effort to encourage and keep check on the evacuation process
444
 supports this view and 
reveals the positive Christian intentions behind Meiser‘s clandestine activities in this period. It 
is as a result of such conversations that we know that Meiser was genuinely concerned to 
effect the rescue of non-Aryan Christians within his Landeskirche and that it was not just by 
chance that his decision to finance the Büro Grüber ended up saving a considerable number of 
lives in his name. 
Further to this, there is also evidence to suggest that, even after the Büro Grüber had been 
closed down by the Gestapo in the early war years, Meiser still continued to ease the plight of 
non-Aryan Christians through his involvement in the Innere Mission of his Landeskirche. 
Founded in 1886, the Innere Mission of the ELKB traditionally supported relief efforts in the 
Bavarian community, by financing care homes for the elderly and refuges for young people, 
for example, or even carrying out ‗hands on‘ missionary work in towns and cities.445 After the 
closure of the Büro Grüber, however, Meiser used his right of decision as Landesbischof to 
determine which missionary efforts the Bavarian Innere Mission ought to fund. He thus 
directed Pastor Friedrich Hofmann of the Innere Mission to take over the care of non-Aryan 
Christians as part of its relief effort in this period.
446
 Although Meiser may not have vocalised 
his opinions about the discrimination of nichtarische Christen from the Church on the 
national stage, his continued localised efforts to assist those most affected by Nazi racial laws 
within the ELKB nonetheless reveal Meiser to have been in clear, albeit covert, opposition to 
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the racial policies of the Nazi State. Moreover, as the present-day Landesbischof of the ELKB 
confirms, in light of Meiser‘s distinct preference for caution and the fact that his ability to 
influence national Church proceedings was ultimately trumped by Wurm‘s membership of the 
executive KFA in this period, Meiser‘s indirect involvement in relief efforts for non-Aryan 
Christians was still ―mehr, als viele andere Menschen gewagt haben‖.447 
Despite Meiser‘s honourable intentions, however, it was Landesbischof Theophil Wurm 
of Württemberg who offered the clearest opposition of the three Landesbischöfe in this period 
to the exclusion of non-Aryan Christians from the DEK. Due to his vice-chairmanship of the 
KFA, it was arguably much easier for Wurm than it was for Meiser to become the most 
prominent, unbiased mouthpiece of KFK opinion towards Nazi measures. Although 
Marahrens still remained official head of the KFK at this point, he nevertheless had to be 
careful that declarations bearing his name did not overly infuriate his pro-Nazi colleagues in 
the GVR and, by extension, the NSDAP as well. As a result, there can be no doubt that the 
statements of the KFK issued by Wurm were a more accurate reflection of the attitudes of the 
moderate Church leaders toward Nazi racial laws in this period. Since Wurm ultimately 
lacked the fear which Marahrens had of jeopardising his relations with Germany‘s Nazi 
regime, he was able to take a more outright policy of opposition to the exclusion of 
nichtarische Christen from the Church. For this reason, it was Wurm, in his capacity as 
second-in-command of the KFA, who was able to formulate an unreserved response of the 
KFK to the DEKK‘s directive for racial segregation. In a letter to the DEKK of 7th January 
1942, Wurm unequivocally rejected the organisation‘s discriminatory measures, stating that, 
Vom Evangelium her ist der Ausschluß der getauften Nichtarier nicht zu rechtfertigen. Der Hinweis auf 
die früher oder noch jetzt bestehenden fremdsprachigen Sondergemeinden verfängt nicht; denn die 
nichtarischen Christen reden dieselbe Sprache wie wir. Aber dürfen die Kirchen an der Tatsache der 
Ausscheidung der Juden aus der deutschen Volksgemeinschaft achtlos vorübergehen? Sicherlich nicht. 
An keinem Unglücklichen darf der Christ achtlos vorübergehen. Daß die nichtarischen Christen heute 
Unglückliche sind, wird niemand bestreiten wollen. Dürfen wir dieses Unglück noch steigern, indem 
wir ihnen die Teilnahme an unseren Gottesdiensten entziehen?
448
 
As was by now typical of Wurm‘s written protestations, he employed a mixture of direct 
and rhetorical questioning in order to emphasise to the DEKK the heresy of its directive. In 
referring to the shared Christian character of Aryans and non-Aryans alike as a common 
language, Wurm implicitly opened up the idea of a mutual understanding that ought to 
transcend the superficial, racial divisions of the ignorant and uninformed Nazi State. 
Moreover, by characterising the persecuted as ―Unglückliche‖, Wurm‘s words were 
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undoubtedly intended to pull on Christian heartstrings, since one of the fundamental Christian 
instructions has always been the duty to love one‘s neighbour and to display charity. Wurm‘s 
rhetorical scolding of the DEKK, then, was the most direct way in which he was able to assert 
the moral superiority of the KFK over the official ‗German Christian‘ leadership of the 
Church without being overly accusatory. By employing this rhetorical method, Wurm was 
able to move the KFK into a position of clear opposition to the DEKK which, aside from 
emphasising the parting of ways between Marahrens and Wurm‘s executive leadership of the 
organisation, helped to reinforce the ‗Confessing‘ credentials of the KFK in line with the 
politico-ecclesiastical policies of the wider Bekennende Kirche. 
Further to the fact that Wurm undoubtedly showed the most strength of spirit in his direct 
opposition to the persecution of nichtarische Christen at this stage in the Third Reich, it is 
also clear that he was able to do so as a result of his lack of obligations to the DEKK and his 
subsequent ability to draw on his vice-presidency role in the KFA to correct the moderated 
views of its leader Marahrens. Even though it must be appreciated that Wurm was brave in 
directly objecting to the DEKK‘s directive to exclude all non-Aryan Christians from the 
Church, his comparative outspokenness must not be used, however, to condemn Marahrens 
for his less than lucid position on this particular Nazi racial law. Marahrens was, after all, 
trapped between two opposing national Church governing structures at this point. This had the 
effect that he was unable to object to the aims of the DEKK in the same way as Wurm, as any 
forthrightness from Marahrens risked his instantaneous dismissal from the GVR and, thereby, 
giving the GDC a ‗free licence‘ to ‗Nazify‘ the wartime Protestant Church. Similarly, Meiser‘s 
lack of vocal objection to the DEKK should not also be used to indict him of ambivalence to 
Nazi racial policies in this period. As his involvement in ‗underground‘ relief efforts shows, 
Meiser recognised the injustice behind the Nazi measures and was prepared to ease the plight 
of non-Aryans in his Landeskirche. Since Meiser‘s primary concern still continued to be for 
the status of confessional Lutheranism in Nazi Germany, however, which may allow him to 
appear hypocritical in light of his reluctance to defend wider Christian ethics in the Third 
Reich, it must be appreciated that the indirect financing and supervision of aid organisations 
was the safest way by which Meiser was able to lessen the impact of Nazi injustice whilst still 
attempting ―gegen den Druck des Regimes die Landeskirche zu bewahren‖.449 
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The Euthanasia Programme 
Historiographical accounts that concentrate on Nazi racial policies often overlook the fact that 
the NSDAP also intensified its aggression during the war years towards those sections of 
German society which it deemed to be ‗life unworthy of life‘. To this end, the NSDAP 
instigated a programme of enforced euthanasia against the mentally and physically ill, and 
later against the elderly. The euthanasia programme was implemented after the onset of war in 
1939, as the Nazis had waited for the distraction of war as a means to avoid ―expected church 
opposition‖ to the measures.450 Between 1939 and 1941, therefore, the Nazi regime 
established six secret Euthanasie-Tötungsanstaltungen throughout the Third Reich which, 
despite the best efforts of the NSDAP, failed to hide their murderous operations from the 
outside world. According to official statistics, the first of these euthanasia killing-centres was 
concealed in Schloß Grafeneck, which was situated in the heartland of the territory of the 
ELLKW.
451
 In its first year of operation, Schloß Grafeneck laid claim to the highest death toll 
out of all the so-called Euthanasie-Tötungsanstaltungen in Nazi Germany, claiming 9,839 
lives in 1940 alone.
452
 Since Württembergian Landesbischof Theophil Wurm was in a prime 
position to observe events at Grafeneck, this sub-chapter investigates both how Wurm reacted 
to this breach of Christian morality in his Landeskirche and whether his counterparts, 
Marahrens and Meiser, adopted similar politico-ecclesiastical positions. 
Since it did not take long for Wurm to gather evidence about the true nature of events at 
Grafeneck, it was only logical that he was the first of the bishops of the ‗intact‘ churches to 
take position on the Nazi euthanasia programme in this period. In the first direct outburst of 
any of the three Landesbischöfe against Nazi racial and eugenic policies outside the Church, 
Wurm sent a clear letter of protest against the euthanasia measures to Reichsinnenminister 
Frick on 19
th
 July 1940.
453
 Adopting a more direct tone than Marahrens had employed in his 
letter to Frick concerning the exclusion of non-Aryan Christians from the Church, which was 
examined in the previous sub-chapter,
454
 Wurm‘s letter presented a series of convincing 
known facts about Grafeneck which defied reason and excuse. Since Wurm was accusing the 
NSDAP of being in breach of the very Christian morality which it had once purported to 
defend in Germany, Frick remained silent towards Wurm‘s claims and failed to respond to his 
letter. 
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As well as demonstrating to the NSDAP that the German Protestant Church was 
prepared to rebuke the Nazi regime for its breaches of Christian morality, Wurm also used the 
advantage provided to him by his extensive knowledge of the Nazi euthanasia programme to 
further highlight the hypocrisy and immorality of the NSDAP at large. In the same letter, 
Wurm stated that, 
Soeben erst hat der Führer zum Gebet für die kämpfenden Truppen und an demütigen Dank für den 
herrlichen Sieg über Frankreich aufgefordert. Dürfen wir nicht diesem Gott auch das Leben unserer 
leidenden Volksgenossen anempfehlen und ist es nicht sein Wille, daß wir, so lange Er sie am Leben 
lässt, uns ihrer annehmen?
455
 
By adopting his customary style of rhetorical questioning, Wurm managed to challenge the 
supposed Christian principles of the Nazi State, proving them to be applied only in those 
cases which served its political agenda. Having called into question the Nazi regime‘s widely 
propagated perception of itself as a truly Christian community, therefore, Wurm succeeded in 
exposing the inappropriateness of the NSDAP‘s euthanasia measures, not only on 
humanitarian grounds but also by carefully reflecting its Christian claim back on itself and 
exposing its double standards. Wurm made this connection explicit when further explaining 
that, 
Und da die Partei ausdrücklich auf dem Boden des positiven Christentums steht, und unter diesem 
positiven Christentum wiederum ausdrücklich und vor allem die ethische Haltung des Christen, 
besonders auch die Nächstenliebe verstanden wissen will, so könnte sie eigentlich die Maßnahmen zur 
Lebensvernichtung nicht billigen.
456
 
Since he received no reply from Frick to this letter, Wurm penned yet another message to 
the Reichsinnenminister concerning the euthanasia programme on 5
th
 September 1940. By this 
point in time it had become clear that residents of old people‘s homes throughout 
Württemberg were now also being sent to their deaths in Grafeneck.
457
 In an effort to evoke a 
response from Frick this time around, Wurm ended his second letter with a string of direct 
questions, which were very different from the vaguer rhetorical approach of his previous 
protestations, concluding that: 
Muß das deutsche Volk das erste Kulturvolk sein, das in der Behandlung der Schwachen zu den 
Gepflogenheiten primitiver Völker zurückkehrt? Weiß der Führer von dieser Sache? Hat er sie gebilligt? 
Ich bitte, mich in einer so ungeheuer ernsten Sache nicht ohne Antwort zu lassen.
458
 
Just as in his letter to Hitler that protested about the destruction of the Matthäuskirche in 
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1938,
459
 Wurm again demonstrated a certain naivety as to the nature of Germany‘s Führer 
when inquiring whether Hitler knew about and had personally endorsed the Nazi euthanasia 
programme. Since Wurm had witnessed the escalation of Nazi violence since Hitler came to 
power in 1933 and was well aware of Hitler‘s intentions from his political speeches and 
writings of the time, it must be appreciated that by employing a superficial air of naivity in his 
writing, Wurm was able to justify his threat to expose the Nazi euthanasia programme to the 
wider society behind a more immediate warning to approach Hitler about the issue. Through 
understated threats such as these, then, which Wurm made to seem even more realistic 
through his emphatic use of the verb bitten, Wurm ultimately found a means of presenting 
himself to the Nazi regime as not only a credible force to be reckoned with, but also as one 
which had the potential to expose its hideous crimes through ecumenical connections to the 
outside world. 
These warnings were consequently not empty threats. In fact, Wurm‘s letter to Frick was 
soon distributed far and wide,
460
 and over the course of the next few years Wurm spread 
awareness of the Nazi euthanasia programme. This first began when Wurm sent a letter to the 
pastorate of the ELLKW on 27
th
 July 1940, in which he asked that all ―bekanntgewordene 
Fälle‖ of the so-called ‗mercy‘ killings be reported to him.461 Wurm then attempted to present 
his case for complaint against the euthanasia programme to both Hitler and 
Propagandaminister Goebbels.
462
 Although neither of them responded to Wurm‘s 
protestations, Wurm‘s decision to approach Hitler and Goebbels after Frick at this stage in the 
Third Reich was particularly risky, since the Nazi regime was by now at the height of its 
power and was brash and overconfident owing to its successive military victories. In 
consideration of all that Wurm stood to lose by risking Nazi reprisals in this period, then, his 
decision to speak out above and beyond the confines of the Church ought not to be 
undervalued. 
Wurm also proved himself to be unrelenting in the face of the NSDAP‘s failure to answer 
his complaints. In 1943, he used a prominent church service in Württemberg to take his 
grievances over the euthanasia measures to the public stage. At the height of the Second 
World War, Wurm asked his congregation, 
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Haben wir es nicht mit angesehen, daß das gebrechliche Leben, das sogenannte lebensunwerte Leben, 
preisgegeben wurde, und müssen wir es nun nicht erleben, daß unsere Lebenswertesten und 
Liebenswürdigsten draußen geblieben sind?
463
 
Although the State‘s euthanasia programme had officially ceased by the time Wurm spoke of 
the so-called mercy killings in this public address, there can be no doubt that Wurm drew 
upon the Nazi euthanasia programme to provoke thought on the downturn in the German war 
effort. Wurm‘s words also show that he was beginning to acknowledge a sense of shared guilt 
for complicity in Nazi crimes, since he uses the collective pronoun wir to emphasise how the 
German people, including himself, looked on whilst the Nazi regime was murdering those it 
deemed ‗life unworthy of life‘. Wurm deduced, therefore, that all Germans were by now 
paying the price for their past negligence by having to witness the suffering of their own 
loved ones in the heightened conditions of war. In light of the ‗eye for an eye‘ sense of 
rationale Wurm displayed in this sermon, then, it is possible to see that, as the wartime years 
progressed, Wurm‘s theological stance was becoming ever more akin to that of the 
‗Dahlemitic‘ strand of the Bekennende Kirche. 
While Wurm undoubtedly made the first clear move towards a more forceful form of 
Widerstand against Nazism in this period, his increasingly direct protestations against the 
Nazi euthanasia programme must be set in relation to the relative inaction of his counterparts 
Marahrens and Meiser. To take the position of Marahrens first, it should be noted that he only 
really objected to the Nazi measures as part of his role on the GVR. Since not even the 
‗German Christians‘ were able to justify the unlawful murder of German citizens in this way, 
the GVR released statements against the so-called mercy killings on behalf of the DEKK.
464
 
Aside from his involvement in the decisions of the GVR, however, Marahrens only briefly 
commented on the Nazi euthanasia programme in his capacity as Landesbischof of the 
ELLKH. In a Wochenbrief of 31
st
 July 1940, Marahrens spoke of ―den Dienst der Liebe, den 
die Kirche ihren schwächsten Gliedern in den Heil- und Pflegeanstalten schuldig sei‖.465 
Although confirming that he recognised the duty of the Church to care for the sick and the 
infirm, Marahrens nonetheless avoided explicit mention of the so-called mercy killings that 
affected Germany‘s ailing citizens at this stage in the Third Reich. 
Meiser, however, was even more reluctant to broach the issue of the Nazi euthanasia 
programme than Marahrens, since he never made a comment against the measures outside of 
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the frameworks of regional or national Church administration. After Dekan Christian Stoll had 
confronted Meiser with his concerns about the unlawful killings of disabled citizens in 
Bavaria, Meiser replied to him on 30
th
 December 1940, stating that, 
Was Sie mir in Ihrem Schreiben vom 21.12. berichten, ist nur ein Beleg mehr für die außerordentlich 
ernsten Vorgänge, die sich gegenwärtig auf dem von Ihnen erwähnten Gebiet abspielen. Die 
Angelegenheit hat uns im Landeskirchenrat und in der Kirchenführerkonferenz schon oft und ausgiebig 
beschäftigt. Es darf mit gutem Gewissen gesagt werden, dass geschehen ist, was geschehen konnte, um 
die Stimme der Kirche in dieser Sache nachdrücklich zu Gehör zu bringen. Leider blieb all unseren 
Bemühungen der sichtbare Erfolg bisher versagt.
466
 
Meiser‘s insistence on operating solely within the confines of both the administration of his 
Landeskirche and the KFK reveals his unwillingness to take initiative in protesting against the 
Nazi euthanasia programme and his distinct preference for community action. The fact that 
Meiser also appeared resigned to the Church‘s failure to protest effectively and to influence 
State policies in this area demonstrates his awareness of the limitations of Church authority, 
which can be seen to be in line with his Lutheran interpretation of wordly order. 
Although Marahrens and Meiser both failed to comment fully on the Nazi euthanasia 
programme as part of their respective Church leadership roles, however, it cannot be 
automatically concluded that both bishops lacked humanitarian concern during this period. 
For one thing, it must be accepted that, when strictly defined, Lutheran doctrine prohibited 
clergymen to comment on the affairs of the State. For High Lutherans like Marahrens and 
Meiser, then, to be seen to protest against what, for them, was ultimately a purely secular 
policy was difficult to reconcile with their fundamental Protestant confession. Secondly, since 
no Euthanasie-Tötungsanstaltungen were situated within the territories of the ELLKH and the 
ELKB,
467
 the issue of the so-called mercy killings was a less immediate concern to both 
bishops than it was to Wurm. Although they were eventually made aware of the measures by 
Wurm, without direct evidence of the murders taking place within their own Landeskirchen, 
both Marahrens and Meiser were still able to shy away from the issue and, at the very least, 
had reason not to further infuriate the NSDAP by protesting over an issue which did not affect 
their Landeskirchen directly, yet purported to destroy them by way of potential reprisals.  
To summarise the dramatic disparity of response to the Nazi euthanasia programme 
between Wurm on the one hand, and Marahrens and Meiser on the other, then, it can be said 
that Wurm‘s decision to respond to this controversial aspect of Nazi policy was made easier 
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by the unfortunate geographical location of the measures within his Landeskirche, combined 
with his relative freedom to question Nazi actions due to the unrestricted Intaktheit of his 
Landeskirche. Wurm‘s increasing turn to a more ‗Dahlemitic‘ line of theological rationale in 
this phase of the Protestant Kirchenkampf also allowed him to view Nazi measures, as well as 
the apparent disregard of the German people towards them, as actions which were worthy of 
punishment and divine vengeance. Due to the High Lutheranism of Marahrens and Meiser, by 
contrast, both bishops were reluctant to criticise policies of the Nazi regime during this period 
which had no direct bearing on the administration of the Church. These positions are 
nonetheless problematic, since, as Christian bishops, both Marahrens and Meiser had a duty to 
preserve Christian ethics in Nazi Germany at large and not just the status of confessional 
Lutheranism in the Church. Whilst Wurm ought to be commended, therefore, for his eventual 
move away from the constraints of confessional Lutheranism, unlike Marahrens and Meiser, it 
must nonetheless be appreciated that Wurm was the only bishop of the ‗intact‘ churches in a 
position to object effectively to the killings owing to his lack of administrative obligations, his 
more relaxed and ‗universalised‘ interpretation of confessional Lutheranism, and his 
proximity to the organised murders. 
 
The Holocaust 
The years of 1939 to 1945 saw Nazi violence and brutality towards the Jews culminate in the 
genocide that came to be known as the ‗Holocaust‘ during the course of the 1950s.468 
Although there has been much debate over whether the mass extermination of European 
Jewry in this period had always been the main aim of Hitler himself, or was simply the result 
of a ―series of ad hoc responses of a splintered and disorderly government machinery‖ that led 
to ―an inevitable spiral of radicalisation‖,469 there can be no doubt that once the Nazis 
proclaimed their intention to implement the so-called ―Endlösung‖,470 they set in motion the 
systematic killing of over six million Jews from across Europe. As an institution that was 
designed to protect God‘s people on earth and to promote Christian standards of morality in 
secular society, the German Protestant Church faced its largest challenge to date with the 
intensification of the NSDAP‘s persecution of the Jews and the eventual onset of the 
Holocaust. Lutheran Protestants in particular faced a two-fold dilemma in this period: they 
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firstly had to assess whether they were at all obligated to respond to the NSDAP‘s murderous 
acts, which involved reconciling their specifically Lutheran obligation to refrain from political 
comment with their wider Christian conscience. Secondly, they also had to determine whether 
they were actually able to protest against the NSDAP‘s murderous measures, in consideration 
of all they had to lose and the extent to which they were actually able to influence the 
merciless Nazi regime. Since it has often been claimed that agents of German Protestantism 
ought to have done more to prevent the Holocaust,
471
 mainly due to ―the popular and 
theologically proper expectation that Christians are called to a higher standard of morality 
than others‖,472 this sub-chapter assesses to what extent Landesbischöfe Marahrens, Meiser 
and Wurm were prepared to intervene in the issue and to what extent their respective 
decisions were influenced by their own particular theological rationale and their individual 
socio-cultural predicaments at the time.  
 As difficult as it may be for us to comprehend in retrospect, it is impossible to broach the 
subject of the Holocaust from the perspective of specifically Lutheran Protestants without first 
recognising that, unlike the DEKK directive to exclude non-Aryan Christians from 
participation in the Church, which was an issue of immediate concern to all clergymen, the 
implementation of the Holocaust was, in theory, an issue which was detached from the daily 
running of Church affairs. Moreover, since Marahrens and Meiser had already avoided 
comment on the Nazi euthanasia programme as an issue that belonged in the secular domain, 
as has been clarified in the previous sub-chapter, it was not to be expected that the bishops 
would be any more vocal about the Nazi implementation of the Holocaust, which was still 
more remote from the Church‘s immediate concerns.   
Only with reluctance did Landesbischof August Marahrens of Hanover release public 
statements against the Holocaust. Having learnt from his experience during the debate over 
the exclusion of non-Aryan Christians from the DEK, in which he paradoxically gave in to 
pressure from the DEKK to accept the measures as part of the GVR yet was simultaneously 
compelled to reject the policy as spokesman for the KFK, Marahrens was careful this time 
around not to pitch himself clearly on the side of either the Church or the State. Even though 
Marahrens did send a letter to Reichsinnenminister Frick on behalf of the KFK to complain 
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about the Nazi extermination of the Jews in 1943,
473
 the grievances expressed in this letter 
should not automatically be seen as his own, since the issue of the Holocaust was put on the 
KFK‘s agenda by its more radical ‗Confessing‘ members. Once the KFK had voted to 
complain against the murdering of Jews by the NSDAP, Marahrens took it upon himself, as 
the representative of the organisation, to tone down the inflammatory nature of the 
‗Dahlemitic‘ protestations, and issued a relatively mild complaint to the Reichsinnenminister 
instead. Angered by Marahrens‘ ‗taming‘ influence over the wording of the letter, however, 
the more radical ‗Dahlemites‘ in the KFK took their grievances over Marahrens‘ actions to the 
twelfth Bekenntnissynode of the EKApU in Breslau. It was as a result of this particular 
Bekenntnissynode that a more radical statement against the Holocaust was issued to the Nazis 
by the ‗Dahlemites‘ in October 1943, independently of Marahrens‘ moderating influence.474 
This statement declared explicitly that, ―Die Vernichtung von Menschen, lediglich weil sie 
Angehörige eines Verbrechers, alt oder geisteskrank sind oder einer anderen Rasse angehören, 
ist keine Führung des Schwertes, das der Obrigkeit von Gott gegeben ist‖.475 It is not only by 
comparison with ‗Dahlemitic‘ statements such as this that Marahrens‘ ‗taming‘ influence over 
the KFK‘s protestations in this period is revealed, however. As will become clear later in this 
sub-chapter, Marahrens‘ protestations on behalf of the KFK also pale in comparison to those 
of his ‗intact‘ counterpart Theophil Wurm. 
A further illustration of Marahrens‘ ‗toning down‘ of protestations from the KFK against 
the Holocaust is that, even though the letter he signed on behalf of the KFK proclaimed that 
the Nazi eradication of the Jews was contrary to ―die elementarsten Gebote Gottes‖ and 
thereby justified the KFK‘s complaints on the grounds of the Church‘s function to see to the 
preservation of ―die Heiligkeit des Lebens‖,476 Marahrens nevertheless ‗softened‘ the letter by 
appending to it a personal declaration of his own that had not been approved by the rest of the 
KFK. Before Marahrens signed the letter he added the declaration that,  
Die Rassenfrage ist als völkisch-politische Frage durch die verantwortliche politische Führung zu lösen. 
Sie allein hat das Recht, die notwendigen Maßnahmen zur Reinhaltung des deutschen Blutes und zur 
Stärkung der völkischen Kraft zu treffen und trägt auch allein vor Gott und der Geschichte die 
Verantwortung dafür.
477
 
By proclaiming that racial issues were purely a secular affair to be resolved by worldly 
administration only, Marahrens visibly appealed to Lutheran logic, yet controversially negated 
                                                          
473
 ‗Schreiben an den Reichsinnenminister‘, 19/01/1943, in Klügel, 1965, p.203. 
474
 Cf. Gutteridge, 1976, p.248. 
475
  Ibid. 
476
 ‗Schreiben an den Reichsinnenminister‘, 19/01/1943, in Klügel, 1965, p.203. 
477
 Ibid. 
155 
 
the right of the Church to intervene in the perpetration of the Holocaust. This is a stance that 
Marahrens can be seen to have practised publicly since 1939, when in a Wochenbrief to the 
ELLKH he similarly declared, ―Daß die evangelische Kirche die Verantwortung für die 
Reinerhaltung unseres Volkstums im Bereich des Volks- und Staatslebens anerkennt, ist oft 
ausgesprochen worden und bedarf keiner Begründung‖.478 In light of his complicated national 
web of allegiances to the ‗German Christian‘ GVR, the ‗Confessing‘ KFK, and the State-
based RMfKA in this period, however, it can be said that Marahrens added the above 
sentences as a disclaimer to show the Nazis that he was expressing disapproval solely over 
their chosen methods of handling the so-called ―Rassenfrage‖, and not over Nazi ideology as 
such. It is for this reason that more radical ‗Confessing‘ pastors began to question if 
Marahrens‘ own interpretation of confessional Lutheranism in this period was as apolitical as 
he professed. As Heidrun Becker explains, ―Psychologisch geschickt war die Frage an 
Marahrens impliziert, ob er einer kommunistischen Regierung den gleichen Respekt zollen 
würde wie einer nationalsozialistischen‖.479 
Since Marahrens was by now operating under a highly aggressive Nazi government with 
no political alternatives in sight, however, his agreement to send the letter to Frick should not 
be taken lightly, particularly in terms of his multiple structural ties at this point in the Third 
Reich. To ensure the least conflict occurred, as was customary of his actions in the earlier 
stages of the Protestant Kirchenkampf, Marahrens appeased the KFK by sending the letter, yet 
also took care not to infuriate the Nazis. A ‗watering down‘ of the KFK‘s complaints was 
therefore the best option for Marahrens to preserve his mediating function within the Church 
in this period. By acknowledging the ultimate right of the NSDAP to find an appropriate 
solution to the so-called ―Rassenfrage‖, however, it might be argued that Marahrens shirked 
his responsibility, as well as that of other churchmen, to intervene in the Nazi killing machine. 
Although it can be argued that churchmen like Marahrens may well have been able to impede 
the murderous aims of the NSDAP,
480
 it must nevertheless be acknowledged that, through his 
compromising efforts, Marahrens at least managed to ensure that the last remaining example 
of undistorted German Protestantism in Nazi Germany was protected against potential 
reprisals from the violent NSDAP. 
Taking even less action than Marahrens, however, Landesbischof Hans Meiser of Bavaria 
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never explicitly made a public statement about the ‗Jewish question‘ during the course of the 
Third Reich.
481
 In accordance with the dictates of his Lutheran confession, on which he had 
previously founded an effective means through which to preserve German Protestantism in 
the period prior to the Second World War, Meiser avoided comment on the Nazi murdering of 
the Jews. Following his own persecution at the hands of Nazi authorities in 1934 for the 
article he had written on the so-called ―Judenfrage‖ in 1926,482 Meiser was all the more 
reluctant to comment on Nazi eugenic thinking and racial laws in this period. In order to fully 
appreciate the effect of these public reprisals on Meiser‘s subsequent preparedness to take a 
position against the NSDAP on the Holocaust, it must be remembered that Meiser had written 
the essay in 1926 because he was asked by the Schriftleitung of the Predigerseminar for 
which he worked to take a position on the so-called ―Judenfrage‖ and to offer Christian 
guidelines on how to deal with the issue.
483
 In this respect, it is possible to suggest that, ―Er 
hat es wohl nur getan, weil man ihn eben darum gebeten hatte‖.484 
Translating this experience into the context of the Nazi annihilation of the Jews in the 
latter years of the Third Reich, it seems plausible that Meiser was doubly reluctant to heed 
any further requests that risked rendering him victim to a similar and even more brutal smear 
campaign from the NSDAP. It is in this context that we must view Mesier‘s subsequent 
refusal of a request by the Lemppscher Kreis to protest openly about the Holocaust in 1943. 
The Lemppscher Kreis was a group of Protestant booksellers and publishers who had come 
together to formulate the ―Osterbotschaft Münchner Laien‖,485 which was a declaration 
against the NSDAP‘s extermination of the Jews. When the Lemppscher Kreis asked Meiser to 
disseminate the arguments of its Osterbotschaft on the national stage, either through church 
pamphlets or sermons, Meiser refused on the grounds that it was too dangerous for him to do 
so and it risked his arrest. Meiser also explained that, if he were to read the Denkschrift, it 
would not ease the plight of the Jews anyhow, and their suffering might even be heightened 
by the NSDAP in retaliation.
486
 Although Meiser was not prepared to spread awareness of the 
Osterbotschaft himself, he did, however, hand over his copy of the Denkschrift to his 
colleague Theophil Wurm, who was in a far more advantageous position to propagate the 
message. After all, it must be appreciated that since Bavaria was by now considered the 
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spiritual home of the NSDAP and since Meiser had been under heightened surveillance by the 
Nazis following the controversies in his Landeskirche in 1934, any criticism of State measures 
by Meiser was at increased risk of detection and subsequently reprisals by Nazi agents. 
Finally, it ought to be recognised that Meiser‘s strict adherence to confessional 
Lutheranism and his previous harassment at the hands of the Nazis meant that he was not only 
reluctant to comment on secular policies, but particularly those relating to the so-called 
‗Jewish question‘. Speaking at an assembly of the first VKL on 13th September 1935, Meiser 
exclaimed, ―Ich möchte meine Stimme erheben gegen ein selbstverschuldetes Martyrium. Ich 
sehe mit einiger Sorge auf die kommende preußische Synode, wenn sie solche Dinge 
anschneiden will wie z. B. die Judenfrage‖.487 Not only does this early remark confirm the 
pattern for a conscious policy of caution adopted by Meiser regarding Nazi racial thinking, 
but also reveals his implicit criticism of the tendencies for direct defiance of the ‗Dahlemites‘, 
who had already shown themselves to Meiser as prepared to transcend traditional Lutheran 
teachings and, thereby, sacrifice the status of institutional Protestantism in Germany in their 
attempts to confront the NSDAP over its secular policies. Since Meiser had already 
established as early as 1935 that he was not prepared to agree to any comments on secular 
policies which risked putting the essence of the DEK in jeopardy, it is understandable that he 
was no more flexible in his responses to the Nazi persecution of the Jews in 1943, particularly 
in light of the NSDAP‘s established brutality, not just towards those it considered 
lebensunwertes Leben but also towards anyone who dared criticise it.
488
 
Contrary to Meiser‘s constant reluctance to comment on secular affairs, however, 
Landesbischof Theophil Wurm of Württemberg showed no qualms about protesting to the 
very top levels of the NSDAP about events associated with the Holocaust. Initially keen to 
solicit the support of his colleagues within the DEK at large, Wurm used his authority on the 
executive committee of the KFA to raise awareness of the impending Holocaust to his fellow 
Church leaders as early as the autumn of 1941.
489
 Even though he failed to gain their 
agreement to outright protest, Wurm nonetheless voiced his concerns about news of mass 
killings of Jews of Europe to Reichsminister Kerrl only months later. In a letter to Kerrl 
written in December 1941, Wurm directly referred to the ―Beseitigung der Geisteskranken 
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und Schwachsinnigen‖ and spoke of ―Gerüchte[...] über massenhafte Tötungen im Osten‖.490 
Although mass extermination camps were not officially put into operation by the Nazis to 
murder the Jews until 1942, it must be remembered that the Nazis had been carrying out mass 
shootings of Jews and Slavs in the captured Eastern territories since early 1941, and the gas 
chambers at major extermination camps such as Auschwitz had been operational for trials 
since September 1941.
491
 The earliest protests of the ‗Dahlemitic‘ wing of the Bekennende 
Kirche against the Holocaust, such as its statement of Breslau and the protest writings of both 
Bonhoeffer
492
 and Barth
493
, date from 1943, when the mass murders were already well under 
way, whereas Wurm should be given credit for raising objection to the annihilation of 
European Jewry long before the Nazi killing machine had moved fully into motion. 
Moreover, the fact that the mass murders did not take place within the territory of Wurm‘s 
Landeskirche, unlike the Nazi euthanasia programme, only serves to reinforce the fact that his 
protests were truly motivated by deep-seated moral and ethical concerns. Again, a full ten 
months before the Bekenntnissynode of the EKApU issued its protest against the Holocaust, 
Wurm claimed to know, through holidaymakers who had travelled to the occupied territories, 
of the ―systematisch[e] Ermordung von Juden und Polen‖.494 By raising objections to these 
measures, Wurm showed that the physical distance of the extermination camps from his own 
‗local‘ area of jurisdiction, be it on the regional or the national level, was immaterial. Here is 
clear evidence that Wurm operated over and above his obligation to serve both the regional 
interests of his pastorate and the national interests of the deutsches Volk, and protested against 
the Holocaust on the grounds of his overriding Christian commitment to serve all God‘s 
people on earth. 
To demonstrate the strength of Wurm‘s sense of duty to universal Christendom, then, we 
need look no further than the letter of protest he wrote to Germany‘s Führer on behalf of the 
KFK. On 16
th
 July 1943, Wurm sent the following words to Hitler:  
Im Namen Gottes und um des deutschen Volkes willen sprechen wir die dringende Bitte aus, die 
verantwortliche Führung des Reiches wolle der Verfolgung und Vernichtung wehren, der viele Männer 
und Frauen im deutschen Machtbereich ohne gerichtliches Urteil unterworfen werden. [...] / Diese 
Absichten stehen, ebenso wie die gegen die anderen Nichtarier ergriffenen Vernichtungsmaßnahmen, im 
schärfsten Widerspruch zu dem Gebot Gottes und verletzen das Fundament alles abendländischen 
Denkens und Lebens: Das gottgegebene Urrecht menschlichen Daseins und menschlicher Würde 
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überhaupt.
495
 
To take his complaints to the very top level of national administration in this way was an act 
of bravery in itself, but the concluding lines of his letter are particularly significant in that, in 
complete contrast to Marahrens‘ earlier letter from the KFK, Wurm most plainly subordinates 
Hitler‘s authority to God and denies his right to interfere with the God-given order of 
creation. By further emphasising the fact that many men and women had been unlawfully sent 
to their deaths, Wurm implicitly applied a Lutheran moral yardstick to the NSDAP and 
showed that it had failed in its self-appointed role as God‘s chosen instrument on earth. 
Although these were undoubtedly risky claims to make against a dictatorship that had already 
revealed its capacity to carry out the heartless murder of millions throughout Europe, the main 
reason why Wurm was able to employ such direct methods of argumentation was due to his 
complete detachment from the DEKK and his consequent ability to portray himself as a 
representative of the spiritual force of Christendom, and not as the physical or secular 
manifestation of the German Protestant Church. 
In this context, it can be appreciated that Marahrens was not in a position to utter such 
direct protestations like Wurm, since his close association with the administrative centre of 
the DEK rendered him a representative of institutional Protestantism in Germany at large, and 
thereby risked endangering the status of all the Protestant confessions in the event of Nazi 
reprisals. Similarly, although many have argued that Meiser should have put his name to a 
similar letter of protest to Wurm‘s,496 it must be appreciated that Meiser‘s recent ability to 
portray himself as the chief protector of specifically Lutheran Protestantism in Germany also 
rendered him a representative of a significant part of the national Protestant Church. Even 
though Meiser was predominantly concerned with preserving the status of confessional 
Lutheranism in this period, the loss of this single facet of German Protestantism was 
nonetheless a lesser risk than losing all the original Protestant confessions. It is for this reason 
that, despite his own reluctance to address the ‗Jewish question‘, Meiser still possessed a 
certain degree of flexibility with regard to opposing the NSDAP. This hypothesis is 
corroborated by Wurm‘s post-war reflections on his own decision to sign the KFK‘s letter of 
1943, in which he acknowledged that, ―Marahrens konnte sich zur Mitunterschrift nicht 
entschließen. Meiser wäre bereit gewesen, aber wir fanden es dann doch richtiger, das 
Schriftstück nur mit einer Unterschrift abgehen zu lassen.‖497 By recognising that his own 
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signature sufficed on the letter of protest, then, Wurm strategically ensured that the ‗intact‘ 
Protestantism of Meiser‘s ELKB was at least secured and thereby able to continue the fight in 
the event that his own efforts failed and provoked reprisals from the NSDAP. 
All in all, therefore, the above analysis of the dramatically different responses of the three 
Landesbischöfe to the Holocaust reveals that their actions in this period can only be explained 
through reference to the bishops‘ respective positions on the regional and national stage. 
During this period, Wurm was the only bishop of the ‗intact‘ churches not directly exposed to 
heightened surveillance or threatened by brutal reprisals from Nazi agents. Further to this, 
Wurm also had a free licence to speak on behalf of the KFK as a result of both the successes 
of his previous protestations and his ongoing turn to universal Christian values and 
‗Dahlemitic‘ theological rationale. It was for these reasons that, alone among the three 
bishops, he came to the forefront of the Protestant struggle against the persecution of the Jews 
in this phase of the Third Reich and, more significantly, became the only face of direct 
opposition (Widerstand) to emerge from the ‗intact‘ Landeskirchen.  
 
Das kirchliche Einigungswerk 
Despite not officially being referred to as kirchliches Einigungswerk until late 1943,
498
 a fresh 
wave of initiatives to reconsolidate institutional Protestantism in Germany had occurred since 
1940, primarily since Landesbischof Theophil Wurm of Württemberg had found himself 
becoming ―ein[e] Art Schlüsselfigur‖ on the national level of Church administration.499 As a 
result of his lack of obligations to the predominantly ‗German Christian‘ DEKK, his 
increasing appeal to the ‗Dahlemitic‘ strand of the Bekennende Kirche, and his relatively mild 
adherence to confessional Lutheranism, Wurm not only found himself in an ideal position to 
protest to the NSDAP over its interference in Church affairs and its policies of mass 
extermination, but also managed to use his ecclesiastical freedom to instigate the largest and 
most effective structural change to the nature of the DEK to date. This was to prepare the 
Church for the foreseeable fall of the Third Reich and was to form the basis of the post-war 
EKD. Since it was Wurm‘s unification efforts which dominated the final years of the 
specifically Protestant struggle against Nazism, this sub-chapter will firstly outline Wurm‘s 
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particular contribution to the Church consolidation process, before considering the responses 
of his counterparts Marahrens and Meiser to his specific brand of kirchliches Einigungswerk 
during this period. 
Since he had continually moved closer to the confrontational ‗Dahlemitic‘ line in his 
responses to Nazi policies, particularly to its wartime restrictions and its policies of racial 
segregation, Wurm gradually began to win widespread respect and admiration within Church 
circles.
500
 When the time came for Wurm to fulfil his own desire to bring about intra-Church 
unification, he was therefore able to draw upon his newfound status as the man of hope for 
both moderate and radical ‗Confessing‘ clergymen alike and began to solicit support for his 
own design for the new national German Protestant Church. Since 8
th
 July 1940, Wurm had 
been engaged, in partnership with his Bavarian counterpart Meiser, in efforts to tighten their 
ecumenical ties with the northern German Landeskirchen.
501
 When he was struck down with a 
life-threatening illness in 1941, however, Wurm experienced an epiphany and began to 
formulate a clearer position on the direction in which he wanted his kirchliches 
Einigungswerk to go. 
Since Wurm had come to recognise the ―Sünde und Schuld‖ of institutional Protestantism 
in Germany for having allowed itself to split into competing factions instead of remaining 
intact to preach the pure Word of God,
502
 he henceforth began to work for the consolidation of 
the German Protestant Church based upon universal Christian principles, which transcended 
the squabbles of the various Church-political factions as well as traditional inter-
denominational divisions. In an open attack on the leadership style of the GVR, which 
blatantly governed the DEK in direct relation to secular developments in the Third Reich, 
Wurm expressed his objection to its methods of administration with the words,    
Wenn Sie aber, wie ich in den letzten Wochen, mehrmals unmittelbar vor den Pforten der Ewigkeit 
gestanden wären, dann wäre es Ihnen unmöglich gewesen, im Namen der Kirche ein Wort zu sprechen, 
das statt eines klaren Zeugnisses eine Verhüllung der Tatsachen enthält.
503
 
Demonstrating to the national leadership of the DEK that his recent illness had caused him to 
consider its policies to be in breach of the clear Christian witness that the Church ought to 
convey, Wurm thus confirmed his intentions to part ways with the existing Reichskirche, and 
began instead to establish a unified Church that existed in the sole service of God. In doing so, 
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Wurm not only positioned himself in complete opposition to the aims of the GDC, but also 
redefined the concept of a Confessing Church which, in his eyes, ought not to exist solely in a 
politico-ecclesiastical function to fight against the heresy of Nazism, but ought rather to 
remain detached from any political comment and propagate only the original Christian 
teachings which would in turn serve to undermine Nazi authority. 
To illustrate the strength of Wurm‘s determination to establish a pietistic Confessing 
Church, we need only look to his sermons and public addresses of the central war years, in 
which he increasingly developed the idea of the German Protestant Landeskirchen united 
solely by their common allegiance to God. For example, by the summer of 1942, at the height 
of Nazi military victories in Europe, Wurm did not comment on the territorial gains brought 
about by secular battles, but rather on the potential of the Christian bond to unite the 
individual Protestant factions. In a sermon on 14
th
 June, Wurm exclaimed that, ―Diese 
evangelische Gotteserkenntnis, diese gehorsame Anerkennung der biblischen Wahrheit, der 
apostolischen Verkündigung eint uns; sie ist ein Band der Gemeinschaft, das wir heute 
beglückend empfinden‖.504 As if emphasising the benefits of unification for the Church was 
not enough, however, by the end of the same year Wurm had also begun to accentuate the 
responsibility of the German Protestant Church to the wider ecumenical community to 
demonstrate that it shared with the other Christian churches of the world the same undistorted 
faith in Christ. Recognising that the endemic factionalism of the DEK risked jeopardising its 
fundamental Christian witness, Wurm used the prominent Reformationsfest of December 1942 
as a platform to remind the DEK of its overriding responsibility to act as a unitary force of 
God. He stated that, 
Wir können es der Welt nicht glaubhaft machen, daß der Herr Christus durch sein Wort und seinen Geist 
uns regiert, wenn wir nicht als seine Gemeinde zusammenstehen und alle Meinungsverschiedenheiten 
in Fragen der kirchlichen Organisation zurückstellen hinter die Pflicht zu einhelliger Bezeugung der 
christlichen Botschaft.
505
 
To add weight to these calls for a unified Christian community, in his first official move 
to push his kirchliches Einigungswerk forwards, Wurm used the occasion of the 
Reformationsfest to issue his aptly named dreizehn Sätze über Auftrag und Dienst der Kirche. 
Although these Sätze underwent numerous revisions throughout the remaining years of the 
Third Reich to render them acceptable to all the various Church factions that had emerged as 
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a result of the Protestant Kirchenkampf,
506
 they nonetheless marked Wurm‘s first public step 
towards initiating structural change on the national level of the DEK. Wurm used his sermon 
to justify his Sätze, stating that, 
Die ersten vier Sätze stellen fest, daß die Kirche [...] eine göttliche Stiftung ist und darum nicht wie eine 
menschliche Organisation ihren Auftrag ändern und irgend einer Zeitströmung anpassen kann, und daß 
sie zur Erfüllung dieses Auftrags auch dem eigenen Volk gegenüber in der Öffentlichkeit arbeiten muss 
und nicht im Winkel bleiben kann.
507
 
Cleary demonstrating that he rejected the compromising methods of the GDC and its 
expectation that the Church ought to adapt itself to the socio-political climate of its secular 
surroundings, Wurm had plainly moved towards a theological rationale that was akin with that 
of the ‗Dahlemites‘ in this period. In short, due to the favourable socio-cultural conditions in 
which he found himself following his expressions of hostility to Nazi secular policies, Wurm 
was finally able to draw upon the Intaktheit of his own Landeskirche and his independence 
from any of the major Church factions in order to expand this autonomy onto the wider DEK 
itself. Moreover, since Wurm had also found protection from the persecution of the NSDAP in 
the infallibility of universal Christendom by this point, it is understandable that he saw in the 
promotion of the Church‘s common Christian witness an effective bulwark against Nazism. 
The extent to which Wurm believed in the power of the Church‘s common Christian witness 
to withstand the demands of Nazism on the national Church level is demonstrated by his 
sermon held on Kirchweihsonntag in the autumn of 1943. In this sermon, Wurm poignantly 
asserted that, ―In meinem Wörterbuch steht das Wort ‗Unmöglich‘ nicht mehr‖.508 Armed with 
such a determination to succeed, Wurm pledged his uncompromising commitment to 
achieving the unification of the DEK on universal Christian precepts, which his counterparts 
Marahrens and Meiser had hitherto failed to achieve. 
Wurm‘s measures of kirchliches Einigungswerk were, however, not the only Protestant 
unification efforts being undertaken during the war years. Further to his efforts to advance the 
lutherischer Flügel between 1933 and 1939, Landesbischof Hans Meiser of Bavaria continued 
to foster a communal Lutheran identity on the national level of the DEK during this period. 
On first glance, one could be forgiven for perceiving no difference between the attitudes of 
Meiser and Wurm towards the concept of kirchliches Einigungswerk, mainly since a 
programme of Church unification efforts that was based upon the principles of confessional 
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Lutheranism still required an acknowledgement of the Christian witness as the cornerstone of 
the Church. Best demonstrating Meiser‘s determination to eliminate Nazi heresy from 
German Protestantism is his sermon at Nuremberg in November 1941, in which he declared 
that, 
...durch Wort und Schrift wird verkündet: Wir haben keinen Recht, unseren Führungsanspruch in 
Europa anzutreten, solange wir nicht den Mut haben, die Mächte einer fast 2000jährigen geistigen und 
politischen Gemeinschaftsidee auf revolutionäre Art zu überwinden und die neue nationalsozialistische 
Idee an ihre Stelle zu setzen. Dem Deutschen unserer Tage bleibt darum die immerwährende Aufgabe 
und heilige Verpflichtung, alle Lebenserscheinungen unseres Volkes mit nationalsozialistischem 
revolutionären Geist zu erfüllen und innerhalb Deutschlands alle Traditionen der alten Welt zu 
beseitigen. Das ist die radikale Verneinung des Christentums.
509
 
Although Meiser‘s recognition that a belief in Christ ought to remain at the centre of 
Church life and not become superseded by temporal Nazi distortions was strikingly 
reminiscent of Wurm‘s own attitudes to the wartime predicament of the German Protestant 
Church, his later grievances over Wurm‘s methods of unification show Meiser to have had 
different ideas as to the direction the kirchliches Einigungswerk should take. Despite 
supporting the Church conciliation efforts of Wurm in principle, as can be inferred through his 
signing of Wurm‘s dreizehn Sätze,510 Meiser most evidently began to object to the multi-
confessional direction in which Wurm‘s unification efforts were heading. In particular, he 
raised concern in early 1942 over ―eine Stärkung des Unionismus‖.511 Fearful that Wurm‘s 
approach to kirchliches Einigungswerk risked creating a Church with a compromised 
confessional basis that was reminiscent of the United Protestantism of the EKApU, Meiser 
first refused to sign in agreement with the dreizehn Sätze and, once again, began to assert his 
arguments for a strictly Lutheran DEK. Before eventually agreeing to put his name to Wurm‘s 
Sätze, Meiser wrote that, 
Ich konnte meine Unterschrift nicht geben, wenn die vorgelegten Sätze ein Bekenntnis über die Kirche 
darstellen oder zu einem solchen ausgewertet werden sollten. [...] Mein Wunsch ist, daß die Sätze nicht 
wie die Theologische Erklärung von Barmen Ursache neuer Spaltung, sondern wirklich Mittel der 
Einigung werden, wobei ich mich versichere, daß im Rahmen der Einigung die Ziele des Lutherrats 
nicht aus den Augen verloren werden.
512
 
Reluctant to compromise the lutherischer Flügel, which he had so painstakingly 
established during the early years of the Third Reich and which, between 1935 and 1939 in 
particular, had served to shelter the ‗intact‘ Protestantism of Hanover, Bavaria and 
Württemberg from the escalating conflict between the NSDAP and the more radical element 
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of the Bekennende Kirche, Meiser ultimately sought to influence Wurm‘s actions by 
reminding him of the Lutheran character of his own Landeskirche and his subsequent 
obligations to the Lutherrat. Although his efforts were doomed to failure from the start since, 
as Paul Fleisch concluded, for Wurm ―der lutherischer Zusammenschluß [war] doch nur eine 
Vorstufe zum evangelischen Zusammenschluß‖,513 Meiser nonetheless remained committed to 
the idea of establishing a specifically ‗deutsche lutherische Kirche‘ to the end of the Third 
Reich and beyond. Often working against extreme adversity, Meiser ultimately showed the 
strength of his commitment to confessional Lutheranism by continuing his struggle for the 
lutherischer Flügel even after the Gestapo prohibited the continued existence of the Lutherrat 
in October 1944.
514
 
To sum up Meiser‘s response to Wurm‘s kirchliches Einigungswerk, then, it is clear that, 
in principle, he supported the unification efforts of his southern German neighbour, yet in 
practice he objected to Wurm‘s desired end-goal of a national Church that was united by 
universal Christian principles and not specifically by confessional Lutheranism. Having been 
swayed by the earlier successes of his national lutherischer Flügel in acting as a bulwark 
against the conflict between the feuding ‗Dahlemites‘ and the Nazi State, Meiser evidently felt 
compelled in this phase of the Third Reich to continue to enhance the intra-Church Lutheran 
bond in the hope that this also functioned as an effective impetus for unification. Despite his 
genuine desires to effect structural change in the all-too-compartmentalised DEK and to 
oppose the heresy of the GDC, however, Meiser‘s unwillingness to compromise the 
confessional status of both his highly Lutheran Landeskirche and his wider lutherischer 
Flügel rendered him unable to heed the concerns of the more radical ‗Dahlemites‘, and the 
Reformed and United Protestants alike. This ultimately left Wurm free to occupy the centre 
stage of the Protestant Kirchenkampf with his more universalised mode of kirchliches 
Einigungswerk during this period. 
It is thus only after delineating the two parallel types of Church unification effort that 
were taking place during the final years of the Third Reich that it is possible to demonstrate 
that the response of Landesbischof August Marahrens of Hanover to the Protestant Church 
conciliation efforts lay somewhere in between the two paths of progress adopted by Wurm on 
the one hand and Meiser on the other. As a representative of the highly Lutheran ELLKH, 
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which had fought since 1866 to maintain its confessional autonomy from the EKApU,
515
 it is 
understandable that Marahrens only originally consented to Wurm‘s kirchliches 
Einigungswerk on the proviso that its conditions for unification ―dem Bekenntnis entsprechen 
und uns nicht in den Verdacht der Unionisierung bringen‖.516 Almost echoing Meiser‘s fears 
that Wurm‘s plans for the new German Protestant Church risked having a ‗diluting‘ effect on 
specifically Lutheran practices and principles, Marahrens thus turned to his original strong 
confessional beliefs to avoid giving full commitment to Wurm‘s efforts. This tendency to seek 
sanctuary in confessional Lutheranism to prevent assimilation into the ‗United‘ Protestant 
confession had long been typical of clergymen from the ELLKH who, in their efforts to 
preserve the confessional character of their Landeskirche against the comparatively ‗diluted‘ 
Protestantism of their ‗United‘ surroundings in northern Germany, had come to be viewed as 
some of the staunchest Lutherans in the German territories.
517
 
Marahrens‘ particular entanglement on the national level of Church administration, 
however, also raises the question of the extent to which his initial reluctance to commit to 
Wurm‘s kirchliches Einigungswerk was a result of the High Lutheranism characteristic of his 
ELLKH, or rather a means to avoid conflict, once again, with his Deutsche Christen 
counterparts in the DEKK, who almost to a man viewed Wurm by now as a clear-cut member 
of the ‗Dahlemitic‘ branch of the Bekennende Kirche. Since the GVR, for which Marahrens 
was spokesman, made ―no significant contribution‖ to the task of uniting and re-organising 
the DEK itself during this period,
518
 it is plausible that Marahrens considered not being seen 
on the regional level of his ELLKH to be openly welcoming of Wurm‘s measures to be the 
best way of preserving the seeming neutrality of the GVR towards the Church unification 
efforts. Gertraud Grünzinger has indeed already pointed to Marahrens‘ participation in the 
GVR to explain his suspicion over Wurm‘s unification methods during this period. According 
to Grünzinger, ―Marahrens stand dem Einigungswerk Wurms, der alle bekenntnisgebundenen 
Kräfte zusammenführen wollte, zunächst wohl skeptisch gegenüber, da er mit dem 
Geistlichen Vertrauensrat eine reichseinheitliche Lösung bevorzugte‖.519 Since Marahrens was 
therefore already engaged in the fruitless task of trying ―to square a circle‖ as part of his 
prominent role on the administration of the DEK,
520
 namely by having to appease the NSDAP, 
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the GDC, the ‗Dahlemites‘ and the Church moderates, any overly enthusiastic assertion of 
support for Wurm‘s kirchliches Einigungswerk, either in his guise as GVR spokesman or on 
behalf of the ELLKH, undoubtedly risked losing him the support of all those outside the 
Bekennende Kirche. 
In spite of these structural constraints, however, it cannot be assumed that Marahrens was 
himself ambivalent to Wurm‘s kirchliches Einigungswerk in this period. In a sermon given in 
late 1943, Marahrens cited the well-known biblical instruction, ―Ich bin der Herr dein Gott, du 
sollst keine anderen Götter neben mir haben‖ (Exodus 20, 2-6).521 By expressing the 
sentiment that the Church ought to respect the Word of God only and not adhere to the 
instructions of any temporal idols, Marahrens‘ speeches during this phase of the Third Reich 
manifestly began to take on the same tone and transmit the same warnings as those of Wurm. 
In recognition of his inability to express personal sentiment on the issue for fear of 
jeopardizing his many conflicting Church positions, however, it can be appreciated that 
Marahrens was only able to offer support for Wurm‘s kirchliches Einigungswerk by safely 
framing it within widely-acknowledged biblical lessons. Moreover, since Marahrens had 
always strived to work as chief conciliator of the DEK throughout the Protestant struggle to 
date, the type of unification that Wurm was by now attempting to bring to the Church was of 
the sort that Marahrens himself had once hoped to achieve, yet had ultimately been unable to 
provide as a result of his complex web of obligations to all sides of the Protestant conflict. 
Marahrens‘ inability to comment in depth or, indeed, to contribute personally to the 
kirchliches Einigungswerk process did not mean, however, that his operations on the level of 
national DEK administration did not aid Wurm‘s own unification efforts during this period. 
Although Marahrens was eventually criticised for spending the war years providing 
―Äußerungen zu konkreten militärischen Aktionen der Wehrmacht‖ as part of his role on the 
GVR,
522
 to a certain degree his ongoing appeasement of the NSDAP and his ability to 
demonstrate to Germany‘s Nazi government that it had the fundamental support of the DEK 
during the war years left the way clear for Wurm to conduct his kirchliches Einigungswerk 
without attracting the attention of Nazi agents. Even though Hanns Kerrl passed away in 
December 1941, Marahrens still remained at the centre of the conflict between the Protestant 
Church and the Nazi State. The predicament of the Bekennende Kirche had even worsened 
considerably once the NSDAP replaced Kerrl with Hermann Muhs, who began to place 
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tighter financial restrictions on the Church and confiscated Church property to fund the 
German war effort.
523
 Whilst the NSDAP was continuing its efforts to hamper the operations 
of the radical wing of the Bekennende Kirche, then, and even preventing the work of the 
lutherischer Flügel through increased Gestapo surveillance,
524
 Wurm was nonetheless left in 
peace to implement his kirchliches Einigungswerk ‗backstage‘ in the DEK. These unification 
efforts were obviously helped by the fact that Marahrens was ultimately head of the KFA so, 
with attention being paid to Marahrens‘ actions in this phase of the Third Reich, Wurm was 
relatively free to negotiate ‗behind the scenes‘ with the rest of the KFK and more radical 
members of the Church resistance movement generally. In this particular context, it can 
therefore be claimed that, although Marahrens‘ actions in the GVR essentially consisted of the 
very heresy which Wurm‘s unification efforts were trying to dispel, his continuous 
pacification of the Nazis through congratulatory messages, telegrams of support, and prayers 
for victory implicitly enhanced Wurm‘s freedom of intra-Church arbitration. 
Since Marahrens ultimately had his own early efforts at achieving Church conciliation 
thwarted by his obligations to agencies of both political and ecclesiastical Nazism, then, his 
decision to support the unification efforts of both Meiser and Wurm during the war years was 
the best means by which he could influence the kirchliches Einigungswerk without 
endangering either the confessional status of his Landeskirche or his personal standing on any 
one of his executive committees. Although Marahrens eventually put his name to Wurm‘s 
―Aufruf‖ for the kirchliches Einigungswerk,525 his actions show that he was only comfortable 
in doing so after having visibly shown himself to ‗water down‘ Wurm‘s dreizehn Sätze along 
with Meiser. In this respect, therefore, Marahrens was still able to honour his underlying 
desire for Church unification and live up to the expectations of the KFK without either 
jeopardising the High Lutheranism of his ELLKH or overly enraging the Nazi factions for 
which he was obligated to work during this period.  
 
Chapter Summary 
Drawing the individual strands of this chapter together, which deal with secular developments 
as well as purely intra-Church processes, it becomes evident that the responses of 
Landesbischöfe Marahrens, Meiser and Wurm to each policy area corresponded entirely with 
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the respective socio-cultural positions in which they found themselves in the final years of the 
Third Reich. With Marahrens and Meiser ultimately having had their ability both to oppose 
Nazi measures and to contribute to all-encompassing Church conciliation efforts restricted by 
their concurrent commitments to particular factions of the DEK, it was only Landesbischof 
Wurm of Württemberg who remained in an advantageous position both to criticise Nazi 
agents without overt risk to the Church and to enact a process of structural reform within the 
DEK remote from Nazi suspicions. 
  Although Wurm‘s actions obviously dominated developments in this third and final 
stage of the Protestant struggle against Nazism, his comparative successes should not be 
allowed to overshadow the contribution to the resolution of the conflict of Marahrens and 
Meiser during the Second World War. To take Marahrens‘ predicament first, then, this chapter 
has drawn attention to the restrictions imposed on him as a result of his reluctant entrapment 
in the GVR which, in light of its associations with both the GDC and the RMfKA, not only 
obligated him to respond positively to Nazi policies but also precluded any possible criticism 
of Nazi methods in view of its emphasis on spiritual affairs only. Further to this, Marahrens‘ 
operations on behalf of the GDC-led Reichskirche also limited the extent to which he was 
realistically able to support and contribute to Wurm‘s project to establish an alternative 
Church government. Despite having originally started out at the forefront of the intra-Church 
unification process at the beginning of the Protestant struggle, Marahrens was by now forced 
to remain silent on the matter to avoid angering his pro-Nazi colleagues in the GVR. Although 
his continuous efforts to appease the NSDAP and his GDC counterparts have often led to 
Marahrens‘ denunciation in retrospective literature, it is important to recognise firstly that he 
was not able to act otherwise in this phase of the Third Reich, and secondly that his 
declarations of support for the NSDAP and its war effort were not without implicit benefit. By 
continually praising secular developments as part of his role on the GVR, Marahrens 
ultimately protected his subsidiary committee of the KFK from overt suspicion, and thereby 
provided Wurm with a comparatively free space in which to pursue dialogue over his own 
kirchliches Einigungswerk. 
As the luminary of the ‗intact‘ dynamic during the previous stage of the Protestant 
Kirchenkampf, by contrast, Meiser continued to promote the same strict confessional 
Lutheranism throughout the Second World War, which had earlier provided the three 
Landesbischöfe with a means to avoid incorporation into the outright conflict between the 
‗Dahlemites‘ and the NSDAP. Since the dictates of the specifically Lutheran confession meant 
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that Meiser was virtually exempted from commenting on secular developments, however, 
Meiser found himself during the war years neither able to offer clear comments on the Nazi 
war effort nor, more significantly, able to criticise the NSDAP when its policies concerning 
the mass murder of the Jews and other persecuted minories began. Adding to this Meiser‘s 
personal reluctance to take position on the so-called ‗Jewish question‘, which dated back to 
his earlier harassment at the hands of the NSDAP in 1934, it is somewhat understandable that 
Meiser failed to find both the inclination and the courage to alter his ecclesiastical habits 
which had, until now, served to protect not only himself from Nazi reprisals but also the 
‗intact‘ Protestantism represented by his Landeskirche. Unfortunately for Meiser, however, the 
honourable intentions behind his efforts in this period do not disguise the fact that he failed to 
use his authority in the Church to protest against the extreme violations of human rights 
taking place throughout the Third Reich at the time. 
Meiser‘s silence towards Nazi racial policies does not mean that he was completely 
insignificant to the Church relief effort though. Although he may not have made as much use 
of his presumed ecclesiastical freedom in this phase of the Third Reich to help the Jews as 
many hoped
526
 and, as a result, has become ―eine persona non grata‖ in Kirchenkampf 
historiographies in general,
527
 Meiser‘s ‗underground‘ efforts to finance the Büro Grüber must 
nonetheless be acknowledged as having saved a considerable number of lives from the Nazi 
killing machine during this period. Similarly, his reluctant support of Wurm‘s particular brand 
of kirchliches Einigungswerk ought not to be viewed as evidence of Meiser‘s general hostility 
to the plans. After all, Meiser‘s continuous efforts to effect change on a specifically Lutheran 
basis may well have put him in opposition to Wurm‘s methods, but not necessarily to his 
general objectives. It is in this respect, then, that Meiser almost became a victim of his own 
staunch confessional values. Unable to compromise any aspect of the original Lutheran 
confession of both his Landeskirche and his national lutherischer Flügel, Meiser had no 
choice but to resist not only the heresy of the GDC but also the universalism of more 
moderate and radical ‗Confessing‘ clergymen, whose support was ultimately necessary for the 
realisation of intra-Church unity. 
As a result of Marahrens and Meiser‘s increasingly restricted efforts in the Protestant 
struggle against Nazism, then, Wurm found himself projected ―von Jahr zu Jahr mehr in den 
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 Cf. The accusations raised against Meiser in the Meiserstraße conflict, in H. C. Meiser, 2008, pp.48-66; or the 
newspaper articles of Käpper, 2007 and Bormann, 2009. 
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 H. C. Meiser, 2008, p.5. 
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Mittelpunkt des Kampfes zwischen Staat und Kirche‖.528 In short, the inability of both 
Marahrens and Meiser to act in the best interests of every Church faction and every Protestant 
denomination in this period only served to highlight Wurm‘s own preparedness to lead the 
German Protestant Church through the final years of the Third Reich and beyond. Moreover, 
circumstance had initially helped to bolster Wurm‘s own credentials in line with those of the 
more radical ‗Dahlemites‘. Firstly, Wurm already represented a Landeskirche with a strong 
pietistic tradition, which arguably rendered it easier for him to move away from the 
constraints of High Lutheranism and appeal to wider Christian values. Secondly, the fact that 
the Nazi euthanasia programme in particular took place predominantly within his own 
Landeskirche meant that Wurm was instantly put in a strategically more advantageous 
position to either Marahrens or Meiser in this period, since it was easier for him to collate 
information on the issue and to take his well-researched concerns to government officials. 
Although his subsequent protests over Nazi policies of racial and eugenic discrimination in 
this phase of the Third Reich arguably came too late for many, as a leader of an ‗intact‘ 
Landeskirche, Wurm nonetheless had to exercise a degree of caution in his protestations to 
ensure the least risk possible to the undistorted Protestantism he represented. For this reason, 
he was not overly reckless in his confrontation of the NSDAP, as can be demonstrated by the 
fact that he ensured that Meiser remained free of association with the KFK‘s letter of protest 
to Hitler in 1943. This manoeuvre guaranteed that at least one aspect of ‗intact‘ Protestantism 
did not risk reprisals in the event of Nazi aggression against the Church. Despite the tardiness 
of Wurm‘s complaints, then, it cannot be denied that they were strongly motivated by a 
genuine concern for humanity in this period and the propagation of God‘s unconditional love 
to all His people on earth. 
All in all, the events of the ‗Wurm Years‘ not only demonstrate the rise to prominence of 
Landesbischof Wurm of Württemberg both within the ‗intact‘ dynamic and within German 
Protestantism at large, but also, most significantly, reveal the unspoken interdependency 
between the three Landesbischöfe of the ‗intact‘ churches, who can be seen to have been 
largely reliant upon each other‘s actions to effect small yet significant changes in the society 
of Nazi Germany, as well as to ensure the survival of their particular ‗intact‘ dynamic to the 
end of the Third Reich and beyond. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In the introduction to this dissertation I claimed that, by studying the lives of Landesbischöfe 
Marahrens, Meiser and Wurm during the Third Reich, it would be possible to provide fresh 
insight into the particular dynamic in which these bishops and the ‗intact‘ churches they 
represented participated. My purpose was twofold: to demonstrate how each of the 
Landesbischöfe in turn came to the fore of their particular ‗intact‘ dynamic to lead the group 
through the Protestant Kirchenkampf as a modest yet effective force of opposition to Nazi 
hegemony, and to reveal the unspoken structural reliance of the Landesbischöfe upon each 
other throughout the Third Reich. The ultimate aim behind this dissertation, therefore, was to 
show how the ‗intact‘ dynamic that was shared by all three Landesbischöfe was a more 
successful vehicle of Resistenz against Nazism than it was possible for the bishops to display 
had they conducted the struggle alone. 
My investigation took as its starting point the wealth of existing literature on the 
Protestant Kirchenkampf, which it showed either to downplay the efforts of the three 
Landesbischöfe in comparison to the more spectacular modes of opposition of the 
‗Dahlemites‘, or to glorify the contribution of any one of the regional bishops to the struggle 
against Nazism. In its attempt to do justice to the bishops‘ situation as leaders of the only 
three ‗intact‘ Protestant Landeskirchen, therefore, this dissertation based its narrative upon a 
consistent acknowledgement of the fact that Landesbischöfe Marahrens, Meiser and Wurm 
had no choice but to pitch their particular form of Resistenz against Nazism somewhere 
between the extremes of defiance and compliance in order to preserve the ‗intact‘ 
Protestantism that they collectively defended. In employing this specifically ‗social history‘ 
approach, however, this dissertation acknowledged the potential pitfalls of this methodology, 
in so far as it can appear to downplay the brutality and moral repugnance of Nazi actions. In 
order to ensure as far as possible that this investigation did not ignore the totalitarian 
dimension of the wider history of the Third Reich, therefore, the beginning of each chapter 
outlined the development of crucial Nazi policies in each historical period so as to 
contextualise fully the bishops‘ lives in a broader framework of the violence and 
discrimination that eventually led to war and genocide in Europe. 
The ‗Introduction‘ to this dissertation outlined the historical and methodological context 
in which a discussion of the bishops‘ precarious predicaments ought to be placed, and the 
three central chapters of this dissertation analysed the bishops‘ individual functions within 
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three distinct stages of the Protestant struggle against Nazism. The first chapter was designed 
to demonstrate how the initial leadership of the ‗intact‘ dynamic fell to Landesbischof August 
Marahrens of Hanover, and examined the peak of Marahrens‘ national Church leadership 
from his involvement in the Kapler Ausschuss of 1933 through to the establishment of the 
RKA in 1935. With Marahrens‘ increasing obligations as ―dienstältester Bischof‖ to work for 
the conflicting interests of both the national Protestant Church and the NSDAP in mind, the 
second chapter then considered the comparative freedom of Landesbischof Hans Meiser of 
Bavaria to protect the ‗intact‘ dynamic with his fostering of the lutherischer Flügel between 
1935 and 1939. Finally, having established that both Marahrens and Meiser soon became 
restricted in their manoeuvres by their respective positions of Church leadership, the third 
chapter examined the rise of Landesbischof Theophil Wurm of Württemberg during the years 
of the Second World War, not only to assume the headship of the ‗intact‘ dynamic that he 
shared with Marahrens and Meiser, but also to come to the forefront of the Protestant Church 
conciliation process per se. 
By examining the leadership styles of the three Landesbischöfe together in this way, it 
becomes possible to see how each of the bishops in turn steered the dynamic of their peculiar 
‗intact‘ group through the Third Reich on a moderate course between the extremes of defiance 
and compliance. The structure and approach of this investigation not only draws attention to 
the gradual shifts in prominence of each of the Landesbischöfe within their unique ‗intact‘ 
grouping, but also demonstrates how this ‗intact‘ dynamic shared by all three men depended 
on each of the bishops‘ unique leadership styles to allow it to overcome three very distinct 
stages in the Protestant struggle, and ultimately to maintain the status of institutional 
Protestantism throughout the Third Reich and beyond. A summary of the development of the 
racial and expansionist ambitions of Germany‘s Nazi government at the beginning of each 
chapter in this dissertation ensures, however, that the bishops‘ relative successes in 
maintaining the autonomy of German Protestantism in the Third Reich are kept in perspective 
by reference to the escalating brutality of the NSDAP, about which the bishops often 
controversially failed to protest or which, at times, they even endorsed. 
If we consider the conduct of Marahrens throughout the entire course of the Protestant 
Kirchenkampf first, it becomes strikingly evident that, despite having started out in the most 
favourable position of all three Landesbischöfe, his initial successes only ended up working 
against him in the central and final stages of the conflict. Following his parallel commitment 
to the intra-Church VKL and the State-based RMfKA in 1935, Marahrens was rendered 
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incapable of making any significant contribution to the direction of the ‗intact‘ dynamic due 
to his parallel structural commitment to both Christocentric and Nazi agencies. Having started 
the Protestant Kirchenkampf as a key member of the Kapler Auschuss, however, Marahrens 
nonetheless revealed his desire to unify German Protestantism in accordance with the 
principle of the sola Scriptura. It was only natural, therefore, that Marahrens initially 
expressed objection to the heresy of a Reichskirche based on secular principles, together with 
hostility to Reichsbischof Müller, through his membership of the first VKL. His headship of 
the organisation was also a logical consequence of his past experience of both constitutional 
affairs and of Müller‘s character during his time on the Kapler Auschuss. 
 Despite ending the first stage of the Protestant Kirchenkampf at the helm of intra-Church 
opposition to the GDC-led Reichskirche, Marahrens found himself unable to display the same 
antagonism towards the interference of the NSDAP in Church affairs during the phase of 
staatliche Kirchenpolitik. Owing to his parallel commitment to appeasing his predominantly 
Nazi parishioners in the ELLKH, to fulfil his Lutheran obligation to respect Germany‘s 
secular leadership, and also to take any measures necessary to keep the hope of an alternative 
Church governing structure alive, Marahrens did not oppose Nazism in its entirety when 
agreeing to co-operate with Hanns Kerrl and his RKA. Having consequently renounced his 
presidency over the first VKL, however, Marahrens was not able to sit back and allow the 
GDC to dominate the spiritual affairs of the Church, since his innate dislike of its heresy and 
longstanding desire to bring about Church unification purely on ecclesiastical grounds 
prohibited him from actively campaigning for a continuation of the Reichskirche. Instead, 
finding himself torn between the secular interests of the NSDAP and the spiritual core of the 
Church, Marahrens found protection in numbers within the lutherischer Flügel developed by 
his counterpart Meiser, which conveniently enabled him to ground his contradictory displays 
of support for both the Church and the State upon existing and shared theological principles. 
Moreover, Marahrens‘ inability to show unequivocal support for the initiatives of either 
the Church or the NSDAP was further highlighted when the Nazis singled him out to serve on 
their GVR in the final stage of the Protestant Kirchenkampf. This time, being the only one of 
the three Landesbischöfe forced to respond to State demands, Marahrens was compelled to 
step back from intra-Church developments in the KFK and concentrate purely on providing 
spiritual support to the Nazi war effort. This conflict of interests was inevitably enhanced by 
the death of his son in the early years of the war, which provoked a tension between his 
patriotic fervour in this period and his opposition to a Nazi monopoly of spiritual support for 
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German troops. Although Marahrens‘ actions during this period saw him ironically promote 
the very ‗Nazified‘ Christianity to which he had once taken personal exception, it must be 
appreciated that this was motivated by a desire to prevent potential reprisals to German 
Protestantism at large. Although his close affiliation to Nazi agents meant that Marahrens 
neglected his wider Christian obligation to condemn the NSDAP for its brutal methods of 
persecution and mass murder during this period, which calls into question the worthiness of 
his intentions, it ought at least to be recognised that his continual messages of praise for Nazi 
military victories in this phase of the Third Reich actually helped to clear the way for the 
kirchliches Einigungswerk and the direct protests of his counterpart, Theophil Wurm. From 
examining the position of Marahrens in the Third Reich alone, then, it is already possible to 
see, not only how the actions of Meiser helped to ease Marahrens‘ worsening predicament 
between 1935 and 1939, but also how the structural double-bind that Marahrens found 
himself in during the Second World War implicitly facilitated the work of Wurm. 
The interdependency of the three Landesbischöfe becomes even clearer, however, when 
the respective highs and lows of Meiser‘s Kirchenkampf career are placed alongside the life 
story of Marahrens in the Third Reich. It is only in this context that it becomes evident that, 
instead of having to come to terms with declining influence over the ‗intact‘ dynamic like 
Marahrens, Meiser was at first forced to project himself into a dominant role within the 
grouping before ceding his position of influence to Wurm in the final stage of the conflict. 
After actively welcoming the GDC into the administration of the DEK in a tactical endeavour 
to assert the authority of his own Landeskirche against its strongly Catholic surroundings, 
Meiser‘s initial tendency to compromise the Christian confessions for strategic societal gain 
almost instantaneously undermined his own potential to act in the best interests of the national 
Church in the first stage of the Protestant Kirchenkampf. Having had time to prove, however, 
that he had dramatically changed his assessment of the GDC, and that he fundamentally 
objected to its manipulation of the original Christian confessions, Meiser was able to help his 
own cause, and consequently that of the entire ‗intact‘ dynamic, by fostering the lutherischer 
Flügel, which both testified to his overriding commitment to Church doctrine and protected a 
particular sector of the Protestant Church from embroilment in the rapidly intensifying 
struggles between the ‗Dahlemites‘ and the NSDAP between 1935 and 1939. 
The potential of Meiser‘s lutherischer Flügel to facilitate the work of the ‗intact‘ dynamic 
soon diminished, however, with the onset of the Second World War. When the imperative for 
the Church to comment on the rapidly escalating brutality of the Nazi State was at its 
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strongest, Meiser, in his strict adherence to the teachings of confessional Lutheranism, was 
ultimately reluctant to protest to the NSDAP, so as to continue to protect his lutherischer 
Flügel from increasing Nazi aggression. Once Nazi violence clearly began to head towards 
war and genocide in Europe, however, Meiser‘s failure to take up fully his wider Christian 
obligation to thwart Nazi atrocities obviously calls into question his unswerving adherence to 
Lutheran precepts. Although Meiser assisted ‗underground‘ Jewish relief efforts within his 
own Landeskirche, his reluctance to confront Nazi violence directly undermined his ability to 
turn the ‗intact‘ dynamic into an effective force of opposition to Nazism for the third and final 
stage of the Protestant struggle. Although the continued presence of his lutherischer Flügel 
undoubtedly ensured that the more radical ‗Dahlemites‘ did not monopolise Wurm‘s 
kirchliches Einigungswerk during this period, and that Marahrens had a safe channel through 
which he was able to influence the Church conciliation process without endangering his 
position on the GVR, Meiser was nonetheless forced to take a less prominent role behind his 
southern German counterpart Wurm who, in his customary Württembergian pietism, was 
relatively at liberty both to comment on secular developments in this phase of the Third Reich 
and to nurture an all-encompassing brand of kirchliches Einigungswerk amenable to the three 
main Protestant confessions. 
To complete the picture of the bishops‘ interdependency, it is important to realise that 
without the leadership efforts of Marahrens and Meiser during the first two stages of the 
Protestant Kirchenkampf, Wurm‘s consistently more confrontational approach to Nazism 
would have lacked a stable platform. Since Wurm had never successfully hidden his 
abhorrence of Nazi heresy from 1934 onwards, the consecutive leadership of the ‗intact‘ 
dynamic of Marahrens and Meiser until 1939 served to shield Wurm‘s directness which, in 
the earlier stages of the Third Reich, was certainly at risk of jeopardising the reputation of the 
‗intact‘ dynamic along the lines of the escalating persecution facing the ‗Dahlemitic‘ strand of 
the Bekennende Kirche. Although Wurm initially voted for Ludwig Müller as Reichsbischof 
in the intra-Church elections of May 1933, this was purely a rash, politically-motivated move 
to quell the influence of political Catholicism in his region and to raise the profile of his 
Protestant Landeskirche. Wurm‘s politico-ecclesiastical activities after this initial blunder 
nonetheless show that he steadfastly objected to the unorthodoxy of the GDC in ensuing 
years, yet he remained in a subordinate position first to Marahrens and then to Meiser in terms 
of his ability to influence national Church proceedings. It was not until the efforts of both of 
these bishops were thwarted by their commitment to the leadership of their respective national 
and Lutheran Churches that Wurm was able to make his voice heard, not only in terms of 
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expressing his own concerns about Nazi policies but also by coming to the forefront of the 
unique framework afforded to the three Landesbischöfe through the Intaktheit of their 
respective churches. Arguably the most knowledgeable about Nazi atrocities due to the 
location of the first Euthanasie-Tötungsanstaltung within the territory of his own 
Landeskirche, Wurm not only possessed the most freedom of the three Landesbischöfe in the 
latter stages of the Third Reich but also the most evidence to enable him to protest effectively 
against State measures. Moreover, the respect that was increasingly afforded to him as a result 
of the direct nature of his complaints to Nazi authorities in this phase of the Third Reich 
ultimately placed Wurm in the most favourable intra-Church position of all, which allowed 
him both to develop and execute a design for what was eventually to become the post-war 
German Protestant Church. 
Tracing the continual shifts in position of Marahrens, Meiser and Wurm between the 
limits of defiance and compliance in the Protestant Kirchenkampf has therefore demonstrated 
that the bishops‘ contribution to the struggle was neither static nor a pure reflection of their 
personal preferences. Having taken the bishops‘ common interest in maintaining the Intaktheit 
of their respective Landeskirchen as the rationale for looking at the three Landesbischöfe 
together in one study, this investigation has shown their continually shifting positions within 
their ‗intact‘ dynamic to be less a reflection of personal will and more a mixture of tactical 
and inescapable responses to ever-changing societal and ecclesiastical circumstances. In this 
respect, this investigation has revealed that, although all three bishops were obligated by the 
nature of their professions to refrain from membership of any political party, the specific ways 
in which the bishops behaved within the Church was constantly shaped by the activities of the 
Nazi regime at particular times.  
Instead of purely condemning Marahrens for his pro-Nazi actions during the latter stage 
of the Protestant Kirchenkampf, criticising Meiser for his evasion of confrontation through the 
lutherischer Flügel or, indeed, attributing the credit for the rehabilitation of the German 
Protestant Church entirely to Wurm as a result of his ability to come to the forefront of the 
‗intact‘ dynamic during the wartime years, this dissertation acknowledges the valuable 
contribution of all three Landesbischöfe to the relative resilience and effectiveness of the 
‗intact‘ dynamic as a force for Christocentric Protestantism in the Third Reich. In response to 
existing studies, which categorise the reactions of Marahrens, Meiser and Wurm to Nazism 
according to clear-cut definitions of resistance and opposition, this investigation has not only 
proved that it was possible to contribute effectively to the Protestant Kirchenkampf in ways 
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that lie between defiance and compliance as conventionally understood, but has also exposed 
the necessary presence of the two concepts. Not only has this investigation exposed the 
necessity of compliance behind the bishops‘ most prominent displays of defiance to Nazism 
but, in an important change of perspective, has also uncovered the intrinsic defiance behind 
those actions which would otherwise be deemed direct displays of compliance. 
In short, this investigation into the lives of Landesbischöfe Marahrens, Meiser and Wurm 
in the Third Reich, with its consistent attempt to explain their actions in this period with 
reference to variable socio-cultural factors, has shown the bishops to be not only literally 
positioned somewhere between defiance and compliance, but also ideologically situated 
between a theological imperative to display defiance on the one hand, and a tactical and often 
obligatory secular need to demonstrate compliance on the other. In its focus on a mixture of 
intra-Church developments, the imposition of State policy on the Church and also purely 
secular processes, this inquiry has revealed how the bishops‘ initial common willingness to 
resist the GDC eventually translated into three very different historical legacies as a result of 
the bishops‘ individual obligations to their professions, their Landeskirchen, their particular 
Lutheran confession, the wider German Church and the Nazi State, as well as to universal 
Christendom. Although the generally accepted individual post-war legacies of Marahrens, 
Meiser and Wurm resulted from the end-positions in which the bishops found themselves in 
1945, this investigation has hopefully demonstrated that all three bishops should be given 
credit for having worked to preserve the essence of institutional Protestantism within the 
Third Reich principally as a result of their respective roles and inherent interdependency 
within their unique ‗intact‘ dynamic. 
In spite of the valuable contribution that the three bishops made specifically to the 
survival of German Protestantism in Nazi Germany through their collective strand of 
Resistenz, however, it must nonetheless be acknowledged that their ecclesiastical successes 
will remain forever eclipsed by both their failure to prevent and comparative contribution to 
the Nazi ‗end goals‘ of war and genocide in Europe. As such, this dissertation must be 
recognised as having presented a micro-history of the Landesbischöfe of the ‗intact‘ churches, 
for whom Nazi anti-Semitism and violence had been woven so deeply into the fabric of their 
everyday lives in the Third Reich that direct Widerstand was ultimately impossible. 
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EPILOGUE 
 
Although the post-war lives of Landesbischöfe Marahrens, Meiser and Wurm fall outside the 
remit of this investigation, in order to give proper closure to this inquiry it is nonetheless 
helpful to note what each of the bishops went on to do and how they were received after the 
fall of the Third Reich and the consequent collapse of the DEK. 
After the victory of the Allies in Europe, the institutional basis of the German Protestant 
Church lay in as much desolation as the hundreds of destroyed church buildings throughout 
Germany. The leaders of the individual Landeskirchen found themselves not only having to 
reconstitute their regional churches, many of which had been regrouped during the Third 
Reich, but also having to agree, once again, on a new form of national Church administration. 
Further to this, they also had to contend with the question of their shared guilt for not having 
opposed Nazism more forcefully. Significantly for this investigation, the Landeskirchen of 
Hanover, Bavaria and Württemberg remained territorially ‗intact‘ and continued to operate 
with Landesbischöfe Marahrens, Meiser and Wurm at their helms. 
As a logical consequence of his kirchliches Einigungswerk at the end of the Third Reich 
and his standing as a key figure in the national Church, Landesbischof Wurm called a 
conference of the leaders of all the German Protestant Landeskirchen which took place in 
Treysa on 27
th
 August 1945. Resembling the former KFK, the Treysa conference did not 
escape the endemic factionalism of old, with the bruderrätliche ‗Confessing‘ churchmen 
seeking an equal union of the three Protestant confessions, and the lutherischer Flügel, 
headed by Landesbischof Meiser, desiring Lutheran dominance over the proposed Church. 
Having met at Treysa only two days previously, the Lutherans declared their willingness to 
work with the Reformed and United Protestants in a Church confederation only so long as a 
specifically Lutheran Church was formed within it. As a result of the conflict of interests at 
Treysa, a provisional leadership committee was established for the new national Church, 
which was most notably led by Wurm and included Meiser, but with no sign of participation 
from Landesbischof Marahrens. This was because Marahrens had been boycotted by his 
fellow churchmen after the fall of the Third Reich for having formerly cooperated with 
Hitler.
529
 Although the new provisional leadership committee founded at Treysa was intended 
to foster closer union between the individual Protestant Landeskirchen in post-war Germany, 
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 As early as 24th July 1945, Willem Visser‘t Hooft from the Provisional World Council of Churches had 
written to Bishop George Bell of England to explain how Marahrens ―must disappear‖ from the German Church 
(cf. Jasper, 1967, p.300). 
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and managed to issue the Stuttgarter Schulderklärung of October 1945 that acknowledged the 
shared wartime guilt of the churches, constitutional disagreements between the various 
Church factions only became worse. 
Due to the difference of opinion as to which direction the kirchliches Einigungswerk 
should take, Meiser set about formalising a national union of Lutheran churches (in the guise 
of the VELKD),
530
 which also received the backing of Marahrens, whilst the bruderrätliche 
clergymen drew up their pan-confessional design for the new Protestant Church. Perched 
somewhere between the two groups, as a Lutheran but with established ‗Confessing‘ 
credentials, Wurm remained a part of the Detmolder Kreis, comprising Lutheran 
Landeskirchen which opposed Meiser‘s plans for the VELKD.531 After a second conference in 
Treysa, which took place between 5
th
 and 6
th
 June 1947, the three groups eventually reached a 
compromise and drew up a constitution for the present-day EKD.
532
 Although this 
constitution was based on an acknowledgement of the VELKD within the EKD, which 
signified a triumph for Meiser‘s lutherischer Flügel,533 it was to be Wurm who was appointed 
the first Ratsvorsitzender of the EKD on the occasion of its formal establishment in Eisenach 
on 8
th
 July 1948.
534
 
In complete contrast to the respective successes of Meiser and Wurm, who eventually got 
to see the fruits of their Kirchenkampf labours in the actualisation of the VELKD and the 
EKD, Marahrens virtually slipped out of view in the context of the new EKD. As Gerhard 
Besier has shown, Marahrens instead found himself as a prime target of the ‗denazification‘ 
process conducted by the British occupation forces in Hanover.
 535
 Although this was a logical 
consequence of his pro-Nazi utterances on behalf of the GVR in the final years of the Third 
Reich, Marahrens did not help his post-war case. As well as not being a signatory of the 
Stuttgarter Schulderklärung of 1945, Marahrens never issued an apology of his own, 
particularly for the dismissal of non-Aryan Christians from his Landeskirche after 1934. 
Moreover, as the studies of Gerhard Lindemann have shown, Marahrens made no attempt to 
restore those ministers to their former positions in the ELLKH who had first lost their jobs 
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 For more information on Meiser‘s ―Lutherische Einigungsbemühungen‖ after 1945, cf. Hauschild, 2006.  
531
 The Detmolder Kreis included the churches of Württemberg, Oldenburg, Eutin and the Lutheran churches of 
the EKApU (Helmreich, 1979, p.422). 
532 For detailed information on the discussions leading up to the foundation of the EKD, cf. Smith-von Osten, 
1980. 
533
 For details on how Meiser continued to strive for a ―Kirchenbund – nicht Kirche‖ after 1949, cf. Fix, 2006. 
534 It should be noted that the VELKD also came into being in Eisenach on the same day but, significantly, 
Wurm chose not to admit to it his ELLKW (Hauschild, 2006, p.116). 
535 Cf. Besier, 1986. 
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because of Nazi racial laws.
536
 Following mounting pressure from the British occupation 
forces and, most notably, from his former ‗intact‘ colleagues Meiser and Wurm,537 then, 
Marahrens ultimately resigned from his leadership of the ELLKH on 15
th
 April 1947, and thus 
made no personal contribution to the realisation of the EKD. He was immediately replaced by 
Hanns Lilje, himself a signatory of the Stuttgarter Schulderklärung. 
Thus, whilst August Marahrens ended his life ousted from both the regional and national 
churches for which he had once been spokesman of choice, Theophil Wurm and Hans Meiser 
continued to reap the rewards of their Kirchenkampf efforts, with Wurm voluntarily entering 
retirement from both the ELLKW and the EKD at the height of his career in 1949,
538
 and 
Meiser remaining head of the ELKB and the VELKD until his own chosen retirement in 
1955.
539
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                          
536 The most prominent cases of Paul Leo, Bruno Benfrey and Rudolph Gurland are detailed in Lindemann, 
1996, pp.520-521, and Lindemann,1998.  
537
 Gerhard Besier details how Meiser and Wurm made Marahrens into the main ―Sündenbock‖ for the direction 
of German Protestantism during the Third Reich (cf. Besier, 1986, pp.111-158). 
538 For Wurm‘s own account of his life after 1949, cf. Wurm, 1953, pp.205-222. 
539 For details of Meiser‘s contribution to the VELKD and the EKD between 1949 and 1955, cf. Mensing, 2006. 
For information on Nachkriegsprotestantismus in the ELKB under Meiser, cf. Renner, 1991. 
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